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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
DRUG POLICY IN AN ERA OF NORMATIVE CHANGE: PROHIBITION AND
HARM REDUCTION IN URUGUAY, ECUADOR, AND PERU
by
Nicolas Beckmann
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
The present dissertation investigates how the advocacy and contestation of international
norms related to the production and use of psychoactive substances affected drug policy
decisions in South America since 1971. The goal is to provide a more complete account
of why most states in the region are sticking to prohibitionist policy models, despite their
evident failure and an international context that has become more favorable to the
exploration of alternative policies. At the same time, it seeks to detect some of the factors
that enabled countries to move towards a framework of harm reduction, prohibition’s
main competitor in international drug policy debates.
The theoretical part of this dissertation delineates that international norms, and
their advocacy and contestation, affect policy choices primarily by changing the domestic
and international incentives for governments to act according to the norms’ parameters.
In line with this argument, the three case studies on Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru reveal
that, rather than responding to specific drug-related problems, considerations about
power, material benefits, and international standing have driven most policy decisions.
While the motivations behind drug policy changes are strikingly similar, case-specific
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constellations of incentives, actors, events, and factors related to political cultures and
systems, help explain differences in outcomes.
Despite the multiplicity of processes leading to different choices, the three cases
illustrate several tendencies and resemblances, which contribute to a more complete
understanding of the drug policy field in South America. Most importantly, in contrast to
previous studies and popular narratives that tend to blame the U.S. for South America’s
drug policy failures, this dissertation emphasizes that key actors from South America not
only accepted drug war policies but actively promoted prohibition and militarization.
Through the emphasis of South American agency this dissertation offers a new historical
contextualization of the war on drugs, which helps to understand why prohibition remains
popular today. Given prohibition’s popularity and embeddedness in institutional cultures,
policy flexibilization were often catalyzed by events that caused large audiences to
sympathize with victims of repressive drug policies as well as specific political junctures
that allowed for effective local advocacy of alternative policy models.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 7, 2017 Peru’s National Police raided a clandestine marijuana laboratory in Lima’s
neighborhood San Miguel. However, instead of drug traffickers the laboratory was run by a group
of mothers producing cannabis oil and other medicines for their children suffering from
degenerative diseases. The incident raised public attention and initiated a national debate about
marihuana prohibition, in light of its widely-acknowledged medical properties. Within the same
year, the country’s Congress almost unanimously approved a new law allowing scientific
investigations as well as the import, production, and use of cannabis-based medicines. While the
legalization of so-called medical marijuana does not contradict the rules and regulations of the
prohibitionist International Drug Control Regime (IDCR), which allows for the use of drugs for
medical and scientific purposes, Peru’s decision represents a growing flexibilization of drug
policies in South America, which would have been unimaginable a few decades earlier.
For several decades, drug policies across South America have been shaped by the goal to
undermine and repress all activities facilitating recreational drug consumption through
prohibitions, law enforcement, and the use of force. As outlined in greater detail in the following
chapters, these policies have not only been ineffective in eliminating or reducing drug
consumption, but also gave rise to powerful criminal industries that undermine public security
and the rule of law in many states. The emergence and persistence of these policies are often
explained as impositions from the U.S. and the IDCR it helped to set up. The United States’
influential role in international drug control efforts started in the late 19th century, when its
expansion into the Pacific Rim exposed the country’s leadership to high levels of opium
consumption in Southeast Asia, which, in their view, undermined the country’s economic and
geopolitical objectives. Around the same time, the use of narcotic substances within the U.S. was
increasingly perceived as a grave social problem. As most drugs and their ingredients were
supplied by foreign traders, the U.S. government began pushing for multilateral treaties

1

regulating the “legitimate” drug trade, i.e. for medical and scientific purposes, while restricting
recreational drug use.
In the following decades, a growing group of states negotiated and adopted eight drug
control treaties, each of which invented new mechanisms to regulate the licit drug trade while
undermining activities related to the supply of narcotics for recreational purposes.1 As the number
of treaties grew, efforts for a more encompassing global regulation gained impetus, and
eventually succeeded in creating the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs within the
framework of the United Nations (UN). Coming into force in 1964, the Single Convention
cemented drug prohibition as the dominant norm in guiding drug policies across the globe. It was
supplemented by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which prohibited recreational
use and regulated the licit trade in synthetic drugs without any organic content. The 1988 UN
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which sought
to undermine specifically the illicit networks that administer the drug trade and introduced new
regulations for the licit trade in precursor chemicals, completed the drug control regime’s legal
framework.
Parallel to the establishment of a highly prohibitionist drug control regime of global
reach, in the 1980s the “war on drugs” became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin
America and was put into practice through the application of military force to combat drug
cartels, eradicate illicit crops, destroy drug laboratories, and interdict drug supplies.

1

These include the International Opium Convention of 1912; the Agreement concerning the Suppression of
the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium of 1925; the International Opium
Convention of 1925; the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs of 1931; the Agreement concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking of 1931; the
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936; the Protocol for Bringing
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Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1948; and the Protocol for Limiting and
Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International Wholesale Trade in, and use
of Opium of 1953.
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In line with these global and regional developments, in the course of the 20th century
South America became increasingly prohibitionist. In the beginning of the century, most
countries merely restricted the sale and consumption of narcotic substances like opium, cocaine
and marijuana, which were often distributed in pharmacies without many limitations. Over time,
however, more and more drug-related activities became punishable. Furthermore, penalties for
drug-related offenses increased with each new legislation. In the 1980s and 1990s, the region’s
primary producers of cocaine, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, went through of process of
securitization and militarization of their drug policies. Especially in Colombia, this led to violent
confrontations between the governments and the largest drug cartels.
While the U.S. role in the “war on drugs” is well established and widely acknowledged,
there is a series of questions that have not been addressed in detail by the existing literature. For
example, why did several governments criminalize drug possession and consumption, while
others did not? Why did some states join the “war on drugs” much later and more reluctantly than
others? And, why did certain countries relax their drug policies in the 1990s, a moment when
others became more prohibitionist? The existing literature rightly emphasizes the role of U.S.
pressure. Yet, it is not very clear how South American states absorbed and processed this
pressure.
The question of why South American states opted for different approaches in dealing
with their drug-related problems becomes even more complex for the period since the early 2000s
when prohibition and the “war on drugs” became increasingly unpopular. Libertarians like
Thomas Szass and Milton Friedman have argued for many years that drug consumption should be
a personal right, and not subject to state control. Other critiques have focused on the negative
consequences of the “war on drugs” and prohibition. The crux of their argument is that the illegal
nature of the drug trade allows criminal networks to make large profits, which are often used to
corrupt state institutions, establish control over territories (to protect their illegal business
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operations), and buy weapons. At the same time, the goal to suppress and undermine these
criminal networks has led to large outbreaks of violence, especially in Colombia in the 1990s and
more recently in Central America.
While academics and social activists have expressed these criticisms for many years, in
the 2000s prominent public intellectuals as well as former and incumbent presidents from Latin
America, with different ideological inclinations, have elevated these critiques to the political
mainstream. Moreover, several critics of prohibition started advocating a new type of drug policy,
based on harm reduction. In contrast to prohibition, which seeks to undermine recreational drug
use at all cost, harm reductionists believe that this is an impossible enterprise. Instead, they seek
to make consumption less harmful for drug users and society as a whole.
This dissertation argues that the growing contestation of prohibition and the emergence of
harm reduction as an alternative policy framework constitute substantial normative change, which
is likely to influence drug-policies within South American states. The empirical record seems to
confirm this assumption. Since 2005, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador
decriminalized the use of marijuana and other psychoactive substances; Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Peru and Uruguay passed laws that enable the production, import, and use of certain
cannabis-based medicines; Ecuador and Brazil reduced legal penalties for small-scale trafficking;
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay promoted treatment and public health policies; Chile,
Colombia, and Uruguay legalized the self-cultivation of cannabis plants; and Uruguay even went
as far as legalizing the production, sale, and recreational consumption of marijuana. Moreover,
although Bolivia upholds one of the most punitive laws regarding the trafficking and
consumption of illegal drugs, the government of Evo Morales (2006-), a former coca grower,
installed a new system of “social control” to regulate coca production.2
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Previously, in a country where the coca leaf is considered sacred and whose indigenous population has
consumed it for millennia, coca farmers were subject to violent eradication campaigns, irrespective of
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However, the application of increasingly tolerant drug policies is not a uniform trend.
While Venezuela applauded and supported its regional peers for changing the terms of the debate,
in 2005 and 2010 the government of Hugo Chávez issued two new laws, each of which widened
the scope of punishable drug-related activities and significantly increased penalties for drug
offenses. In 2015, Ecuador increased the penalties for the possession of small amounts of drugs,
making their consumption de facto illegal, even though the country had decriminalized drug use
in its 2008 constitution. In the same year, Argentina’s newly elected president, Mauricio Macri,
declared the extinction of the drug trade as one of the three main goals of his presidency, closely
resembling the rhetoric of the “war on drugs.” Furthermore, since 2011 Peru eradicated more
hectares of coca than ever before and arrested more drug users than in previous decades, despite
the fact that the possession of drugs for personal consumption is not technically illegal.
The persistence of prohibition raises the question of why most countries in South
America are struggling to leave behind unsuccessful policy models, especially in light of a more
favorable international context and potentially better alternatives. Moreover, why did some harm
reduction policies take hold in Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia, but not in Paraguay, Peru, and
Venezuela? In other words, why do countries from South America, which are exposed to the
same policy failures and processes of norm advocacy and contestation opt for different policy
choices?
In the following dissertation, I seek to tackle these questions by illustrating different ways
in which international norms on drug policies, as well as their advocacy and contestation, interact
with domestic-level processes and thereby affect the incentives of governments to enact changes
whether or not they sold their leaves to illicit groups. Under the new system, registered farmers are allowed
to cultivate an area of 1,600 square meters with coca and are bound to report to the authorities if other
farmers exceed this amount. This approach has not only provided Bolivian farmers with a legal mechanism
to produce coca for the licit domestic market, but also led to an overall reduction in coca production (The
Conversation, “How Bolivia Curbed Coca Production by Moving Away from Violent Crackdowns,”
September 29, 2016, https://theconversation.com/how-bolivia-curbed-coca-production-by-moving-awayfrom-violent-crackdowns-66251).
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in drug policies. While much of the literature on international norms highlights how they produce
sameness, this dissertation shows that norms are crucially important in the drug policy field even
though countries chose different policies. By changing what the international community, specific
governments, transnational agents, and domestic actors considers as appropriate behavior, norms
provide multiple incentives for governments to act according or against a particular norm.
Moreover, one and the same norm may be interpreted differently, even by actors within the same
regional or domestic setting. These factors help explain why being exposed to the same norms
does not necessarily lead to sameness. Norms matter primarily because there is no one singular
logic or mechanism of how they effectuate change, but multiple ones that constantly interact and
sometimes work against one another.
To advance a better and more complete understanding of how international norms affect
drug policies, this dissertation proceeds in four steps: First, it justifies why the concept and
theories about international norms are crucial to study drug policy changes in South America and
draws conceptual distinctions between different norm-types (chapter II). Second, it examines how
the diffusion of norms about drug policy initiatives (prohibition vs. harm reduction) is spreading
globally and regionally (chapters III to V). Three, based on the International Relations (IR)
literature on norms, chapter VI develops a theoretical framework of how international norms
create and alter incentives for governments to change their drug policies. While the framework is
based on strong rationalist assumptions, it incorporates considerations about governments’
identities and the unique characteristics of specific cases, which are prominent in sociological
institutionalism and post-positivism. Fourth, chapters VII to IX trace empirically how
international norms play into the decision-making process within states, and how specific cases
(Uruguay, Ecuador and Peru) received, reacted, and implemented various policy options since
1971.
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The three case studies reveal that, rather than responding to specific drug-related
problems, considerations about power, material benefits, and international standing have driven
most drug policy reforms. Although since the early 2000s policies responding to specific
problems have become more common, these are still embedded in power-based calculations.
While the motivations behind drug policy changes are strikingly similar, case-specific
constellations of incentives, actors, events and factors related to political cultures and systems,
help explain differences in outcomes. This makes it extremely hard to theorize parsimoniously or
even predict future policy changes. Nevertheless, several findings of this study contribute to a
better understanding of the drug policy field in South America and how international norms affect
political processes and outcomes. The following section details how this study and its findings
contribute to the existing literatures on Latin American drug policies and international norms. The
last section of this introduction explains the criteria for selecting Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru as
case studies, as well as the dissertation’s research strategy.
1.1 Background, Relevance, and Contribution
The present study builds on two different literatures: the primarily empirical literature on
the illegal drug trade and drug policy in Latin America; and, the more theoretical literature on
international norms within the field of IR. The drug policy literature has made important
contributions to a better understanding of the evolution of the international drug control regime
(IDCR);3 the development and changing nature of the illegal drugs trade in Latin America, and its
social, political, economic, and cultural repercussions;4 the history of the “war on drugs” and its
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William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the 20th Century. An International History (New York:
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Drogas y prohibición. Una vieja guerra, un nuevo debate, ed. Juan G. Tokatlián (Buenos Aires: Libros del
Zorzal, 2010), 27-56.
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effects on democratic governance;5 the complex relationship between the drug trade, state policy,
and violence;6 and the effects of drug policies on prison populations.7
The present dissertation contributes to this diverse literature in four important ways. First,
chapter V provides the first comparative analysis of how South American countries (except
Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana) penalized drug-related activities since 1971. Tables 6 to 9
not only summarize which countries criminalized the possession of drugs for personal
consumption but also detail the lowest and highest forms of punishment for drug trafficking, and
aggravated forms of trafficking (i.e. particularly serious offenses that justify higher penalties).
The chapter substantiates the claim that even though the region as a whole has become more

III, eds., Drug Trafficking in the Americas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Juan C.
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(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Francisco E. Thoumi, “La relación entre
corrupción y narcotráfico: Un análisis general y algunas referencias a Colombia,” Revista de Economía de
la Universidad del Rosario 2, no. 1 (Junio 1999): 11-33; and Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs,
Economy, and Society in the Andes (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003).
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prohibitionist until the 1990s, there were important differences in how each country applied
prohibition.
Second, studies addressing changes of drug laws are often incomplete or contain
significant errors. For example, articles about Ecuador cite the 1987 Law of Control and
Intervention in the Trafficking of Narcotics and Psychotropic Drugs as a new law that was more
prohibitionist than its predecessors.8 However, the 1987 law merely constituted a new
codification of previous laws, which neither altered the classification of drug-related crimes nor
their penalties. Furthermore, some texts incorrectly argue that Ecuador’s 1990 Law 108 did not
distinguish between drug traffickers and drug users.9 Similarly, the literature on Peru tends to
ignore a myriad of legal changes that occurred in the 1990s, characterizing Law 28,002 from
2003 as a reform that increased penalties for drug-related crimes even though it actually lowered
some of them.10 Given these errors, the present dissertation seeks to provide a more accurate
picture and characterization of South America’s drug laws.
Third, while most authors agree that the prohibitionist and militarized framework of the
“war on drugs” constitutes a serious policy failure, there is very little analysis of how drug
policies haven been debated and designed within specific states, especially in comparative
perspective.11 Generating new insights about changes in drug policies is vital because even
8
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However, while the case studies offer interesting insights on the evolution of drug policies across the
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though there is a large body of evidence showing that prohibitionist policies are ineffective, many
countries across the globe keep applying them. The present study will not only be relevant to
explain the continued popularity of drug prohibition, but may also interest government officials
and drug policy activists, who can learn from this dissertation how actors from other countries
brought about change; how they contested the dominant norm and policy framework of
prohibition; how they incorporated the rising international prominence of harm reduction in
national debates; and how they overcame political, social, and legal obstacles.
An important insight of this dissertation is that the timing of local advocacy is crucially
important. While the rising international prominence of harm reduction allowed drug policy
activists to make stronger cases for alternative policy models, in and of itself local advocacy has
not been sufficient to generate significant changes in public opinion policy outcomes. All three
case studies reveal that advocacy for harm reduction policies is most effective at specific political
junctures that offer short and limited opportunities for policy changes. In Uruguay and Peru,
flexibilizations of drug policies were catalyzed by events that caused large audiences to
sympathize with victims of drug prohibition, such as the arrest and imprisonment of Alicia
Castilla, a 66-year old writer who grew marijuana plants at her home (despite the fact that drug
consumption was technically legal) in Uruguay, and the above-mentioned detention of mothers
producing cannabis-based medicines for their sick children in Peru’s capital Lima. Furthermore, a
series of unrelated killings within a week shocked the citizens of Uruguay and created a political
climate that allowed government officials to make a case, and convince that country’s president,
that marijuana legalization would help alleviate the problems related to organized crime and

region, many of them do not provide strong answers on how and why particular drug policy changes
occurred (Beatriz Caiuby Labate, Clancy Cavnar, and Thiago Rodrigues, eds., Drug Policies and the
Politics of Drugs in the Americas [Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016]). Furthermore,
Cutrona studied Argentina’s resistance to the “war on drugs” in comparative perspective (Sebastián A.
Cutrona, Challenging the U.S.-Led War on Drugs: Argentina in Comparative Perspective [New York:
Routledge, 2017]).
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citizen insecurity. In Ecuador, the broad support of social movements for the leftist candidate
Rafael Correa in 2007, enabled civil society groups to take advantage of their close relation with
the government and place the decriminalization of drug use and harm reduction on the political
agenda. Hence, the capacity of activists to recognize windows of opportunity and act quickly at
specific instances is crucially important to advance political changes.
Fourth, generating new knowledge about drug policy changes is not only central to
understand the current period in which several states from South America changed their drug
policies but will also help to shed light on certain aspects of the “war on drugs” that have not
been addressed in detail. As outlined above, while the existing literature and popular narratives
rightly emphasize the threat of U.S. sanctions and economic incentives, it is unclear how the
states of South America absorbed and processed this pressure. The three case studies highlight
that the United States was particularly successful at manipulating domestic incentive structures by
offering technology, training, and financial support to police units, customs and border patrols,
the armed forces, and the judiciary, thereby creating a more favorable context to advance
prohibitionist drug laws. At the same time, the present dissertation emphasizes how multiple
actors from South America not only accepted “drug war” policies but actively promoted
prohibition and militarization, both domestically and internationally. Hence, by emphasizing
South American agency this dissertation offers a new historical contextualization of the “war on
drugs,” which helps to understand why prohibition remains popular today.
To tackle the above-stated issues, this dissertation draws on the IR literature on
international norms, which advances a series of arguments about how norms affect state polices
in various fields. As outlined below, norms are important to this research project because apart
from altering incentives for governments to change their policies and changing the preferences of
political actors, the drug policy field is strongly shaped by processes of norm advocacy and
contestation. In this literature, three theoretical and epistemological perspectives have been
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driving the debate: rationalism, sociological institutionalism, and post-positivism. Rationalist
scholars assume that the social and political behavior of actors is motivated by strategic,
utilitarian, and instrumental means-ends calculations. Within this approach, norms are important
because in their presence actors recalculate how to achieve their given interests.12 Sociological
institutionalists reject the idea that social actors always behave rationally and instrumentally. For
them, the interests and preferences of actors must be analyzed and explained as the products of
intersubjective structures and social interactions. In this perspective, governments and other
actors follow norms not because it serves their interests, but because their identity induces them
to consider adherence to prevalent norms as appropriate.13 Post-positivists are more concerned
about the complexity of the social world, in which entities are hardly ever fixed and multiple
processes are in constant interaction. They see norms as fluid, dynamic, and constantly contested,
embodying different meanings in different contexts. Given the dynamic nature of norms, and the
capacity of agents to alter their content, they encourage researchers to focus on the
communicative processes that accompany social interactions with a particular focus of how social
agents refer to norms to legitimize their actions, rather than assuming a priori how they work.14
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While most research on international norms originated from sociological institutionalist
and post-positivist perspectives, this dissertation sides most with the rationalist view. This is
because governments have two overarching objectives that are relatively fixed and compel them
to follow incentives rather than preferences. Most importantly, governments—including
presidents, ministers, parliamentarians, and state officials—want to stay in office. Hence, they
will try to design policies that are attractive to the population, their electorate or important
domestic actors. Secondly, governments want to improve relations with other states that are
central to advance their strategic goals. This objective is particularly relevant for small states with
few resources given that these states tend to be more vulnerable to outside influences.
Siding with a rationalist view does not imply that policy makers’ considerations about
what is right or wrong are unimportant. In particular, the preferences of individuals involved in
drafting drug laws help explain specific aspects of these laws such as Uruguay’s 1974 decision
not to criminalize the possession of drugs for personal consumption. Furthermore, Uruguay’s
2013 marijuana legalization depended on the support and political capital of the popular president
José Mujica, who appears to have been genuinely convinced that state-regulation was a better
alternative than prohibition. However, as the case studies show the personal preferences of
leaders are not needed to explain most policy choices. Moreover, when they do play a role, they
are only relevant only to the extent that they will not impose great political costs, or when leaders
have no prospects of staying in office. Instead, this project shows that drug policy changes are far
more likely when governments have clear incentives, which will help them to satisfy the abovestated goals.
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My main contribution to the rationalist approach is to specify the three most important
domestic and international incentives for governments to change their drug policies and illustrate
how they are related to international norms. While the framework outlined in chapter VI advances
a series of assumptions about how these incentives operate, which ones are more important to a
particular government cannot be assumed a priori but needs to be investigated on a case by case
basis.
When examining which incentives drove a government to change its drug policy in a
particular way, scholars inevitably have to confront questions about its identity as well as the
socio-economic context in which it operates. As these factors constitute important elements of
sociological institutionalism and post-positivism, the present dissertation illustrates new ways in
which the three competing perspectives can be combined. Ultimately, as highlighted above, most
theorists of international norms use the concept to explain sameness of policies despite political,
economic, and cultural differences. By specifying multiple ways in which norms can affect
political outcomes, the present dissertation highlights how norm-based theories can be used not
only to study sameness but also differences in policy choices.
1.2 Case Selection and Research Strategy
After examining the global and regional diffusion of drug policy initiatives (chapters III
to V) and laying out the theoretical framework (chapter VI), the following chapters VII to IX will
trace empirically the political process that has led to major legal changes in the penalization of
drug-related activities in Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru. While drug policies have both legal and
operational elements this dissertation prioritizes the former. Apart from laying out specific rules,
drug laws often define and represent the content of drug policies. However, especially in the case
of Peru the dissertation also pays close attention to operational features, such as the degree of
coca eradication and the use of the armed forces in drug-control efforts, which were not always
reflected in the country’s drug laws.
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This research project focuses on cases from South America, because state and non-state
actors from this region are important agents in the contestation of prohibition and the recent
advocacy of harm reduction. Furthermore, over the past 15 years South America has experienced
more drug policy changes than its neighboring regions Central America and the Caribbean. This
makes South America an interesting laboratory for the analysis of difference and diverse policy
changes. From within South America, this dissertation analyzes the cases of Uruguay, Ecuador,
and Peru because, in recent years, each of these countries has chosen a distinct approach to their
drug-related problems, offering a high degree of variance in the outcome drug policy. Each case,
therefore, contributes unique insights into how international norms interplay with local processes,
leading to different policy choices.
The case of Uruguay is important primarily because the country’s legalization and
regulation of the production, sale, and recreational consumption of marijuana constitutes the most
far-reaching drug policy reform based on harm reduction. Strikingly, an estimated 60.7 percent of
the population opposed the new law, while only 34 percent of Uruguayans supported it.15
Studying how and why Uruguay decided to legalize marijuana will reveal important insights
about the conditions that are necessary, or facilitate, drug reforms along similar lines. In other
words, it sheds light on the question of what makes marijuana legalization a feasible political
project, despite domestic opposition. Ecuador was selected because of the country’s changing
positions on drug control. After the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017) had decriminalized
drug use (2008), distinguished between different levels of responsibility within the drug trade
(2014), and lowered penalties for trafficking (2014), in 2015 the same government effectively repenalized drug use by increasing the sanctions for the possession of even small amounts of
psychoactive substances. Analyzing the case of Ecuador will generate new knowledge about why
15
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a country that has moved closer to a framework of harm reduction may decide to abandon this
approach. The case of Peru presents an anomaly because, against the regional trend, it has
become more prohibitionist in recent years. This changed in 2017, when, to the surprise of many,
the government of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski decided to legalize cannabis-based medicines.16
Nevertheless, analyzing why consecutive Peruvian governments have been reluctant to apply
harm reduction and, since 2011, arrested more drug users and eradicated more coca than ever
before, will generate key insights on the continued popularity of prohibition and the factors that
prevent normative changes at the regional level from affecting state policy.
Although the countries were selected primarily because of recent developments, each of
the case studies will cover two time frames. The first period analyzes the era of the “war on
drugs” from 1971 until the early 2000s. The second one focuses on the contemporary period from
the early 2000s onwards. There are several reasons for incorporating the “drug war” era into this
project: First, analyzing the historic trajectory of drug policies in each country is crucial to
understanding the conditions in which current policy changes are taking place. Second, it enables
this dissertation to draw cross-temporal comparisons between a period when the norm prohibition
was most dominant, and the current era, in which harm reduction has become increasingly
popular. Third, by incorporating each country’s drug policy history this research project can
address some of the questions that have been unanswered by the literature on the “war on drugs”
(see above). For example, how did local agents respond to U.S. pressures? How were drug policy
changes debated and justified? And, why did Uruguay advance a much softer form of prohibition,
despite having one of the most brutal military dictatorships in the region?
To reconstruct how and why the three cases decided to change their drug laws at a
specific juncture, this project uses techniques similar to process tracing. More precisely, the
16
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present dissertation draws causal connections between the domestic-international incentive
structure and a policy outcome by tracing the sequence of events that have preceded major policy
changes. However, different to most research employing process tracing, this dissertation does
not engage in the testing of clearly defined hypotheses, but instead examines six possible
incentives for policy changes (see chapter VI).17 While each of these incentives has the potential
to effectuate policy changes independently, the incentives often interact and reinforce each other,
leading to multi-causal explanations.
The analysis of policy changes usually involves an assessment of which domestic and
international actors advocated (or rallied against) policy changes; the strategies they used,
including their utilization of international norms; how this affected public opinion and policy
debates; how the government responded to domestic and international incentives; the interactions
between state and non-state actors in the stage of policy design; how new laws were debated in
the parliament; and how governments justified changes in their respective policies. When
determining the relative importance of specific incentives, this dissertation also considers the
motivations, desires, and beliefs of specific actors. Hence, although the goal is to establish the
strongest possible causal connections, parts of the dissertation show some resemblances to
interpretive methods.
For the historical part of the analysis, I examined data from archival and library sources,
including the content of newspaper articles; parliamentary debates; documents from ministries
and governments agencies; diplomatic cables; and written statements by actors involved in the
policy debates. To access this data, I visited historic archives and libraries in each of the countries
selected for this study. In Uruguay, I researched at the Historic Archive of Uruguay’s Ministry of
17
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Foreign Relations, the Administrative Archive of Uruguay’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, the
National Library, the Library of the Legislative Power, and the Law and Social Science Libraries
of the University of the Republic. In Ecuador, I visited the Central Archive of the Ministry of
Foreign Relations and Human Mobility, the National Library, the Library and Archive of the
National Assembly, and the Library Aurelio Espinosa Pólit. In Peru, I visited the Central Archive
of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the National Library in Lima. Furthermore, I accessed
documents from the Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy (PLUSD) and the Digital National
Security Archive (DNSA).
For the contemporary period, I collected evidence from a wide range of sources,
including newspaper articles and media reports; the communicative trails of the actors involved in
the debates on drug policy (policy briefs, position papers, statements to the public, etc.); public
opinion data; and parliamentary debates. An essential part of the analysis is based on semistructured interviews with actors involved in the debates and policy formulation (policy makers,
government officials, NGO and civil society representatives, journalists, etc.). In Uruguay I was
able to interview ten actors, in Ecuador five, and in Peru I had two informal talks with members
of Peru’s leading agency on drug control DEVIDA. These interviews helped me to fill gaps in the
causal process and reconstruct the sequence of events that has led to major policy changes; obtain
a better sense of the motivations of policy makers to advocate and vote for certain changes (or
against them); detect connections between transnational and domestic actors in the drug policy
field; better understand how local actors view international developments debates in drug policy;
and analyze in greater detail how local actors used international norms strategically to accomplish
their goals. Before getting into the analysis, the following chapter II provides a series of
conceptual distinctions between different norm types and outlines in greater detail why the
concept and theories on international norms are ideally suited to study drug policy changes in
South America.
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II. NORMS AND NARCOTICS: WHY INTERNATIONAL NORMS ARE IMPORTANT
TO STUDY DRUG POLICY CHANGES IN SOUTH AMERICA
This chapter discusses why the concept and theories of international norms are essential to study
drug policy changes in South America. From a public policy perspective, the focus on
international norms may seem odd given that it presupposes that norms are an important, if not
predominant, factor in explaining policy changes. However, as outlined in the following chapters,
since the early 20th century drug policies across the world have been influenced by norm
advocacy and contestation through transnational actors and states, which created an influential
drug control regime of global reach. In recent years, transnational NGOs such as the Global
Commission on Drug Policy, the Drug Policy Alliance, the Transnational Institute, and the
International Consortium on Drug Policy have not only commented on regional and national
developments but also interacted extensively with local actors, sharing knowledge and
experiences. In a nutshell, all drug policy debates have international and transnational
dimensions, no matter how local they appear. The concept of norms as well as theories on normdriven policy changes are well-suited to study how international developments impact policy
making at the state level, and how global, regional, and domestic processes interact and influence
one another. Before outlining in greater detail some of the characteristics that make norms so
important, the following paragraphs briefly discuss the role and ascendance of norms in the
discipline of IR, provide some clarity on how this dissertation defines international norms, and
distinguish between different types of norms.
2.1 The Role of Norms in International Relations
Since the inception of the study of international politics in the early 20th century, the
importance attached to norms varied significantly. The early stages of the discipline were driven
by high normative aspirations, expressed in the goal to prevent the mass-scale violence of World
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War I. Prominent IR thinkers like Leonard Woolf, Norman Angell, and Alfred Zimmern sought
to establish ideas that could serve as the basis for a more peaceful international order, including a
system of collective security, international institutions, democratization, and economic and
cultural exchange.18 Even E.H. Carr, who criticized these authors for their neglect of power
politics, acknowledged that effective political action ought to be based on a considerations of
ethics and power.19
The outbreak of World War II gave prominence to more pessimistic accounts of
international politics. According to Ruggie, the academic aversion to idealism resulted in a
widespread discounting of the role of ideational factors, “be they identities, norms, aspirations,
ideologies, or simply ideas about cause-effect relations.”20 “The behavioral revolution and its
enthusiasm for measurement” constituted another tendency that led to a declining interest in
norms and ideas, since such entities were difficult to measure and analyze within the dominant
methodological approach.21 The increasing application of economic methods in the 1970s and
1980s, which drew heavily on rational choice and actor assumptions, as well as strong notions of
utility maximization, reinforced this trend. Within this framework, power and interests were
derived from material factors, such as the position of a state in the international system, or the
possibility to generate welfare and security gains through cooperation. During this period, norms
were most prominent in the analysis of international regimes, defined by Krasner as “sets of
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implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”22 Norms, conceptualized as
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations, were seen as characteristic of the
nature of the regime: “Changes in principles and norms are changes in the regime itself.”23
However, there was very little analysis of how norms originate, evolve, spread, and when and
how they affect political outcomes.
Since the end of the cold war, and the subsequent broadening of the IR field, the study of
norms, and other ideational factors, has gained new prominence. Today, most scholars agree that
norms do have an impact on international and domestic political outcomes. However, there is
strong disagreement about the degree to which they matter; by what mechanisms they affect
political interactions and results; how, when, and why they emanate and evolve; and what
methods and techniques should be applied to study their impact. Similarly, there are ongoing
debates about how norms should be conceptualized. As stated by Björkdahl, “There are many
definitions of norms, which converge and overlap—stemming from different philosophical
traditions and theoretical approaches.”24 This often leads to confusion and misunderstandings in
the debates. To circumvent this problem and provide a greater degree of conceptual clarity, the
following section introduces three categories that distinguish between different types of norms:
norms of behavior, legal norms, and intersubjective norms. It is followed by another section,
which draws a further distinction between norms that guide and norms that follow, which
represent different levels in a normative hierarchy.
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2.2 Distinction 1: Norms of Behavior, Legal Norms, and Intersubjective Norms
Norms are often defined in terms of similarity or patterns of behavior.25 In other words, a
particular type of actor, or a subgroup of this actor, tends to behave in the same or similar ways in
a certain aspect of social life. An example is the design and implementation of increasingly
prohibitionist drug laws across the world since the beginning of the 20th century. This dissertation
defines these patterns as norms of behavior, or behavioral norms.
While most of the IR literature on international norms does not define them in purely
legalistic terms, it often refers to norms that are embedded or outlined in international rules and
regulations, specifying how states should behave. Such norms are a distinct category and
therefore defined as legal norms. An example are the requirements established in the three
international treaties that compose the current international drug control regime: The Single
Convention of Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and its 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances of 1971; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. As outlined in the following chapter, these treaties call
upon their member states to carry out multiple tasks to regulate the licit drug trade, while
prohibiting numerous activities related to the production, trade, and recreational consumption of
mood-altering narcotics and psychotropic substances.26
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The norms expressed in international treaties have very different characteristics in terms of their
precision and the degree of obligation they entail. Some legal norms commit other governments to a certain
objective but do not specify how to achieve it. Other norms carry precise instructions, telling states exactly
what is expected of them. Furthermore, some norms embedded in international treaties merely encourage
their members to act in a certain way, whereas others are much stricter in terms of their obligations. Some
of them even carry the risk of sanctions if states do not comply. An example of a norm that is unspecific
and entails a low level of obligation is the Single Convention’s article 2 §5 (a): “A party shall adapt any
special measures of control which in its opinion are necessary having regard to the particular dangerous
properties of a drug” (U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 2 §5 (a), opened for signature Mar.
30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 [entered into force Dec. 13, 1964]). An example of a norm from the same
convention that is precise and entails a high degree of obligation is article 19 §1 on the estimates of drug
requirements for medical and scientific purposes: “The Parties shall furnish to the Board each year for each
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Another category of norms defined in this dissertation is intersubjective norms. These are
shared assumptions about the appropriate behavior for a particular type or category of actor
(states, businesses, individuals, etc.). Building on the previous examples, in the field of drug
policy intersubjective norms can be shared assumptions about how states should design their drug
laws. As we can see from the examples, drug policy norms often simultaneously have
intersubjective, legal, and behavioral dimensions. However, intersubjective norms do not require
representations in legal documents or conformity of behavior. It is sufficient that a group of actors
or individuals has similar assumptions about how a particular actor should behave. Therefore, this
category is particularly useful to study political activism from civil society that may generate
changes in state behavior and international law.
The existence of intersubjective norms can be identified through expressions of the same
or similar standards of appropriate behavior in statements of political and social actors, the media,
scientific publications, and public opinion, among many others. In the words of Finnemore and
Sikkink, “because norms by definition embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral
assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication
among actors that we can study.”27 Florini also stresses that a norm “must take on an aura of
legitimacy before it can be considered a norm.”28 However, determining whether or not shared
assumptions are considered as legitimate presents serious challenges given that legitimacy is itself
intersubjective. What we can say with some certainty, though, is that the stronger intersubjective
of their territories, in the manner and form prescribed by the Board, estimates on forms supplied by it in
respect of the following matters: (a) Quantities of drugs to be consumed for medical and scientific
purposes; (b) Quantities of drugs to be used for the manufacture of drugs, of preparations in Schedule III,
and of substances not covered by this Convention; (c) Stocks of drugs to be held as at 31 December of the
year to which the estimates relate; and (d) Quantities of drugs necessary for addition to special stocks” (Id.
art. 19 §1).
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norms become (both in terms of the quantity as well as the popularity of actors supporting them),
the more likely they are to generate legal norms and changes of behavior. At the same time, the
existence of international legal norms and norms of behavior are likely to strengthen, legitimize,
and reinforce intersubjective norms. The relationship between the three different norm types,
however, is not always straightforward and may vary significantly in different issue areas.
2.3 Distinction 2: Norms that Guide and Norms that Follow
Many norms form part of a normative hierarchy in which the ones on top set out the
guidelines and parameters for policy choices, whereas the lower ones follow from, reinforce, and
help implement the ones on top. This dissertation defines the first category as norm that guide (or
guiding norms) and the second one as norms that follow (or following norms). The principal
norms analyzed in the framework of this dissertation, prohibition and harm reduction, are both
guiding norms. Advocates of prohibition believe that all activities related to the production,
transportation, distribution, sale, and consumption of mood-altering substances, except for
medical and scientific purposes, should be prohibited. For more than a century, prohibition has
been guiding numerous multilateral treaties, which have set the parameters for drug policies
across the globe. These treaties contain multiple norms that entail different expectations about
how states should behave in order to prohibit recreational drug use and illicit trafficking. For
example, states are expected to supervise and issue licenses to all entities involved in the licit
drug trade; submit estimates of need and statistics of drug sales and purchases to the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB); and report any suspicious activities. At the same time, they are
expected to classify as punishable offenses all other drug-related activities, including drug
possession for personal consumption; create law enforcement agencies to repress illicit traffic;
and run ‘educational’ campaigns to prevent drug use. All of these norms follow from the shared
assessment that recreational drug use should be prohibited.
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Harm reductionist believe that governments should accept drug use as an endemic feature
of human life and try to make it safer for individual users and societies. While harm reduction had
very little impact on the multilateral treaties that constitute the current drug control regime,
similar to prohibition, harm reductionists advocate a series of norms that follow, reinforce, and
help implement it. According to them, governments should provide (or allow the provision of)
clean syringes for heroin users to prevent the spread of HIV, hepatitis and other diseases
transmitted through blood; make treatment available to large groups of addicts to help them
overcome their addiction; allow drug users to test the chemical composition of their drugs to
ensure that it is safe for consumption; distribute drugs to addicts to supervise their drug use and
help them overcome their addiction; and legalize and regulate less harmful drugs to control how
these drugs are marketed and sold. These following norms have not only informed the content of
drug policies in many parts of the world, but also shaped the behavior of private and civil society
actors, which share a commitment to making to lowering the harms and risks of drug use.
While norm advocacy and contestation often occur between guiding norms, supporters of
prohibition and harm reduction also advocate and contest norms within the parameters of these
guiding norms. For example, some supporters of prohibition prefer to penalize drug consumption
with imprisonment, whereas others favor obligatory treatment. Similarly, harm reductionist
frequently debate which substances should be legal and regulated, and, even more important, how
they should be regulated. Moreover, in the areas of treatment, education, and rehabilitation there
is significant overlap between prohibition and harm reduction.
After having provided some clarity about what norms are and how they can be
differentiated, the following paragraphs illustrate some of the effects of norms that make them so
important for this dissertation. Moreover, the next two sections highlight some indicators of a
norm’s strength and explain how their strength may vary at different levels of analysis.
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2.4 Why Norms Matter
Because most norms constitute strong, intersubjective notions of appropriate behavior,
they have the capacity to shape social and political processes in three important ways. First, they
may reflect, or even change, the ideas about what constitutes appropriate behavior of decision
makers with the power to change political outcomes, such as presidents, ministers, or members of
parliaments. Second, they influence the international community’s and domestic constituencies’
views and preferences, as well as their discursive resources, about appropriate behavior. As
outlined in greater detail in chapter VI, this incentivizes governments to act according to
predominant norms, even if it goes against their own convictions. As governments want to stay in
power and maintain good international standing, at least in relation to states that are important to
advance their strategic goals, this effect is more important than the first. However, analysts
should consider and pay attention to both. Third, through their presence in international debates,
laws, and the behavior of other actors, norms can provide unpopular policy choices with aura of
legitimacy, which may be crucial to gain domestic acceptance.
The above-outlined effects of norms are more pronounced the stronger a norm becomes.
According to Björkdahl, the stronger a norm, “the more influential it will be on interests,
individual actors’ behavior and the collective practices of like-minded actors.”29 The strength of a
norm rises as more actors (both state and non-state) share its core assumption and are willing to
advocate for its realization and translation into policy. As stronger norms are more likely to
generate behavioral and legal changes, their presence in international rules as well as their
translation into policy are additional indicators of their strength. However, despite their
importance, “International norms do not determine outcomes, they only create permissive
conditions for action. In other words, norms structure realms of possibilities and define a range of
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legitimate policy options that would not have been self-evident in the absence of such norms.”30
However, their relative strength and importance may vary significantly at different levels of
analysis. Therefore, this dissertation also distinguishes between global, regional, and domesticlevel norms.31
2.5 Distinction 3: Global, Regional, and Domestic-level Norms
The present dissertation defines global norms as assumptions about appropriate behavior
that are shared and advocated by a variety of actors in different parts of the globe. When actors
from a specific region, such as South America or South-East Asia, advocate particular norms, this
dissertation refers to them as regional norms. Domestic-level norms are those assumptions that
are prominent among actors within a particular state.
Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive. In fact, norms can be
simultaneously global, regional, and domestic. However, their respective strength is likely to vary
across these different levels of analysis. Moreover, both global and regional norms may affect or
become domestic-level norms, whereas, the other way around, domestic-level norms may turn
into, or increase the strength of, regional or global norms. For example, this may be the case
when the adaptation of a norm provides effective solutions for an issue of common interest.
The fact that norms are an important factor in social life, raises the question of why
particular norms and policy proposals, such as drug prohibition and harm reduction, spread and
diffuse across the globe, inspiring, or turning into, public policies, while other do not. In the
words of Ann Florini, “Why, of the variety of norms available at any given time to govern
behavior in particular choice situations, does one rather than another become a widely accepted
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standard of behavior?”32 The following paragraphs summarize the most important arguments
about the spread of norms in global politics.
2.6 How Norms Spread
To answer the above question, scholars of policy diffusion from different fields have
focused both on the mechanisms of norm and policy diffusion, as well as the characteristics
inherent to the norm itself. Scholars focusing on the norms’ characteristics have stressed
numerous factors including the form and content of the norm (clear and specific vs. ambiguous
and complex); the degree to which they are applicable in cross-cultural contexts (for example,
norms focusing on bodily harms); and their compatibility with other prominent norms.33 A point
of strong disagreement is the norms’ specificity, meaning how well their guidelines are defined
and understood by different actors.34 While Legro and others argue that very specific norms are
more likely to be followed, Krook and True uphold that “norms diffuse precisely because—rather
than despite the fact that— they may encompass different meanings, fit in with a variety of
contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors.”35
Such divisions are equally prominent in the debates on the mechanisms through which
norms and policy proposals diffuse. While scholars disagree on the extent to which particular
mechanisms matter, they agree that the spread of particular policies cannot be understood in
isolation of international factors. The following paragraphs summarize the most important
diffusion mechanisms mentioned in the literature: coercion, persuasion, competition, emulation,
(rational) learning, and cognitive heuristics. In the former two, external actors (states,
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international governmental organizations, private enterprises, and civil society actors) actively
seek to promote policy changes in other countries, while the latter ones are more decentralized
focusing on how domestic actors, primarily governments are applying norms to obtain particular
benefits.
In a process of coercion, sometimes referred to as penetration or external pressure,
powerful actors seek to implicitly or explicitly influence policy choices of other states by altering
their opportunities and constraints. According to Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, “this mechanism
may involve the threat or use of physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and benefits,
or even the monopolization of expertise—all of which aim at influencing policy change in other
countries.”36 Dolowitz and Marsh refined the discussion on coercion by distinguishing between
direct and indirect coercion. In the former, governments directly force or pressure a weaker one to
adapt a policy, whereas the latter highlights the role of externalities such as constraints of the
world economy, technology, fears of being left behind, and the emergence of an international
consensus.37 Moreover, the authors highlight that international organizations and NGOs are
increasingly acting as agents of coercive transfers.38
Rather than the use of coercive material forces, persuasion refers to the use of arguments
and deliberation to convince governments to adapt a certain policy. Checkel argues that
persuasion is most effective when “the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment; (…)
when the pursuadee has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader’s
message; (…) when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the
36
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persuadee belongs or wants to belong; (…) when the persuader does not lecture or demand but,
instead, ‘acts on principles of serious deliberative argument;’ (…) when the persuader-persuadee
interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, private settings.”39
The mechanism of competition refers to the attractiveness of certain policies to investors
and buyers in international markets. According to this mechanism, states may opt to apply
specific policies to appear more attractive than their peers in terms of attracting foreign capital
and selling their products. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garret argue that “competitors will have strong
incentives to give up policy and social tools they favor on political and social grounds and follow
suit—for fear of large-scale losses of investments and jobs.”40
Emulation, sometimes labeled as mimicry, refers to a process of adapting structures and
policies from other societies.41 Several scholars have related emulation to a quest of obtaining
legitimacy, standing and social acceptance in the international system.42 According to this view,
governments apply norm-based policy proposals not because they expect direct benefits from
them, but because it is expected from them by their regional peers, the international community,
or any other group of states to which they want to belong. A failure to follow a norm may lead to
protest, shaming, and exclusion, resulting in a lack of social standing.
For diffusion theories based on (rational) learning, policies of others are important not
because they affect the payoffs of a policy choice, but because actors’ choices generate new data
39
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that informs beliefs about causal relationships.43 The mechanism is based on the idea that
governments have an interest in improving their policies by learning from the experiences of
others. Therefore, policies that have proven to be successful in other countries are likely to be
adopted in some form in other contexts.
Weyland’s framework of cognitive heuristics acknowledges that policy choices are goal
oriented and that external models are attractive because they offer solutions to real-world
problems. He upholds, however, that a series of cognitive-psychological shortcuts undermine
decision-makers’ capacities to process information and adequately assess others’ policy choices.
Therefore, policy choices are often inspired by desires of what external models might achieve,
rather than actual facts. This explains why large groups of states sometimes adapt strikingly
similar but sub-optimal policies.44
While several scholars are highlighting the strength of one mechanism over the others,
most research combines insights from different theories to explain specific policy choices and
their diffusion. Many of them acknowledge that the mechanisms outlined above offer different
insights, which may operate under specific circumstances, in different sequential orders, or in
distinct issue areas. For them, the question is not which of the mechanisms is the best one to
explain the emergence of behavioral norms, but under which circumstances each mechanism
matters. In this sense, the research and use of competing and complementary explanations
highlight there is no one size fits all approach on how norms spread and influence behavior. Each
norm and diffusion process have their own histories and need to be investigated on a case to case
basis, paying attention to multiple developments shaping the spread of a policy. The following
two chapters attempt to provide a brief overview of the history of drug prohibition, its
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contestation, and the rising advocacy of harm reduction as an alternative way of regulating drug
use.
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III. FROM LOCAL TO GLOBAL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROHIBITION AND
INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
The consumption of psychoactive substances for medical, recreational, and mood-altering
experiences has been a constant feature of human life in both tribal and modern societies.45
However, over time states and societies have created different norms and rules in dealing with
their production, sale, and use. For example, the consumption of mood-altering substances has
been accepted in many tribal cultures, in which shamans or religious leaders were entitled with
the authority to distribute them during special rituals or religious ceremonies.46 In other contexts,
drug distribution and consumption was almost unrestricted, for example during the 19th century in
the United States (see below).
While for most of human history norms regarding drug use were strongly embedded in
local cultures and traditions, throughout the 20th century the United States led a coalition of
countries, which elevated drug prohibition to become a powerful global norm and created a
highly prohibitionist drug control regime. The present chapter provides an overview of the
principal steps and developments towards the establishment of prohibition as the dominant norm
in guiding drug policy across the globe, as well as the creation of numerous following norms
embodied in multilateral treaties, regulating the licit drug trade and seeking to curb their illicit
traffic. The chapter begins with a display of first initiatives to reduce opium production and trade
between British India and China. It then traces how, as the result of geopolitical and, to a minor
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extent, domestic considerations, the United States emerged as a dominant actor in international
drug control initiatives.
The next part analyzes the early attempts to create a global drug control framework,
including the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission and the 1912 International Opium Convention.
In the following, it analyzes drug control efforts within the system of the League of Nations,
especially the creation of the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous
Drugs, the 1924-25 Geneva Conventions, the creation of the Permanent Central Opium Board;
and the 1931 Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.
The key part of the chapter examines drug control initiatives within the United Nations,
especially the establishment of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (and its 1972
protocol); the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which constitute the legal
framework of the international drug control regime (IDCR). Furthermore, the chapter provides a
detailed account of how the licit drug trade, i.e. the production and distribution of drugs for
medical and scientific purposes, became increasingly controlled, while activities related to
recreational drug use became more restricted, punishable, and criminalized. The subsequent
chapter IV outlines the most important critiques of the prohibitionist IDCR and highlights key
moments in which drug control and prohibition have been contested. It shows that even though
prohibition remains the most prominent guiding norm in the area of drug policy, it now has a real
competitor: harm reduction.
3.1 The Sino-Indian Opium Trade and the Beginning of International Drug Control
International drug control initiatives are inextricably linked to the intensification and
acceleration of global commerce during the 19th century. While traders had exchanged narcotic
drugs like opium and marijuana for centuries, in the early 19th century these substances moved
into the mainstream of international flows of goods and capital. Opium imports into China, which
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rose from 200 to 6,500 metric tons between 1800 and 1880, best exemplify this point.47 Traders
also began exchanging the raw materials and chemical precursors of plant-based drugs, thereby
facilitating the discovery of cocaine and heroin in European laboratories, which became popular
for their medical qualities.48
The trade of narcotics (any drug with raw-material content) and their ingredients posed
new challenges to societies around the world. Although drugs were often promoted as remedies
for widespread diseases, their mood-altering qualities gained increasing popularity. As their
consumption spread, so grew the perception of their risks and side effects, especially their
propensity to develop harmful addictions. However, the ability of governments to control and
regulate the drug trade not only depended on their own efforts but on the capacity and
cooperation of their counterparts around the world. This problem was most explicit in the
growing trade of opium between British India and China.
Introduced by Dutch traders operating from India in the early 17th century to combat the
effects of malaria, opium use spread gradually along the Chinese coast. After large-scale opium
addictions took place in Amoy (Xiamen) and Formosa (Taiwan), Chinse authorities began to see
opium smoking as a moral vice and economic threat.49 In 1729, the Chinese government issued an
Imperial edict banning the import and sale of opium for the first time.50 However, European
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merchants kept smuggling opium into Chinese territory. By the end of the 18th century, illegal
imports into China had doubled as compared to six decades earlier.51
Much of the exports were administered by the British East India Company (EIC). The
EIC acquired a trade monopoly in Bengal and Bihar, which produced most of India’s opium. To
circumvent the Chinese ban and possible legal repercussions, it sold the opium to private
merchants, which shipped the narcotic to British-owned warehouses in Canton (Guangzhou) from
where it was smuggled by Chinese merchants. The growing export of opium to China not only
provided a living for colonial administrators and merchants, but also helped to address long-term
trade imbalances. Yet, the biggest expansion of the opium trade into China began after the EIC
lost its monopoly between 1813 and 1834.52
As the result of the new competition prices for opium declined. This enabled a larger
portion of the Chinese population to purchase and consume the popular narcotic, thereby fueling
Indian production and exports. Between 1775 and 1839, opium exports to China increased from
75 metric tons to an estimated 2,500 tons. As a consequence of the growing trade, in some years
British authorities obtained up to 34 percent of their total revenues in India from opium sales.53
China reacted to the rising consumption by enacting even stricter laws (in 1814 and 1831).
However, none of the measures was successful. In the end, Chinese efforts to protect their
population, and the continued interest of the British Empire to maintain opium exports, erupted in
two military confrontations, in 1839 and 1856, known as the opium wars.54 Both wars ended with
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a humiliation of the Chinese and left them without any choice but to accept the opium trade. By
1880, opium imports rose up to 6,500 tons.55
To reduce the growing trade deficit, in 1880 Chinese authorities decided to gradually
legalize the domestic production of opium, which halved imports between 1880 and 1908, while
domestic production and consumption skyrocketed.56 According to official Chinese estimates, in
1906 opium addiction affected 23.3 percent of the male population and 3.5 percent of the female
citizens, stretching through all levels of Chinese society. Opium consumption was also popular in
Chinese communities abroad, which made its use more visible across the globe.57
At the beginning of the 20th century, British policymakers began to reconsider their
position. As Western powers employed increasingly aggressive strategies to open China to
foreign trade and investment, Chinese rebellions were countered with oppression. The ongoing
fights led to a loss of control of the central government. The British Empire’s leadership,
however, recognized that their interests were best served by maintaining the country’s territorial
integrity and the opium habit was considered to have weakened the country’s position. Through
the electoral victory of the Liberal party, the British anti-opium movement gained political
strength. In 1907, the British government agreed to reduce Indian opium exports by 10 percent
annually, provided that China would cut its domestic production at the same rate. Three years
after the agreement’s implementation, Britain would designate an inspector with the authority to
supervise Chinese progress. On the basis of the inspector’s judgments, both parties would
continue their anti-opium campaigns for another 7 years.58 China’s initial efforts to reduce opium
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production were so impressive that India stepped up its timetable. By 1913, it exported its last
licit opium to China. However, China’s domestic efforts to curb production came to a halt after
the Manchu dynasty was overthrown by revolution in 1911. The unstable republic that followed
was not able to control its territories, enabling several provincial warlords to facilitate opium
production.59
Nevertheless, the Ten Year Agreement of 1907 set the tone and served as an influential
model for drug control advocates for the next six decades. According to McAllister, supporters of
drug control believed the agreement demonstrated that drug control was primarily a matter of
national will: “States that really wanted to impose effective drug restrictions could do so in
relatively short order; had the Chinese government maintained control, the opium scourge would
surely have been defeated. (…) Consequently, questions about what caused addiction, the
relationship between supply and demand, and whether formal controls fostered illegal activity
received little attention.”60 Parallel to the Ten Year Agreement, the United States started pushing
for more encompassing global regulations. The following section outlines the origins and
motivations of U.S. leadership in drug diplomacy and global control efforts.
3.2 The Origins of U.S. Leadership in the International Efforts to Control Narcotic
Drugs
Throughout the 19th century U.S. society experienced with increasing concern significant
rises in the consumption of opium and its derivatives, including morphine, heroin, and codeine, as
well as powder cocaine, all of which were imported and sold without any restrictions. Many
medical professionals promoted the use of opiates to treat different expressions of pain, anxiety,
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and symptoms of gastrointestinal illnesses.61 Cocaine not only gained popularity as a remedy for
sinusitis and hay fever but, interestingly, also as a cure for opium, morphine, and alcohol habits.62
According to Musto, “By 1900, America had developed a comparatively large addict population,
perhaps 250,000.”63 This gave rise to concerns and pressures to prohibit their unrestricted sale.
Campaigns to restrict drug use were not only motivated by concerns about health and welfare but
also tied to racist stereotypes and fears of minority groups. Opium smoking became associated
with immigrants from China, most of whom had entered the U.S. around 1870 to work in railroad
construction. However, after a period of economic depression they began to constitute a labor
surplus and started to be viewed as a threat. Opium smoking was considered as another way in
which the Chinse undermined American society, contributing to its prohibition in 1909.64
Interestingly, the available data suggests that opiate addiction in the United States had witnessed
its peak in 1890, about two decades before the imposition of tighter restrictions.65
Cocaine was primarily feared in the South. Many government officials believed that its
euphoric and stimulating properties would spur violence against whites by the black minority.
According to popular anecdotes, after taking cocaine blacks acquired superhuman strength,
cunning, efficiency, improved pistol marksmanship, and resistance to .32 caliber bullets. The
passage of the country’s first comprehensive drug law, the 1914 Harrison Act, contained
numerous examples of the South’s fear of the cocainized black.66

61

David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press [1973, 1987], 1999), 1.
62

Ibid. 7.

63

Ibid. 5.

64

Ibid. 6.

65

Gene A. Heyman, Addiction: A Disorder of Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3-4.

66

Musto, The American Disease, 7-6.

39

Internationally, U.S. leadership in drug control is intimately related to the seizure of the
Philippines from Spain and the goal to export U.S. products to China. After the United States
took over the Philippine Islands in 1898, opium smoking was well established among the ethnic
Chinese population. Prior to the arrival of the U.S., the Spanish administration had operated a
government monopoly, which allowed opium sales, but only to ethnic Chinese. A 1902 cholera
epidemic led to more widespread use among native Filipinos, who took opium because of the
constipating qualities of its alkaloids. Subsequently, opium use became so widespread that the
first Episcopal bishop of the Philippines, Charles Henry Brent, an important voice in Philippine
affairs, became one of the principal leaders in the international anti-opium movement. In 1903,
the Islands’ civil governor, William Howard Taft, appointed an investigating committee,
integrated by Bishop Brent and two medical experts, to examine how other regions dealt with the
problem. After visiting Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, and
Java, the committee concluded that the only effective laws against opium were those enacted by
Japan. While opium use in the United States and the Philippines raised strong concerns in the
U.S. government, its principal motivation to become engaged in international narcotics control
was tied to its goal to improve relations with the Chinese government and gain access to the
Chinese market.
American merchants and investors saw a great potential for U.S. investments and the
export of industrialized goods. However, they believed that rampant opium consumption lowered
Chinese demand.67 At the same time, U.S. traders experienced distrust due to general anti-foreign
sentiments and the harsh treatment Chinese travelers and laborers received in the U.S. In 1905,
Chinese merchants issued a voluntary embargo against U.S. goods. The U.S. leadership saw
controlling the opium trade as a way to mollify Chinese resentments. In 1906, President Theodore
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Roosevelt (1901-1909) responded favorably to a request by Bishop Brent, urging for an
international meeting to help China with its opium problem.68 Brent believed that continued
opium trade would undermine prohibitionist efforts in the Philippines. Under the leadership of the
medical physician and Far East expert Dr. Hamilton Wright, and supported by temperance
groups, missionary societies, and merchant organizations, the U.S. began preparations for the first
international conference to discuss the opium trade.69
3.3 The 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission and the Path to the Hague
In February 1909, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Japan, China, Persia, and Siam convened in Shanghai.
The only state invited that did not attend was the Ottoman Empire.70 Most nations, however, were
only mildly interested in the topic. This was expressed in the request of Great Britain and the
Netherlands to rank the meeting as a commission, which could make only recommendations and
not issue any commitments.71
Under the leadership of Bishop Brent, who was chosen chairman, the Commission began
a fact-finding mission, gathering data on cultivation, trade, and consumption of opium. Moreover,
the Commission issued resolutions endorsing to gradually suppress opium smoking; reexamine
laws about opium use; and prohibit the export of opium to other nations whose laws prohibited its
importation. Moreover, there was unanimous agreement that governments should take measures
to control morphine and other opium derivatives.72
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The conference, however, also revealed fundamental differences. While the U.S.
delegation aimed at creating the foundation of an unambiguous prohibitionist global drug regime,
based on a rigorous control of drug supplies, most other colonial powers had more moderate
views. Many of them believed that drug use could not be eliminated, and that drug control should
focus on limiting the consequences of their abuse and deter their use through higher prices.
Furthermore, several countries did not share the U.S. position that all non-medical uses were evil
and immoral. Therefore, the meeting could not reach agreement on a definition of what
constituted legitimate use.73 The colonial powers also rejected the U.S. proposal to follow up the
meeting in Shanghai with a plenipotentiary conference.
The United States, however, continued to exert pressure for a post-Shanghai meeting.
The country’s new president, William Howard Taft (1909-1913), who was governor general of
the Philippines from 1901 to 1903 and had strongly supported Bishop Brent’s anti opium
positions, favored international action. Moreover, opium restriction coincided with his goal to
expand U.S. influence in the Pacific region. Once again, the U.S. goal to penetrate the Chinese
market provided the push for another meeting. At the time, a new wave of Chinese nationalism
and resistance to foreign investment threatened to undermine U.S. goals. The country’s leadership
believed that helping to curb the opium trade would give them more prestige in China and that
another international meeting would “smooth the troubled water” for its “aggressive commercial
policy there.”74
In September 1909, the U.S. sent invitation letters to the powers represented at Shanghai
to enable a conference in The Hague in the following year. The list of items the United States
proposed to discuss included control of the production and distribution of opium; limiting opium
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cultivation; uniform national controls and penal regulations; governmental regulation of opium
exporters; and reciprocal rights to search vessels suspected of carrying contraband opium.75
Despite initial reluctance, and due to continued pressure from the U.S. government, a critical
mass of governments agreed to meet at the Hague on December 1, 1911. However, several
countries insisted on amendments to the agenda. Italy called for international controls on
marijuana; France refused to consider any changes to its domestic legislation; Great Britain and
France rejected proposals concerning the search of vessels in international seas; Britain insisted
that the conference took up the issue of manufactured drugs like morphine, heroin, and cocaine;
and Germany, the main exporter of these drugs opposed the British proposal.76
3.4 The Hague Opium Conference and Its Aftermath
The divergent interests and competing visions about the nature of drug control efforts
overshadowed the proceedings at the Hague. While the U.S. delegation, supported by the
Chinese, pressed for radical measures, Germany and the Netherlands supported controls over raw
materials but rejected limitations on manufactured drugs, i.e. drugs that go through a process of
chemical elaboration. Germany argued that limiting production made no sense unless other
manufacturing nations, like Switzerland, agreed to do the same.77 Major opium cultivators such as
Portugal (in Macao), Persia, and India, considered domestic drug use as an internal matter.
Moreover, they insisted on the right to export opium to territories that did not prohibit their trade.
Except for China, participants whose populations consumed large amounts of opium viewed the
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enforcement of prohibition as unrealistic and often worried that reducing licit supplies would
foster illicit trade.78
Despite this unpromising outlook, the conference established the first international drug
control treaty, the International Opium Convention, consisting of six chapters and 25 articles.
Chapters I and II called upon the signatories to restrict opium smoking and trade, and included a
clause preventing the export to territories that prohibited their import.79 However, the principal
producing territories defeated provisions to reduce opium cultivation. Moreover, the treaty did not
set a timetable for the elimination of opium smoking.80 The provisions for manufactured drugs of
chapter III remained equally elusive. While they contained a series of licensing, manufacturing,
and distribution controls, the German delegation ensured that the provisions remained vague.
Chapter IV addressed the opium situation in China. It called on the contracting powers to prevent
smuggling of opium and other narcotics into Chinese territory, while the Chinese government
would undertake similar measures. Chapter V called upon all parties to prohibit the possession of
raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts. Chapter VI addressed
the treaty’s signing and ratification procedures.81 Due to Germany’s and France’s concerns that
upon ratification the drug trade would simply move to places with fewer restrictions, it included a
clause that all producing, manufacturing, and consuming states, a total of 34 governments, had to
ratify the treaty before its entry into force.82
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The principle of universality advocated by the Germans and the French proved to be a
major obstacle. Over the next 30 months, eight countries ratified the agreement, while 24
promised to adhere. However, the opium producers Serbia and Turkey rejected the treaty
altogether.83 The outbreak of World War I overshadowed efforts to obtain their support, which
brought drug control initiatives to a hold. However, the following peace negotiations proved
favorable to the Hague Opium Convention. United States, Great Britain, and China insisted on
including a clause requiring ratification as a prerequisite for any peace agreement. This way,
Germany, Austria, and Turkey were obliged to ratify the Convention and its requirement for nearuniversal adherence was satisfied.84 The nascent League of Nations took over responsibility to
supervise its implementation, converting Geneva into the center of international drug control,
assuring it a permanent place in the international agenda.85
3.5 Drug Control in the League of Nations: Early Period
Apart from its goal to create a more peaceful and stable international environment, the
League of Nations became an important venue for grappling with socio-medical concerns,
including child welfare, women’s rights, health care, labor legislation, malnutrition, and drug use.
According to McAllister, League officials showed great interest in drug-related issues because
success in international drug control was believed to strengthen the organization, while failure
would weaken it. The most optimistic voices considered that success in the area of narcotics
control might provide the key to resolve the paramount issue of the day, arms control.86
Additionally, League officials were hopeful that the drug issue would draw the United States,
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which rejected becoming a member, closer to the League.87 Although the League assumed
responsibility for administering the Hague Convention, many of its parties, including the U.S.,
Germany, Russia, and several Latin American states, were non-members.88 However, over time,
many of them became members or cooperated with the its drug control bodies in one way or
another.
To fulfill its responsibility of supervising the International Opium Convention, the
League’s architects created several entities responsible for drug matters. The Advisory
Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, usually referred to as the Opium
Advisory Committee (OAC) served as the focal point for most issues related to the drug trade. It
was integrated by government representatives, who met quarterly during the League’s early years
and annually later on. To assure administrative and executive support, the League established an
Opium and Social Questions Sections (the Opium Section) within the secretariat. The League
Health Committee also provided expertise on medical matters.89
The drug control bodies focused their initial efforts on estimating the extent of the drug
trade. The OAC requested statistical data on imports, exports, re-exports, and reserve stocks.
Conservative estimates calculated that world production of opium and coca exceeded “legitimate”
demand by a factor of 10. As one of its first measure, the OAC recommended that all states adapt
an import/export certification scheme to ensure that all drug shipments had a “legitimate”
destination.90
The League also created a Mixed Sub-Committee, with experts from the OAC and the
Health Committee to study definitional and etiological issues: What is the aim of the work
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undertaken by the League? What constitutes an abuse? How do abuses occur? How can these
abuses be ascertained? And, how can abuses be prevented? However, rather than dealing with the
intricacies of drug use, addiction, and possibilities of treatment, the Mixed-Sub Committee
engaged in narrow, material discussion about the world’s legitimate needs for opium. On the one
hand, the representatives of the OAC wanted to protect the production and manufacturing
capabilities of the states they represented and therefore argued that quasi-medical opium use, i.e.
the eating and smoking of opium in traditional preparations, should be considered as legitimate.
On the other, the experts from the Health Committee argued for a lower ceiling of licit
consumption. Once it became evident that the position of the OAC experts would prevail, the
Health Committee prepared an alternative report, which estimated legitimate opium consumption
33 percent lower.91 According to McAllister, the above episode presents a missed opportunity to
explore alternative approaches:
While social and medical questions never disappeared entirely, the system focused on
economic calculations, regulatory statutes, and enforcement measures. Medical experts
played an important role in defining which drugs possessed addiction potential, but those
determinations focused on narrow physiological manifestations and eschewed the larger
social implications of addiction. Supply control emerged as the regime’s raison d’être.92

Possibilities to envision alternative solutions to drug-related issues further declined with
the return of the United States to the discussions on drug control. While in the early stages the
United States rejected cooperation with the League entirely, pro-League advocates as well as drug
control associations in the U.S. lobbied extensively to cooperate more closely with the
international community. Due to the extent of the global drug trade, concerns about rising drug
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consumption in China, and internal pressures, by late 1922 the government of Warren G. Harding
(1921-1923) decided that it had to engage with Geneva. Subsequently, the State Department
announced that it would send an unofficial observer to the January 1923 OAC meeting.93
Influenced by missionary groups, religious organizations, and temperance workers, the
U.S. took on a radical supply-control position. The U.S. observer campaigned for the elimination
of excess production and the prohibition of quasi-medical opium use, i.e. its consumption in
traditional preparations, in India, and opposed a government-controlled opium monopoly in
China. Despite strong resistance, U.S. interventions not only changed the terms of debates but
also influenced the Mixed Sub-Committee to redefine quasi-medical use of opium as not
legitimate.94 The next OAC meeting in the Spring was attended by four U.S. delegates, who
defended U.S. positions even more forcefully. Furthermore, due to U.S. pressure the parties at
Geneva agreed to hold another plenipotentiary conference on drug control.95
3.6 The 1924/1925 Geneva Conventions
To reduce the complexity of the negotiations, League representatives opted for holding
two consecutive conference. The first one, scheduled for November 1924, included a small
number of states and focused exclusively on the opium situation in Southeast Asia. The second
meeting, which was scheduled to directly follow the first, sought to control the production of
manufactured drugs like heroin, morphine, and cocaine, as well as to limit the amounts of raw
opium and coca imported for manufacturing to supply medical and scientific needs.96
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After the negotiations of the first conference had taken twice as long as planned, the
parties established the Agreement concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal
Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium, signed by the British Empire, Burma, India, France,
Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and Thailand. The Agreement required that the importation, sale,
and distribution of opium (except for retail sales) should be handled by government monopolies;
prohibited the sale of opium and the entry of minors into smoking dens; committed governments
to reduce the number of smoking dens and retail stores; regulated the export and import of opium;
and required governments to discourage the use of opiates through educational campaigns.97
Despite advancing this new set of legal norms, McAllister underlines that the conference
achieved relatively little:
The colonial powers would not commit to a date for elimination of opium smoking. All
insisted that the situation would not improve until China controlled its internal
production. The Chinese exploited the conference to publicize grievances about
extraterritoriality, claiming that they could not alleviate the problem as long as foreigners
escaped Chinese justice. At the same time, the Chinese refused to admit the magnitude of
the problem within their own borders.98

The delay of the negotiations and the failure to achieve a substantive accomplishment set
the tone for the second conference, which started while the first conference was still in process.
Unlike the club-like atmosphere of the first, forty-one governments attended it. However, a small
set of core states dominated the proceedings. While the agenda was targeted towards the
establishment of a new supervisory institution and the creation of a standardized import/export
certification system, the U.S. delegation pressed for a timetable to eliminate opium smoking
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within ten years and the restriction of opium and coca production to medical and scientific needs.
Many governments saw their interests threatened by these proposals and proclaimed to abandon
the negotiations, arguing that these goals lay outside the conference’s competence. However,
after recognizing that its demands would not be met, the U.S. decided to quit the proceedings,
leaving the negotiations of the final agreement to the other parties.99
The final version of the International Opium Convention of 1925, which was signed and
ratified by 56 countries, created a new set of rules regarding the “legitimate” trade of narcotic
drugs and altered the IDCR’s institutional structure. Without any binding obligations, chapter II
compelled states to enact new laws and regulations to control the production of raw opium and
the coca leaf. Chapter III required the contracting parties to pass new laws to limit the production,
import, sale, distribution, export, and use of manufactured drugs to scientific and medical needs.
Chapter IV established a series of guidelines for the trade with Indian Hemp. Chapter V created a
new import/export authorization model as the main control mechanism for international trade. A
system of import certificates and export authorizations ensured that trade in narcotic substances
was controlled by the competent authorities in each country. Ultimately, chapter VI established a
new organization to supervise the regime’s proceedings, the Permanent Central (Opium) Board
(PCOB).100 Art. 21 required all Parties to submit to the PCOB non-binding estimates of the
quantities of each substance covered by the Convention to be imported into their territory for
internal consumption during the following year.101 While earlier drafts of the treaty had
envisioned a board with the power to fix estimates for countries that failed to submit their own,
question estimates that seemed excessive, and sanction states that exceeded the import estimates,
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the final document provided for a board with no compulsory powers and only limited authority to
scrutinize trade.102 The eight members of the Board were to be assigned by the Council of the
League. However, the United States and Germany were invited to nominate one person.
Moreover, even though the League would contribute to the Board’s budget, the new organ was
allowed to hire its own staff, which provided it with some autonomy.103
For supply control advocates the International Opium Convention of 1925 constituted
both shortcomings and advances. On the one hand, it only applied to its signatories, which,
among many others, did not include the United States, Persia, and Peru. More importantly, it did
not place any restrictions on cultivation, manufacturing, and consumption. On the other hand, it
advanced the IDCR’s institutional infrastructure, created new expectations and standards of
behavior (even if not honored at all times), and established the prohibition of all recreational drug
use as the regime’s primary objective.
3.7 The 1931 Limitation Convention
By the end of the decade, many states had tightened their domestic controls, India had
curtailed its opium exports, the International Opium Convention of 1925 enjoyed growing
acceptance, and the work of the OAC and the PCOB provided a clearer picture over supply and
demand in the global drug trade.104 However, from a supply-side perspective a multitude of
challenges remained: Persia and other states filled the void left by the Indian withdrawal from the
quasi-medical opium market; China continued to produce large amounts of opium, while its
importation of manufactured drugs skyrocketed; the European colonial powers continued to
tolerate opium smoking; and many pharmaceutical companies moved their production sites to
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countries with less stringent controls. Moreover, illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs grew
significantly, fostering large-scale, transnational criminal networks.105
Since reducing agricultural supplies appeared unlikely, control advocates focused on the
next logical step, envisioning schemes to curb surpluses of manufactured drugs. This, they hoped,
would inevitably lead to a reduction of the organic raw materials used for their manufacture.
After months of preparations, 57 countries, including the United States, attended the Conference
on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, which convened in Geneva from May 27
to July 13, 1931. OAC representatives suggested to curb production through a quota scheme
according to which all governments were supposed to calculate their medical requirements. The
market would then be divided among manufacturing states according to an agreed-upon
formula.106 However, many governments saw the quota scheme as an infringement on free trade
and were afraid that such a cartel-like arrangement would undermine the possibility of satisfying
their medical needs at a competitive price. Moreover, they objected that the initial scheme did not
consider the need for medical emergencies. After weeks of consultations, the contracting parties
came up with a compromise solution: Signatories were to submit estimates for the needs of
manufactured drugs by August 1 of the preceding year, with the possibility to revise the estimates
in case of a medical emergency. However, they did not have to designate in advance where they
would buy their supplies, thus allowing them to take offers from different manufacturers. Most
importantly, the treaty required countries to cease imports and/or manufacture when they
exceeded their annual estimate.
The 1931 Limitation Convention also introduced the mechanism of drug scheduling, i.e.
applying different levels of control based on the degree of danger presented by a drug, as well as
the extent to which it was useful for medical purposes. While heroin, morphine, and cocaine were
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placed in group I, which was subject to tighter controls, group II consisted of codeine,
ethylmorphine and their salts. New narcotics were subject to the tightest level of control until
governmental representatives determined their effects with the advice and testimonies of medical
experts, pharmaceutical companies, and the research community.107
To supervise the agreement, the signatories created a new institution, the Drug
Supervisory Body (DSB). Different to the PCOB, the DSB was allowed to produce estimates for
all countries and territories, even the ones that did not form part of the treaty.108 However, the
Body was neither allowed to frame estimates unilaterally, nor did it have enforcement powers. 109
In any case, the 1931 Convention, which was eventually ratified by 67 countries, clearly
delineated the boundary between the licit drug trade and illicit traffic. Furthermore, it imposed
significant controls on the licit trade of narcotics, representing an important milestone in the
global prohibition of recreational drugs use.110
3.8 The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous
Drugs
The implementation of the 1931 Limitation Convention coincided with the withdrawal of
Germany and Japan from the League of Nations (1933), the dissolution of the World
Disarmament Conference (1934), and a renewed prospect of war. Furthermore, for the first time,
parts of the drug control community began questioning the regime’s tenets. Though more and
more countries started to regulate their “legitimate” drug trade according to the IDCR’s rules and
regulations, Asian and Latin American states in particular gained a reputation for failing to
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cooperate with the regime or taking advantage of its multiple loopholes. Moreover, to escape
controls several illicit manufacturers moved operations closer to their raw-material sources, into
countries that would not close them down. Consequentially, clandestine drug factories cropped up
in Eastern Europe and Asia. Even in industrialized countries, the new control mechanisms gave
rise to an increasingly sophisticated illicit drug market.111 These developments led to fractions
within the drug control community. Some voices even questioned the efficacy of the supplycontrol approach. In 1936, the PCOB caused a firestorm, arguing that control mechanisms had
largely failed. Moreover, some OAC representatives questioned the IDCR’s strict emphasis on
law enforcement, advocating psychological treatment and prevention as alternative tools.
However, during a period when the future of the League became increasingly uncertain, while
facing severe budgetary constraints, dissenting voices were kept quiet.112
Based on the believe that disrupting transnational criminal networks would eliminate
addiction, League officials began campaigning for a conference that would “impose uniform
penalties on traffickers, punish those who facilitated smuggling into foreign jurisdictions, and
enhance extradition agreements.”113 In 1936, League members and the United States convened in
Geneva to negotiate the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs.
The conference, however, began with a dispute between the United States and other participants
over the agenda. The U.S. delegation insisted to discuss the elimination of raw materials and the
prohibition of opium smoking to which other states objected. Unwilling to compromise, the
United States withdrew from the conference.
The final treaty classified a series of punishable activities related to the illicit drug trade
and urged the Contracting Parties “to make the necessary legislative provisions to severely
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punishing, particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty” all drugrelated offenses.114 Moreover, the treaty established a series of guidelines for the penalization of
foreign nationals and possible extraditions.115 However, the practical importance of the
convention was limited as only 13 countries signed and ratified it. Furthermore, its entry into
force coincided with the outbreak of World War II, which undermined the treaty’s
implementation. WWII also precluded plans for a conference to tackle the long-standing issue of
reducing opium and coca cultivations. Nevertheless, the main tenets of the regime survived
throughout the war.
3.9 U.S. Leadership During World War II
Drug control advocates in the United States saw WWII as an opportunity to align the
direction of IDCR with their preferences. Harry Anslinger, head of the newly established Federal
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and a strong believer in prohibition and heavy penalties, was the
architect of the U.S. approach.116 During the war, the United States had emerged as the world’s
principal producer and distributor of medicines. Anslinger used this position to make drug sales,
as well as coca and opium purchases (of which the United States had acquired massive
stockpiles) dependent on adhering to the control regime’s treaties and submitting statistical
information to the PCOB and the DSB. He also banned drug exports to Mexico in 1940, until the
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country suspended an experimental ambulatory treatment program that involved the free
distribution of morphine to registered addicts, and to Chile (1942), after the country started to
produce its own opium.117 In the later stages of the war, Anslinger and his supporters used their
influence to promote opium prohibition in Asian territories the U.S. occupied. Despite the
questionable legality of these measures, the State Department was able to convince the British
and the Dutch to follow suit.118
The United States also exerted its influence on the IDCR’s functionality and
organizational structure. As it became difficult to maintain personnel and activities in Geneva, the
PCOB and the DSB, which had some autonomy from the League, were allowed to open branch
offices in the United States from where they would carry out their statistical work without
commenting or even sanctioning other governments.119 The OAC, however, suffered a different
fate. Due to its close attachment to the League, it gained a reputation for being susceptible to
political considerations, which, according to U.S. views, undermined initiatives to cut back
production and prohibit all non-medical and non-scientific drug use. Although the head of the
OAC and the League’s Opium Section, Bertil A. Renborg, temporarily resided in the United
States, his activities were severely restricted and eventually the U.S. government denied his
reentry.120 However, the entry of personnel from the PCOB and DSB led to the coalescence of
like-minded control advocates, who began planning and laying out their post-war vision. The socalled inner circle agreed that the OAC should not be resurrected and placed their hopes in a new
organization, within the United Nations system, which could be infiltrated with like-minded
professionals. After the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the United Nations was formulated
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and negotiated, decided that the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) would
deal with drug-related matters, the inner circle successfully campaigned for a new organization,
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which reported directly to ECOSOC. The United
Nations also created a Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND), which functioned as the UN’s
equivalent to the League’s Opium Section (see above).121
3.10 Drug Control in the UN: Early Years
After the newly-created UN bodies picked up their work, members of the IDCR’s inner
circle, who occupied all key positions, had two major objectives: First, the resurrection of control
mechanisms in territories affected by the war; and, second, the regulation and prohibition of
synthetic narcotics like meperidine (Demerol) and methadone, which emerged during the war to
lower the dependence on traditional opioids. To achieve the first objective, representatives of the
PCOB, DSB, and CND, often assisted by agents of Harry Anslinger’s FBN, travelled over Asia
and Europe to explain reporting procedures, search for excess stocks, uncover trafficking
networks, and lobby for support. As the result of their effort, by the late 1940s most countries,
including Germany and Japan, had reconstituted effective regulatory systems.122
The emergence of new synthetic substances entailed both risks and opportunities for
control advocates. On the one hand, by escaping from regulation new synthetics had the potential
to undermine the regime. On the other hand, by creating alternatives to popular narcotics they
promised the potential to make agricultural production of opiates and coca increasingly irrelevant.
In any case, control experts agreed that new drugs had to be regulated. Therefore, the CND
drafted an agreement, which required states to submit the new substances to the same procedures
of estimates and statistical reporting as opium-based drugs. An expert committee of the World
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Health Organization (WHO) would evaluate the drugs according to their addictive potential,
while the DSB and PCOB would oversee their trade. The 1948 Synthetic Narcotics Protocol soon
gained widespread acceptance and was implemented in the following year.123 This meant that 14
new substances came under international control by 1951 and six more by 1954.124
The inner circle’s next move was to expand the IDCR’s control mechanisms to the socalled third world, where most opiate and coca cultivation, and increasingly drug manufacturing,
took place. However, the process of decolonization, political instability, and the emerging cold
war undermined their efforts to some extent. Hard-line actions against recalcitrant states carried
the risk of driving them into the hands of the Soviet Union, which the regime’s primarily Western
agents wanted to avoid at all costs. On top of that, as the IDCR was based on eight multilateral
treaties, which enjoyed different levels of acceptance and contained numerous loopholes, the drug
control system became increasingly hard to administer. Therefore, control advocates wanted to
simplify it by incorporating all previous agreements into a single document. In 1948, ECOSOC
approved negotiations and its staff began drafting a new consolidated agreement, the Single
Convention.125 However, their goal was curtailed by one of the inner circle’s own members, the
head of the DND, Leon Steinig. Rather than putting his weight behind a comprehensive
agreement, he launched a campaign to create an international opium monopoly; an agency to set
prices, buy from producers, and sell to manufacturers. Steinig believed that the creation of such a
monopoly would eliminate excess production and present an opportunity to do the same for
nuclear material.126
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Few took his idea seriously at the beginning, but, to the surprise of many, in 1949 he
reached an agreement on quotas between the four main opium producers: Iran, Turkey, India, and
Yugoslavia. Moreover, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development signaled
interest in providing a loan to set up the new institution. However, in fear of higher prices
pharmaceutical companies started pressuring their governments to oppose the plan, which soon
lost the support of the international community. Rather than recognizing the plan’s unfeasibility,
Steinig devoted the following years to defend and resurrect it, thereby frustrating and delaying the
negotiations for the Single Convention. In 1952, he was finally replaced by the British national
Gilbert E. Yates. However, the initial prospect of quick negotiations towards a comprehensive
treaty had faded. Instead, control officials concentrated their actions on a new protocol to regulate
opium production and sale. The 1953 Opium Protocol obliged producer states to submit to the
DSB estimates about the amount of opium planted, harvested, consumed domestically, exported,
and stockpiled. Year-end statistics would be submitted to the PCOB, which had the power to
make inquiries into discrepancies, conduct inspections, and impose embargoes. Moreover, it
could take investigatory and punitive action even for states that did not form part of the
agreement.127 The Protocol also stipulated that opium should be restricted to medical and
scientific needs, although states had a 15-year grace period before those provisions would be
enforced. While each state was allowed to accumulate very large stockpiles before being
investigated, the 1953 Opium Protocol, contained by far the most stringent drug control measures
embedded in international law.128
However, not all of the states that took part in the negotiations were ready to support it
afterwards. In order to become effective, the Protocol had to be ratified by at least three of the
127

Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International
and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium arts. 8 to 12, opened for signature Jun. 23, 1953, 456 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force Mar. 8, 1963).
128

UNODC, A Century of International Drug Control, 60.

59

seven major opium producers. While India (1954) and, with much reluctance, Iran (1959) ratified
the agreement, none of the other producers gave their support. They hoped that the negotiations
of the Single Convention, into which the 1953 Protocol would be integrated, could produce a
more favorable outcome.129
3.11 The 1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs
The creation of the Single Convention was utterly complex and subject to numerous
considerations about the extent of control mechanisms, state sovereignty, economic interests, and
how to treat and regulate different substances. Control advocates were facing the risk that a treaty
with too many restrictions, punitive elements, and intrusions of state sovereignty would be
rejected by the international community. Therefore, their goal was to make the treaty as
restrictive as possible without losing broad support.
A first draft of the Single Convention emerged in the early 1950s. Bearing the stamp of
DND director Leon Steinig, it included many of the features of the international opium monopoly
and was amply rejected by the UN membership. A second draft was established in 1956. This
time it included several provisions of the 1953 Opium Protocol. Once again, it failed to reach
sufficient support. In 1957-58, the CND composed a more moderate third offer, which most
governments accepted as an acceptable starting point.130
During the negotiations, the 73 participating states defined the narcotic substances to be
controlled; prohibited the use of opium, cocaine, coca, cannabis and its derivatives; specified
punishable offenses related to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs; clarified the reporting
obligations of its members; outlined the IDCR’s control mechanisms and punitive powers; and
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enacted some changes to the regimes administrative structure.131 Moreover, the final document,
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, incorporated nine previous agreements into a unifying
treaty. Only the 1936 Convention on illicit trafficking, which enjoyed little international support
did not make it into the final agreement and remained in force.132
The Single Convention’s prohibitionist character is evident throughout the document.
The treaty’s preamble states “that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,” while “Considering that
effective measures against abuse of narcotics require co-ordinated and universal action.”133
Article 4 establishes that “The Parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures (…)
to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export,
import distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs.”134 Although states were granted a
15 to 25 years transition period, the use of opium smoking, opium eating, coca-leaf chewing, and
cannabis smoking for recreational purposes became prohibited by international law.135
Furthermore, building upon the offenses listed in previous treaties, article 36 specified a series of
punishable offenses related to the illicit trafficking of narcotic substances, which ought to be
penalized “particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty” by the
Convention’s parties.136 Article 33 declared the possession of drugs illegal, but did not specify
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whether or not it should be punished, thereby allowing governments some flexibility in its
implementation.137
Similar to previous treaties, the Single Convention required all parties to submit estimates
and statistics for the import, export, manufacture, storage, and consumption of opium, coca, and
cannabis as well as manufactured drugs with raw-material content. The import/export
certification system also remained in force, requiring governments to license manufacturers,
traders, and distributers.138 Furthermore, the 1961 Convention maintained the “schedules of
control” scheme (see section 3.7) but expanded the number of schedules from two to four,
allowing for more flexibility in regulating narcotic substances with very different characteristics
and effects.139 Under the new scheme, opiates and cocaine faced the toughest restrictions while
coca production was treated with less severance. Cannabis-growing states avoided any serious
limitations. Due to the successful lobbying of pharmaceutical companies, psychotropic
substances, a new category used for synthetic drugs without any organic content, including
hallucinogens, amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers, were not restricted.140
To simplify the supervision of the treaty’s commitments, it promoted some administrative
changes. The PCOB and the DSB were fused into a new body, the International Narcotics Control
Board (INCB). The new board would collect estimates and statistics, while having the authority
to calculate and make estimates for states failing to submit them. It also maintained the power to
issue embargoes against states failing to comply with the IDCR’s rules as well as to deduct excess
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imports and manufactures from the quantities allowed for the following year.141 However,
producers of organic raw materials assured that the conference eliminated all clauses dealing with
inspections, mandatory embargoes, and clear reduction targets.142 To most control advocates, the
goal of achieving a unifying and inclusive agreement outweighed the objective to achieve bolder
steps in eliminating all non-medical and non-scientific drug use. Nevertheless, because of these
limitations, the United States rejected the treaty and started to campaign instead for the
ratification of the 1953 Opium Protocol. Although the U.S. was successful in convincing Greece
and Turkey to adhere, thereby fulfilling its entry into force, it was unable to halt the progress of
the Single Convention. At ECOSOC’s 1962 autumn session, 81 nations approved a resolution in
favor of the Single Convention, while only the U.S. rejected it. In the following, numerous states
sped up their ratification procedures. In 1964, the UN secretariat had received 40 ratifications,
which ensured its entry into force in the same year. In 1966, the Single Convention had already
received over 50 ratifications, leaving the U.S. with no other choice than to follow suit.143 Today,
the treaty, as amended by the 1972 protocol (see below) has been ratified by 181 countries,
thereby enjoying almost universal application.
3.12 The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances
Although the Single Convention enjoyed great international acceptance, it did little to
prevent drug consumption. The United States in particular experienced sharp rises in heroin use.
At the same time, numerous countries witnessed with increasing concern the spread of
psychotropic drugs, including methamphetamine, LSD, and MDMA. Their growing usage in
different cultural and social contexts, including appearances in popular culture, challenged the

141

See: U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra n. 132, arts. 14, 15 and 21.

142

McAllister, Drug Diplomacy, 208-209.

143

Ibid. 217-218.

63

dominant believe that these “modern, scientifically based substances” did not have the properties
to develop dependencies.144 Moreover, new studies of the WHO indicated that some
amphetamines shared characteristics similar to cocaine and that certain hallucinogens produced
effects analogous to cannabis.145 As calls for their regulation became more forceful,
pharmaceutical companies successfully lobbied their governments to prevent these substances
from being incorporated into the Single Convention, which would have implied high levels of
control and more bureaucratic obligations. Instead, UN membership agreed to negotiate a new
treaty regulating the “legitimate use” of psychotropic substances.
During the negotiations, cultivating and manufacturing states reversed the roles occupied
at the 1961 conference. While the cultivators wanted to uphold the manufacturers of psychotropic
drugs to the same standards as narcotic substances, manufacturing states (mainly Western
industrial powers) argued for the type of loopholes they previously opposed.146 The final
document not only reflected the power relations between the two groups but also the influence of
pharmaceutical companies, which managed to place multiple representatives in the delegations
negotiating the treaty. Even before the start of the conference, manufacturers were able to remove
language from the draft that would have required governments to submit estimates of need,
thereby allowing pharmaceutical companies to keep producing as much as they liked.147 While
the final document placed fairly strong controls on hallucinogens like LSD and DMT, it applied
much weaker limitations on widely-used stimulants and depressants. Other substances, including
precursor chemicals, escaped controls altogether. Moreover, the schedules of the 1971
Convention did not make any mention of derivatives, which allowed pharmaceutical to
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circumvent controls by slightly changing the chemical composition of the controlled substances.
Therefore, only 32 substances spread among the four schedules.148
Despite these limitations, the 1971 Convention extended the principle of prohibiting
recreational drug use to a new set of substances.149 In pursuing this goal, it stated that the
substances covered in the treaty could only be supplied with medical prescriptions, accompanied
by the appropriate warnings about health risks. Moreover, the treaty prohibited advertisements of
these drugs to the general public.150
Similar to the Single Convention, the new agreement called upon its members to take
preventive and repressive action against illicit traffic as well as to assist and cooperate with other
states in their efforts against international traffic of psychotropic substances.151 Any action against
the rules of the Convention, or a law enacted in pursuance of its obligations, ought to be treated as
a punishable offense, while holding it desirable that these crimes be treated as extradition
offenses.152
McAllister also upholds that “In subsequent years, skillful manipulation by pro-control
governments and the UN secretariat gradually plugged many of the treaty’s gaps.”153 After its
entry into force in 1976, the WHO and the CND declared that derivatives of the substances
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regulated by the Convention also fell under international control. Furthermore, the DND and
INCB asked governments to submit statistics that were not part of the treaty on a voluntary basis.
By the early 1980s most governments followed suit. This way, provisions not included in the
Convention became part of customary international law.154 Nevertheless, despite their widespread
use, they remained a secondary concern for control advocates, who continued concentrating their
efforts on narcotic drugs.155
3.13 The 1972 Amendment to the Single Convention
While the United States took on a moderate position regarding the regulation of
psychotropic substances, and did not ratify the 1971 Convention until 1980, it launched another
high-profile international campaign against the supply of narcotics. Fueled by domestic heroin
use, in 1970 U.S. officials began advocating strengthening the Single Convention, hoping to
achieve an outright ban on opium production. As several states rejected the proposal, the U.S.
suggested to empower the INCB in its regulatory and investigatory capacities and to create a new
framework for extradition procedures.156
There was little opposition to U.S. proposals and at a 1972 conference in Geneva, the 97
participating states negotiated 22 amendments to the Single Convention. Most importantly, the
agreement established new powers and control mechanisms for the INCB to fulfill the goal of
limiting “the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount
required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to
prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of,
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drugs.”157 According to the Protocol, parties had to supply the INCB with information about the
precise area to be used for the cultivation of opium poppies as well as the approximate quantity of
opium to be produced.158 If the INCB suspected illicit trafficking, it could request explanations
from governments, and propose consultations, truth-finding studies, and international
cooperation.159 Although these measures depended on the cooperation of the states that had come
under suspicion, they provided new ways of applying pressure to uphold international
commitments. Similar to its already established powers regarding the supervision of imports and
manufacture of narcotic drugs, the 1972 Protocol granted the Board with the capacity to deduct
the suspected amount from the country’s estimate of its licit production, thereby creating an
economic incentive to abstain from illicit cultivation and trafficking.160
Apart from increasing the INCB’s powers, the Protocol established further standards of
behavior for the Convention’s parties. While article 12 required states to seize and destroy any
illicit opium and cannabis plants, article 13 asked them to supply the INCB with information on
illicit trafficking activities within their territories.161
Article 14 covered a set of new provisions regarding the extradition of international drug
traffickers. Most importantly, it declared all drug-related offenses (see note 136) as extraditable
and urged Parties that sign new extradition treaties to include these offenses into the agreements.
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Moreover, it enabled countries that make extradition dependable on the existence of a treaty to
use the Convention as their legal framework.162
The 1972 protocol also paved the way for the creation of a new fund to support largescale crop-substitution programs, technical assistance to improve administration and law
enforcement, and coordination of educational efforts.163 The goal was to help cultivating states,
which had often demanded assistance, to eradicate illicit crops. While in previous decades such
demands were perceived as a form of blackmail, the United States started considering this type of
assistance as an important element of its international anti-narcotics strategy. Since publicly
accepting U.S. money and policy instructions was unattractive to many developing nations, the
UN fund provided an alternative way to channel such assistance. With the support of the UN
secretariat, in 1971 the CND approved the creation of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(UNFDAC), which added a new element to the expanding IDCR.164
3.14 The 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances
Despite the new set of control mechanism, towards the end of the 1970s many countries
experienced sharp rises of drug use, a trend that continued throughout the 1980s.165 While the licit
market had become strongly supervised with few possibilities and incentives to escape controls,
illicit cultivation, production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and sales of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances flourished in many parts of the globe. Apart from supplying
world markets with potentially harmful substances, especially in South America these criminal
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networks were increasingly perceived as a threat to public security and the capacity of the state to
control what was going on within their territories. In December 1984, the UN General Assembly
expressed the rising concern of the international community about the illicit drug trade in a
declaration, stating that “illegal production of, illicit demand for, abuse of and illicit trafficking in
drugs impede economic and social progress, constitute a grave threat to the security and
development of many countries and people and should be combated by all moral, legal and
institutional means, at the national, regional, and international levels.”166 Simultaneously, the UN
General Assembly (UNGA) issued a request to the CND to “initiate, as a matter of priority, the
preparation of a draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.”167 After years of
preparations, the new treaty was first discussed at the 1987 International Conference on Drug
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline for Future Activities
in Drug Abuse Control. A more detailed negotiation took place from November 25 to December
20, 1988, in Vienna, where 106 states convened and adopted the Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
While previous agreements emphasized the dangers of drug use on individuals and
society, the 1988 Convention’s preamble stressed the “links between illicit traffic and other
related organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the
stability, security and sovereignty of states.” At the same time, it highlighted that “illicit traffic
generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to
penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and
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financial business, and society at all levels.”168 Based on the objective to “eradicate illicit traffic,”
the convening parties gave the 1988 Convention the following purpose: “to promote co-operation
among the Parties so that they can address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance having an international dimension.”169
However, several provisions of the treaty were targeted to effectuate domestic legal
changes, calling states to criminalize, and penalize more strongly, several drug-related activities.
Article 3 elevated activities that previous treaties had treated as punishable offenses (see note
136) to become criminal offenses under domestic laws. Furthermore, it expanded the list of drugrelated crimes to include the illicit trade with chemical precursors; and the use, possession, and
transfer of properties and possessions, including monetary ones, stemming from drug-related
crimes.170 The last measure was supposed to deprive traffickers of their financial gains.
Another far-reaching change was the criminalization of the possession, purchase, and
cultivation of drugs for personal consumption, rejecting explicitly the provisions of the 1961
Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention, which only
recommended to treat drug possession as a punishable offense.171 Nevertheless, the treaty
contained a loophole, which allowed countries to deviate from the penalization of drug use: “The
Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment, or in addition to
conviction or punishment of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article,
measures for the treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration of the
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offender.”172 Furthermore, the treaty incorporated the idea of aggravating circumstances of drugrelated crimes, which had been part of South American drug laws since the early 1970s into the
new treaty (see chapter V and chapters VII to IX). These are circumstances that make drugrelated crimes particularly serious and therefore justify stronger penalties.173 The 1988
Convention even went as far as calling upon its parties “to ensure that any discretionary legal
powers under their domestic law (…) are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law
enforcement measures” and “that their courts bear in mind the serious nature of the enumerated
offenses.”174
Similar to regulations on narcotics and psychotropic substances, the 1988 Convention
established a new set of rules for the licit trade with chemical precursors, to be monitored by the
INCB. Article 12 laid out that trade in precursor chemicals was only allowed between licensed
exporters and importers. Information on exports of substances listed in table I had to be supplied
to the INCB prior to the transaction. Moreover, the Parties committed themselves to control all
persons and enterprises active in the manufacture and distribution of such substances; prevent the
accumulation of chemical precursors in the possession of manufacturers and distributors;
establish and maintain a system to monitor international trade of such substances; and to report
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suspicious transactions as well as any seizures and evidence of illicit trade with these chemicals
to the INCB.175
The Parties also established multiple new rules to prevent trafficking in commercial
carriers, illicit traffic by sea, free trade zones and free ports, and the use of mail services.176 To
facilitate international cooperation in dismantling transnational trafficking networks and the
investigation of transnational drug-related crimes, the 1988 Convention instituted guidelines for
mutual legal assistance, the transfer of proceedings in criminal prosecutions, and police and
intelligence cooperation. Aiming to obtain valuable information about trafficking networks and
the intellectual authors of drug-related crimes, it also established the possibility of carrying out
international controlled deliveries. While the treaty widened the scope for the extradition of
criminal offenders, classifying all new drug-related crimes as extradition offenses, the rules for
extradition are similar to the ones outlined in previous treaties.177 Ultimately, though the
Convention does not specify any obligations, it extended the principle of assisting developing
nations, which may not have the resources to enforce its obligations, to so-called transit states, i.e.
territories used to transport drugs, raw materials, and precursors (previous treaties had already
called for assistance for cultivators and manufacturers).
3.15 Conclusion
With the adaptation of the 1988 Convention, the major contours of the current IDCR had
been established, finalizing a lengthy and intricate process of regulating the “legitimate” drug
trade, prohibiting recreational drug use, and criminalizing numerous activities that assist in
supplying clandestine markets with illicit narcotics. The 1909 Opium Commission identified
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opium use as a grave social problem and recommended several steps to undermine its
consumption. The 1912 International Opium Convention introduced the first mechanisms to
control “legitimate” trade and called upon states to prohibit the possession of opium, morphine,
and cocaine. The Geneva Conventions from 1924 and 1925 required the creation of opium
monopolies, called upon states to implement restrictions on opium sales, called upon the
contracting parties to pass new laws to limit the production, import, sale, distribution, export, and
use of manufactured drugs to scientific and medical needs, and established a new system of
import certificates and export authorizations to ensure that trade in narcotic substances was
controlled by competent authorities in each country. The 1931 Limitation Convention invented
the estimates of needs mechanism, which limited how much narcotics a state could legally
import. Moreover, it introduced the mechanism of drug scheduling, which exposed various
narcotics to different levels of controls.
Despite its low level of acceptance, the 1936 Convention on Illicit Traffic, classified a
series of punishable activities related to the illicit drug trade and established a series of guidelines
for the penalization of foreign nationals and extraditions on which subsequent treaties expanded.
The 1961 Single Convention incorporated nine previous agreements into a unifying treaty;
prohibited the use of opium smoking, opium eating, coca-leaf chewing, and cannabis smoking for
recreational purposes; expanded the list of punishable offenses; established new control
mechanisms; and allowed trade embargoes against recalcitrant states. Its 1972 Protocol invented
new mechanisms to pressure defecting countries and enabled the INCB to deduct illicit
cultivations from the amount it was allowed to cultivate legally. Moreover, the Protocol obliged
governments to destroy illicit opium and cannabis plants. The 1971 Convention and Psychotropic
Substances prohibited the recreational use of psychotropic substances, penalized related activities,
and introduced a new set of control mechanisms to regulate the licit trade of these drugs. Building
upon the previous treaties, the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic undertook a series of
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measures to enhance international cooperation against illicit trafficking and, for the first time,
criminalized drug-related activities, including drug consumption. It also generated new legal
norms about the licit trade with chemical precursors.
While each treaty’s provisions reinforced prohibition as the overarching norm in guiding
drug policy across the globe, the strengthening of prohibition is also evident in the number of
signatures and ratifications of each treaty. As shown in table 1, early drug treaties until the 1950s
received fewer signatures (eight to 39) and ratifications (13 to 90) than the drug control treaties of
the UN, which received between 34 and 87 signatures and between 184 and 190 ratifications,
enjoying almost universal acceptance.
Table 1: Global Adherence to International Drug Control Treaties
Treaty
Signatures
Ratifications
1912 International Opium Convention
13
56
1925 Agreement concerning the Suppression of the
8
Manufacture …
1925 International Opium Convention
21
60
1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and
44
67
Regulating …
1936 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic …
26
13
1948 Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs
39
90
…
1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation
34
51
of …
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
61
154
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances
34
184
1972 Single Convention (…) as Amended by 1972
54
186
Protocol
1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
87
190
and …
Data extracted from United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter VI.
Following the 1988 Convention, the IDCR was complemented by a more specific set of
recommendations to inhibit the laundering of illegal assets, issued by the Financial Action Task
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Force on Money Laundering in 1990, 1996, and 2003.178 In 2000, UN membership adopted the
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, with new frameworks for mutual legal
assistance, extradition, law enforcement cooperation, and technical assistance and training.179
Despite the numerous efforts of the international community to undermine the illicit drug trade, it
became increasingly evident that neither the criminal networks nor drug consumption eroded.
This led to an increased questioning of the regime’s premises and its overarching norm. The
following chapter IV addresses the critiques of prohibition in greater detail and highlights key
moments in which the IDCR was challenged.
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IV. CONTESTING PROHIBITION, ADVOCATING HARM REDUCTION: NORMATIVE
CHALLENGES TO A FAILING REGIME
While the previous chapter recounted the establishment of prohibition as the principal norm in
setting out the IDCR’s parameters and guiding drug policies around the world, the present chapter
focuses on the other side of the story. From early on, the prohibitionist regime had been
challenged by recalcitrant states, seeking to escape from its provisions in pursuance of economic
gains. However, prohibition had also been questioned by experts from multiple academic
disciplines, civil society, and, increasingly, former and incumbent state officials. Their critiques
often point to flaws in the IDCR’s underlying assumptions and highlight the regime’s incapacity
to fulfill its major goal of eradicating non-medical and non-scientific drug use. Some of the most
forceful challenges address prohibition’s deleterious side effect of fomenting a huge criminal
industry, which presents paramount challenges to public security, health, and effective
governance. Many critics have converged around the idea of reducing drug harms and risks
through pragmatic interventions in drug markets, as an alternative policy model. The framework
of harm reduction promotes policies based on empirical evidence rather than moral assumptions,
while respecting the rights of drug users to carry out autonomous choices.
Although these challenges have not altered the IDCR’s prohibitionist orientation, as
shown below contestation from civil society and some governments have made the regime more
flexible regarding its members’ policy choices. Furthermore, the rising prominence of harm
reduction has been accompanied by significant changes in how states and societies are dealing
with drug-related challenges. The following section briefly outlines the most prominent critiques
of prohibition, ten in total. It is followed by a presentation of harm reduction as a politically
feasible alternative to prohibition. The remainder of the chapter displays how different actors
have challenged the regime and uplifted harm reduction to become prohibition’s most serious
normative competitor.
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4.1 Ten Critiques of Prohibition
Critiques of prohibition vary significantly. Some of them reject the approach entirely,
others focus on particular elements or effects of prohibition. Nonetheless, most critics agree that
the current IDCR and its prohibitionist norms constitute a serious policy failure. Therefore, they
believe that it needs to undergo far-reaching changes to achieve better results. One of the oldest
challenges to prohibition is the liberal notion that individuals’ choices should not be constrained
by moralistic policies of the state.180 For many liberals, drug consumption is a matter of personal
choice that should not be subject to state control, and even less so state sanctioning. As argued by
the prominent economist Milton Friedman: “It’s a moral problem that the government is making
into criminals people, who may be doing something you and I don’t approve of, but are doing
something that hurts nobody else.”181
A second branch of criticism highlights that prohibition has been ineffective in deterring
people from using drugs or becoming part of the illicit drugs industry, thereby clearly missing its
goal of creating a drug free world. While the threat of legal sanctions may dissuade some
individuals from engaging in drug-related activities, both the demand and supply of drugs have
remained intact. According to the most recent UN data, an estimated 275 million people,
representing 5.6 percent of the global adult population, used illegal drugs at least once during
2016.182 This is a significant increase from 1997, when an estimated 192.7 million people,
representing 3.34 percent of the global adult population, consumed illegal drugs.183 It is
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reasonable to assume that the real numbers are even higher, given that UN data is based entirely
on government estimates.
On the supply side, police, intelligence, and military operations have celebrated
impressive short-term successes in destroying illicit crops and manufacturing sights, arresting
heads of criminal organizations, and even destroying entire drug cartels. However, none of these
actions has been able to eliminate the sophisticated illicit supply networks. Throughout the
decades, drug traffickers have shifted their production and established their presence in areas with
less state control, even across national borders. Popular analogies for this phenomenon are the
balloon and cockroach effect. Moreover, many criminal groups have become smaller and flatter,
while carrying out fewer transaction than the classical drug cartels.184 This makes it easier for
them to escape from state control and adapt to new circumstances. Even the most powerful states
do not have the capacity to eliminate criminal networks, which can resist persecution through a
mix of evasion, corruption, violence, and support of the population.185
A third critique emphasizes that prohibition has given rise to powerful criminal
industries, which present paramount challenges to effective, let alone democratic, governance.
Because drug manufacture and commerce for non-medical and non-scientific purposes is
forbidden, illicit drug trafficking has become a highly profitable activity. To protect their illegal
operations, traffickers use their resources to corrupt and intimidate state officials, sometimes
coopting entire governments agencies. Moreover, in many parts of Latin America criminal groups
exercise high levels of control over rural and urban territories, where they impose their own set of
rules and social orders. These activities undermine the states’ capacity to control what is going on
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in their territories, thereby facilitating the spread of other criminal activities like the trafficking of
arms, human beings, and the provision of multiple illegal goods and services.186
A fourth branch of criticism argues that prohibition is prone to cause large-scale violence.
Drug-related violence is particularly high when several groups of traffickers compete over the
same territories, routes, and markets. Different to legal markets, such disputes are often resolved
through the use of force. Drug-related violence is also common when the state goes after criminal
groups. On the one hand, repression and persecution can lead to direct violent responses by the
traffickers. However, the arrest of criminal leaders may also inspire conflicts of succession in
between and within criminal groups.187 Especially in Colombia and Central America the abovestated dynamics have led to large-scale outbreaks of violence that have caused far more deaths
than drug addiction.188
A fifth critique highlights that prohibition tends to produce overpopulated prisons. During
the “war on drugs,” the U.S, prison population skyrocketed from 196,092 in 1972 to 1,458,173 in
2016 (out of whom 450,345 were incarcerated for drug-related charges).189 Similar trends are
observable elsewhere. In seven Latin American countries the prison population grew on average
by 100 percent between 1992 and 2007, with incarceration for drug offenses showing a strong
upward trend.190 Critics point out that incarcerating drug users and low-level drug offenders not
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only poses great costs on government budgets, but also that overpopulated prisons are often used
by criminal groups to recruit their members, thereby exacerbating the above-mentioned problems
related to organized crime.191
A sixth critique argues that prohibitionist drug control practices violate basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms. For these critics, human rights abuses related to drug control
mechanisms include the criminalization and penalization of drug users, including the requirement
to undergo mandatory treatment; the denial of fair trials to drug offenders; disproportional
penalties for drug offenses, including the death penalty; and the violence related to the illicit
trafficking of drugs and law enforcement strategies, which often affects innocent civilians. Some
also consider that the control of territories by criminal groups further undermines rights-based
social orders.192
A seventh branch of criticism stresses that prohibition is based on strong moral
assumptions, which tend to exaggerate of the harms and risks associated with drug use.
According to the critics, these moralist assumptions lead prohibitionists to discount any evidence
that contradicts their beliefs.193 The economist Francisco Thoumi, who presently serves on the
INCB, argues that the current IDCR is based on very strong ideological conceptions about drug
consumption that have been amply rejected and revaluated by the sciences.194 More specifically,
the critics highlight that only a fraction of drug users develop dependencies, while drug policies
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are designed as if all of types of drug consumption inevitably lead to addiction. Furthermore,
when discussing the harmful effects of drugs, several authors stress the importance of contextual
factors including the social status of the consumer, their relationships with friends and family,
their level of education, prior health conditions, the drugs’ purity, poly-drug use, and the
availability of information and treatment.195
The eighth branch of criticism argues that prohibition is not only ineffective in
eliminating drug use and trade, but also inefficient. While prohibitionists maintain that law
enforcement helps to dissuade potential users by making drugs more expensive, several studies
show that providing treatment is much more efficient in reducing drug consumption.196 Rydell
and Everingham estimated that the least costly supply-control program, i.e. domestic law
enforcement, costs 7.3 times as much as treatment to achieve the same reduction in
consumption.197 In other words, the money invested to enforce prohibition does not even come
close to rendering the desired results.
A ninth critique argues that the IDCR is extremely arbitrary in prohibiting the use of
marijuana and the coca leaf, while allowing the use of alcohol and tobacco. The coca leaf enjoys
widespread use among the indigenous communities of Bolivia, Peru and, to a lesser extent, other
South American countries, where it is used as a natural remedy against altitude sickness and a
stimulant comparable to coffee. Most importantly, it does not produce any intoxication. Though
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experts still dispute the risks and side effects of using marijuana, as well as its potential medical
qualities, most of them agree that it does not pose greater risks than the use of alcohol and
tobacco.198
A last critique emphasizes that by prohibiting drug use, the state is giving up its capacity
to control what is being sold and promoted as a particular substance. In the areas of food and
medicine, as well as legal mood-altering substances like alcohol, tobacco, and coffee, most
societies recognize the benefits of regulating quality and purity, while rejecting state regulation of
illegal drugs. This enables traffickers to mix drugs with potentially more harmful and addictive
ingredients, risking the lives and health of drug users.199,
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4.2 Legalization and Harm Reduction
The previous section showed that prohibition has not only fallen short of achieving its
primary goal of creating drug free societies but also generated a series of harmful side effects that
undermine public security, effective governance, and public health. Some argue that drug
legalization is not only favorable to prohibition on moral groups but provides the most effective
way of getting rid of illegal drug trafficking and its engrained problems. As stated by Milton
Friedman, “Legalizing drugs would simultaneously reduce the amount of crime and raise the
quality of law enforcement. Can you conceive of any other measure that would accomplish so
much to promote law and order?”201 However, apart from the questionable political feasibility of
legalizing all drugs, not everyone who opposes prohibition favors full-blown legalization. For
many critics of prohibition, the framework of harm and risk reduction (short harm reduction)
presents a more attractive alternative. The present dissertation defines harm reduction as a
strategy to ameliorate the potential harms and risks associated with drug use, both for the
individual drug user and society as a whole, without necessarily requiring a reduction of drug
consumption.202 It stems from the belief that drug-free societies are not achievable and that the
use of mood-altering substances constitutes an endemic feature of human life. Thus, harm
reductionists assume that drug use should not be a punishable, let alone criminal, offense.
Moreover, harm reductionists tend to promote a series of policies and services, all of which are
targeted to reduce the harms and risks associated with drug use. The most prominent ones
include: providing evidence-based information on the effects of particular drugs (rather than
moralistic “educational” campaigns that portray all drugs as bad under any circumstance);
substitute medication to treat addiction (including methadone, heroin, and buprenorphine);
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medications to treat drug overdoses (such as naloxone); materials to contain the spread of
AIDS/HIV and other diseases transmitted through blood and body liquids (including clean
syringes, needles, condoms, cotton and alcohol swabs); free testing for HIV/AIDS and other
diseases; treatment, vocational rehabilitation and housing; free testing of the drugs’ purity and
chemical composition so that drug users have more certainty about what they are consuming; and
psychological assistance for individuals that have decided to use drugs for the first time.203 The
list of services based on harm reduction is potentially never-ending and can be adjusted to the
particular needs and challenges of a location.
Many harm reductionists also favor the legalization and government-controlled
regulation of marijuana and other drugs. However, drug legalization is not a prerequisite for harm
reduction policies. Where harm reduction starts and ends is subject to debate and highly amenable
to contextual factors. What matters though is that harm reductionists do not want to end drug
consumption per se but reduce the diverse risks and harms associated with drug use, while basing
their decisions on empirical evidence rather than the moralistic views. As highlighted in graph 1
below, harm reduction occupies a via media between the opposing normative poles of prohibition
and drug legalization. It constitutes, therefore, a more politically viable alternative to prohibition.
Graph 1: Norms Guiding Drug Policy

Harm Reduction
Prohibition

Legalization
• The production, sale
and recreational
consumption of all
mood-altering drugs
should be legal

203

• The consumption of all narcotics should be
decriminalized
• Prioritizes public health over law enforcement
• Focuses on the provision of health and information based
on empirical evidence
• Is open to discuss legalization of marijuana and other
drugs

• The production, sale, and
consumption of all moodaltering drugs should be
prohibited, except for medical
and scientific purposes
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Although harm reduction has become more popular since the 1980s, Einstein highlights
that some harm reductionist practices date back a long time. In the beginning of the 20th century,
the United States introduced morphine, and later methadone, clinics to treat heroin addiction.
Similarly, in the U.K. doctors prescribed opiates to a relatively small number of functioning
addicts. In the 1980s, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, and Australia, introduced
more ambitious harm reduction programs. Many of them were targeted to contain the rising use
of heroin and the associated spread of HIV.204 The Netherlands’ idea to separate drug markets by
turning a blind eye to marijuana sale and consumption in so-called coffee shops stems out of this
logic.205
Despite the common criticism that harm reduction facilitates drug consumption, by 2010,
a total of 93 countries supported certain harm reduction services in official policy documents or
practice. The most popular harm reduction services are needle and syringe exchange program (in
82 countries) and opiate substitution therapy (in 74 countries).206 These numbers indicate that
harm reduction has become increasingly important in guiding drug policies around the world and
effectuated significant behavioral changes. The following section provides a brief overview of the
principal actors contesting prohibition and advocating harm reduction. These include think tanks
and research centers, with close ties to academia and government, permanent advocacy groups,
prominent ad-hoc advocacy commissions, and increasingly top-level elected officials and
governments. While the former primarily gather data and seek to influence drug policy debates,
the latter actors have given their cause an unprecedented level of legitimacy.
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4.3 Actors and Activism
Though drug policy has always been a topic of debate, contestation, and advocacy
between multiple actors, critical voices became more pronounced in the 1980s. At that time,
President Ronald Reagan not only tightened drug controls domestically but also elevated the “war
on drugs” to become a key element of U.S. foreign policy (see chapter V). The negative
consequences of the “war on drugs” gave rise to an unprecedented level of critical scrutiny,
contestation, and the advocacy of alternative policies. The paragraphs below provide a brief
overview of some of the most important actors contesting global prohibition, their missions, and
their major claims.
In 1989, the policy think tank RAND Corporation, which had been carrying out studies
on drug use and policy since the late 1970s, opened the Drug Policy Research Center (DPRC).
The research center sought to bring “an objective, pragmatic perspective to this often emotional
and fractious policy arena.”207 Though RAND Corporation does not take an official position in
the debate between prohibition and harm reduction, analyses of the DPRC and their affiliated
researchers have provided numerous arguments that question the effectiveness and efficiency of
law enforcement and supply-side strategies, while highlighting the cost-effectiveness of
approaches based on public health.208
In 1995, the Amsterdam-based think tank Transnational Institute (TNI), created the
Drugs and Democracy Project. Founded in 1974, TNI describes itself as “committed to building a
just, democratic and sustainable world,” while serving as “a nexus between social movements,
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engaged scholars and policy makers.”209 Although the Drugs and Democracy Project seeks to
inform policy choices through rigorous research and evidence, its proposals are explicitly guided
by principles of harm reduction and human rights for users and producers. One of its central goals
is to analyze, critique, and propose reforms of international drug control policy coordinated by
UN bodies.210
In the Western Hemisphere, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has
established itself as one of the leading voices in the drug policy field. According to the
organization, in the 1990s WOLA was one of the first major actors to warn about the dangers to
democracy of the escalating U.S.-backed “war on drugs.”211 It argues that the “’war on drugs’ has
failed to suppress the production, trafficking, or consumption of illegal drugs, while enriching and
empowering criminal enterprises.” WOLA also stresses human rights abuses, overcrowded
prisons, and threats to democratic institutions as consequences of “harsh law enforcement.”
Moreover, it “advocates for reducing the harms caused by both the drug trade and drug
policies.” 212
In the year 2000, the Drug Policy Foundation (founded in 1987) and the Lindesmith
Center (founded in 1994) joined their forces to create the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA), one of the
most prominent advocacy groups in the field. The organization campaigns for a society in which
“the use and regulation of drugs are grounded in science, compassion, health and human rights, in
which people are no longer punished for what they put into their own bodies but only for crimes
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against others, and in which fears, prejudices and punitive prohibitions of today are no more.”213
They consider it as their mission “to advance those policies and positions that best reduce the
harms of both drug use and drug prohibition and to promote the sovereignty of individuals over
their minds and body.”214 Although much of their activism is centered on drug policy reform
within the United States, they also provide resources and expertise to international partners. Their
policy manager for the Americas spent nine months in Uruguay, working with local partners in
their campaign to legalize recreational marijuana.215
In 2006, the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) started building a global
network of 177 NGOs that support harm reduction, human rights, and evidence-based drug
policies at the global, regional, and national levels. The IDCP’s mission is to facilitate networking
and collaboration between civil society stakeholder and empower their members to more
successfully engage with and influence policy-making processes. Moreover, the organization’s
secretariat also intervenes directly in policy making processes by providing their expertise to
governments, regional organizations, and UN agencies.216 According to Gabriel Buitron founding
member and voice of Ecuador Cannábico, who is also a member of IDPC, the biggest strength of
the network is to channel interests and demands from diverse parts of the world and present them
to decision makers within the UN.217
One of the main donors of the above-listed organizations is George Soros’ Open Society
Foundations (OSF), which helps funding DPA, IDPC, TNI and WOLA. Moreover, since 2008,
the OSFs have their own Global Drug Policy Program, which supports “national and regional
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entities in their aim to decriminalize the possession of all drugs, and emphasize alternative
approaches to regulated access to a variety of currently illicit drugs.”218
While the above-listed organizations have successfully brought the contestation of
prohibition and the advocacy of harm reduction into the center of drug policy debates, in recent
years two further organizations have provided the growing advocacy network with additional
legitimacy. In 2009, former presidents from Brazil (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 1995-2002),
Colombia (César Gaviria, 1990-1994), and Mexico (Ernesto Zedillo, 1994-2000), all of whom
supported “drug war” policies while they were in office, created the Latin American Commission
on Drugs and Democracy (LACDD). The Commission released a statement and book in which
they advocated an in-depth paradigm shift to the drug problem in Latin America, calling for the
end of the “war on drugs” and proposing policies based on harm reduction, decriminalization and
depenalization, prevention, and public health. The document was supported by 17 well-known
personalities from Latin America, including the winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature Mario
Vargas Llosa from Peru.219 Building on the experience of the LACDD, in 2011 its participants
helped create and joined the more prominent Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP) whose
founding members include twelve former heads of state and a former UN Secretary General (Kofi
Annan).220 Since its foundation, the GCDP has published yearly reports. The first three
highlighted several negative consequences of the “war on drugs” with a particular emphasis on
health-related aspects. The latter ones suggested alternatives to current policies prioritizing
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health-based approaches; ensuring access to controlled medicines; decriminalizing drug use and
personal possession; relying on alternatives to punishment for non-violent, low-level actors in
illicit drug markets; regulating the drug markets; and lowering the impact of organized crime and
“its corruptive and violent influence.”221
While retired presidents and politicians have been much more outspoken in their criticism
of the “war on drugs,” some presidents have joined their ranks while in office. In 2012,
Guatemala’s president, Otto Pérez Molina (2012-2015), argued that drugs should be legally
available in highly regulated markets: “Guatemala will not fail to honour any of its international
commitments to fighting drug trafficking. But nor are we willing to continue as dumb witnesses
to a global self-deceit. We cannot eradicate global drug markets, but we can certainly regulate
them as we have done with alcohol and tobacco markets. Drug abuse, alcoholism and tobacco
should be treated as public health problems, not criminal justice issues.”222 Uruguay’s José
Mujica (2010-2015) often defended his country’s marijuana legalization in opposition to
traditional “drug war” policies: “In Latin America, the repressive policies we have been
practicing for the past 50 years are failing. We have to fight to take back the market from drug
traffickers.”223 During his time in office the Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos (20102018) criticized the “war on drugs” and campaigned for new policy models. In his last
intervention at the UNGA, Santos characterized the “war on drugs” as a remedy that has been
much worse than the disease. He argued that it is necessary to arrive at a consensus not to
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criminalize addicts and to understand drug consumption as a matter of public health and not
criminal policy. He also suggested to discuss responsible regulation, search for new ways to
diminish criminal groups, and to confront consumption by dedicating more resources to
prevention, attention, and reducing drug harms.224 Most recently, Mexico’s newly elected
president, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (2018-), has indicated that he is willing to consider the
legalization of certain narcotics during his government.225
The increasing shift in the debate on drug policies has also changed the way in which
some regional intergovernmental organizations (IOs) discuss drug-related challenged. Following
the Sixth Summit of the Americas in 2012 in Cartagena, the Organization of American States
(OAS) prepared two reports on the region’s drug-related challenges. The first one assessed the
extent of different drug-related problems in the Americas, including the negative consequences of
current drug-control policies. Moreover, it called for a greater emphasis on public health and a
flexibilization of the current IDCR, while considering it “worthwhile to assess existing signals
and trends that lean toward the decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale, and use
of marijuana.”226 The second report analyzed four different scenarios that could help alleviate the
region’s drug-related challenges for the period from 2013 to 2025. One of the scenarios, called
“pathways,” addressed the drug problem by “trying out and learning from alternative legal and
regulatory regimes, starting with cannabis,” and “reallocation of resources from controlling drugs
and drug users to preventing and treating problematic use; shrinkage of some criminal markets
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and profits through regulation.”227 The OAS reports represent a significant departure from the
past, in which different variations of prohibition were the only available options to many
governments. Today, the legalization of marijuana, and potentially other drugs, is considered a
real alternative despite the fact that the existing legal framework considers it illegal.
Taken together, the interrelated the bottom-up activism of civil society stakeholders, the
high-profile campaigns by former and incumbent presidents, and the discussion of alternatives to
prohibition in the OAS embody significant normative change. Although prohibition remains the
most important norm in guiding drug policies across the globe, it has become strongly contested
while harm reduction has risen in prominence. Especially in Europe, the Americas, and Oceania,
it constitutes a real alternative to policy makers. As outlined in chapter VI on the impact of
international norms on policy choices as well as the case study on Uruguay (chapter VII), the
rising prominence of harm reduction not only creates new incentives for governments to change
their drug policies, but also allows them to justify these changes to domestic constituencies and
the international community. However, the changing normative environment does not only affect
the policy choices of governments, but, as detailed below, has been accommodated by a certain
flexibilization of the IDCR.
4.4 Changes in the System: The Flexibilization of International Drug Control
As it was highlighted in the previous chapter, global prohibition is not a natural state of
affairs but the result of a long-term process that was met with significant resistance and
skepticism about its practical feasibility. However, with each new treaty prohibition became
stronger and set out more restrictive provisions for the members of the IDCR. The 1961 Single
Convention cemented prohibition as the overarching norm in guiding drug policy across the
globe. According to McAllister, up to the 1960s “Control officials rarely considered issues of
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demand, had little knowledge about addicts, and seldom examined the relationship between
regulatory measures and illicit activity. Control advocates believed that if only the rules could be
drawn out properly, and if only governments carried out their obligations, the problem would
recede.”228 This changed in the late 1960s, when drug consumption became more widespread in
different parts of the world. Especially in the U.S. a variety of drugs, including heroin, cannabis,
cocaine, and LSD enjoyed growing popularity. As drug consumption entered mainstream society
proponents of medical, psychological, and sociological approaches to drug use gained credibility.
This meant that the prohibitionist enforcement model came under increased scrutiny.229
Furthermore, some governments started to devote attention, money, and organizational resources
to investigations about the nature of addiction, treatment programs, rehabilitation schemes, and
preventive education.230 The above-mentioned harm reduction policies in Australia, Canada, and
Europe grew out of this first wave of envisioning alternative models to drug-related challenges.
The new thinking also left its mark on international treaties. Art. 20 of the 1971
Convention, for the first time, recommended its parties to implement practical measures for the
prevention, treatment, education, after-care, and social reintegration of persons involved in “drug
abuse.”231 Similarly, the 1972 Amendment to the Single Convention allowed states to pursue
rehabilitation and treatment as alternatives to incarceration.232 This tendency of acknowledging
the complexity of drug-related challenges continued in the 1980s when the WHO, the CND, and
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the INCB increasingly addressed issues of definition, etiology, and prevention.233 This made an
impact on the 1988 Convention on Illicit Traffic. While previous treaties focused entirely on the
licit and illicit supplies of drugs, the 1988 Convention sought to “eliminate the root causes of the
problem of abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including the illicit demand for
such drugs and substances.”234 Art. 14 §4 stated “The Parties shall adopt appropriate measures
aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
with a view to reducing human suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit traffic.”235
Such language acknowledged that the “illicit supply” of drugs was actually fueled by an “illicit
demand” for these substances and that focusing entirely on the supply side of the problem was not
enough. Furthermore, art. 14 §2 issued that measures to eradicate illicit cultivations “shall respect
fundamental human rights and shall take due account of traditional licit uses, where there is
historic evidence of such use, as well as the protection of the environment.”236 Hence, the 1988
Convention softened, to some extent, the provisions of the 1961 Single Convention, which did
not acknowledge any licit uses of narcotic drugs and their ingredients, while implicitly
acknowledging the environmental dangers and human rights abuses of militarized eradication
campaigns.
In the following decade, the IDCR’s agents continued their dual approach of, on the one
hand, defending and advancing prohibition and, on the other, embracing the complexity of drugrelated questions while granting its members more flexibility in dealing with drug consumption.
Due to rising levels of drug use in the 1990s, the UN General Assembly decided to hold a special
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session (UNGASS) to discuss the regime’s future strategy. Under the slogan “A Drug Free World
– We Can Do It,” the Special Session Devoted to Countering the World Drug Problem Together
adopted a Political Declaration, a Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand
Reduction, and a series of Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World
Drug Problem. The Political Declaration characterized drugs as a “grave threat to the health and
well-being of all mankind, the independence of States, democracy, the stability of nations, the
structure of all societies, and the dignity and hope of millions of people and their families.”237
Furthermore, it established “the year 2008 as a target date for States, with a view to eliminating or
reducing significantly the illicit manufacture, marketing and trafficking of psychotropic
substances, including synthetic drugs, and the diversion of precursors.”238 However, the document
promised a “balanced approach” of reducing “both the illicit supply and the demand for drug”
and recognized the “world drug problem” as “a common and shared responsibility.”239 The
IDCR’s increasing flexibility was substantiated in the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand
Reduction. Paragraph 5 of the Declaration stated that programs to reduce the demand for drugs
“should include a wide variety of appropriate interventions, should promote health and well-being
among individuals, families and communities and should reduce the adverse consequences of
drug abuse for the individual and society as a whole.”240
The above quote constituted the first time a legal UN document made reference to harm
reduction.241 In 1993, the INCB became the first UN body to acknowledge the “importance of
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certain aspects of ‘harm reduction’ as a tertiary prevention strategy for demand reduction
purposes.”242 However, it also made clear that “’harm reduction’ programmes are not substitutes
for demand reduction programmes.”243 In the following years, states were increasingly divided
over the status of harm reduction within the regime. On one side of the debate, the United States,
Russia, Japan, China, and much of the Arab world favored traditional demand reduction, i.e.
prevention and user punishment, over harm reduction. On the other side, several European
countries and Australia supported harm reduction policies.244 The 1998 Guiding Principles
underlined that harm reduction should be part of the practical application of demand reduction
policies, thereby giving its members more flexibility in their policy choices. However, it did not
grant harm reduction more than a supplementary role.245 Most importantly, it did not embrace
harm reduction’s core belief that eliminating drug use is not a feasible goal.
In 2008, the Uruguayan delegation, planted to the CND the idea of incorporating human
rights as a point of reference in the IDCR.246 Despite some resistance, the CND adopted a
resolution to strengthen the cooperation between the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and other UN entities for the promotion of human rights in the implementation of
international drug control treaties. The resolution stated that drug control “must be carried out in
full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other
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provisions of international law and, in particular, with full respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of States, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and
all human rights and fundamental freedoms and on the basis of the principles of equal rights and
mutual respect.”247 Following the resolution, human rights has been referenced by several
UNODC documents as a guiding principle in implementing drug control requirements.248 The
incorporation of human rights principles into the normative foundation of the drug control regime
has not only made it more difficult for states to legitimize torture and the death penalty in
reference to the drug control treaties, but also provided states with more flexibility in their policy
choices. According to Milton Romani, former secretary general of Uruguay’s the National Drugs
Board (“Junta Nacional de Drogas,” JND), who defended Uruguay’s 2013 marijuana legalization
as the country’s ambassador to the OAS (2012-2014), the incorporation of human rights into the
IDCR allowed Uruguay to prepare and justify its reform to the international community.249
The issue of human rights also marked the debates leading up to the 2016 UNGASS on
the world drug problem, which took place in New York from April 19 to 21, 2016. In October
2012, the governments of Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico, issued a joint declaration calling
for a new UNGASS to reexamine international drug control mechanisms. Their joint declaration
highlighted the failure of the IDCR to limit drug consumption and pointed out the spread of
organized crime, corruption, and violence as consequences of the regime’s prohibitionist
character. Moreover, it called for an in-depth review of all available options, including regulatory
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or market measures, to establish a new paradigm that would impede the flow of resources to
criminal groups.250
While the proposal for a new UNGASS to discuss the international drug control strategy
gained widespread support, it soon became clear that important stakeholders favored the status
quo. After the CND started collecting national and regional position papers in order to draft an
outcome document, the United States and the European Union both expressed their unequivocal
support for the existing UN Conventions.251 Furthermore, though the initial goal of UNGASS was
to have an open debate about drug policy, the outcome document was presented for approval
without a formal vote on the first day of the meeting, before the debates of the special session
actually begun.252 The document reaffirmed the international community’s support for the goals
and objectives of the three international drug control conventions and the determination to
“actively promote a society free of drug abuse.”253 Furthermore, despite contradicting evidence,
the document cited that “tangible progress has been achieved in some areas,” a statement that has
received much criticism from reform-oriented actors.254, 255 The document was also criticized for
not mentioning harm reduction, decriminalization, and the abolition of the death penalty for drug
offenses.256
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Nevertheless, reform-oriented voices emphasized a series of advances. As highlighted by
the IDPC, the outcome document “refers to the concept of proportionality for the first time, it
refers to ‘injecting equipment programmes’, ‘medication-assisted therapy’ and naloxone (an
essential medicine used to reverse opiate overdoses), it includes good language on the need to
mainstream a gender perspective, and it calls for ‘alternative or additional measures with regard
to conviction or punishment’.”257 Furthermore, a TNI report stated that the document contains
“arguably the strongest human rights provision ever adopted by a UN drug control resolution.”258
Although the UNGASS outcome document was promoted as a global consensus, the
meeting’s country statements underlined how far apart views and positions on drug policy
actually are. While several countries from Latin America and Europe explicitly promoted harm
reduction and decriminalization, especially countries from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East
vehemently opposed these proposals. The strong opposition from these countries highlights that a
consensus on these issues will be out of reach in the near future.259 Nevertheless, the growing
dissent to the status quo as well as the flexibilization of the regime in certain areas indicate an
international context that has become more favorable to far-reaching policy changes, even if these
changes go against the three drug control conventions. This is most evident in Uruguay’s and
Canada’s recent legalizations of recreational marijuana, which stand in sharp contrast to the
IDCR’s legal framework. It will be fascinating to observe how the regime will respond should
more countries discuss legalization as a policy option.
After having outlined the most important steps in the creation of prohibition as the most
important drug policy norm (see chapter III), as well as key developments in the contestation of
prohibition and the rising prominence of harm reduction through multi-level advocacy, the
257

IDPC, Report on the Proceedings, 3.

258

Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, UNGASS 2016, 7.

259

IDPC, Report on the Proceedings, 5-6.

99

following chapter V relates how these developments played out in South America. The chapter
shows how, since the beginning of the 20th century, drug policies have become more
prohibitionist and how, in recent years, several states have incorporated harm reduction principles
in their national drugs policies. However, despite the fact that regional trends in drug policy
followed international developments, chapter V also highlights significant intra-regional
differences in the penalization and criminalization of drug-related activities as well as the timing
of new drug laws. These differences are investigated in greater detail in the case studies of
chapters VII to IX, which examine major policy changes in Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru.
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V. CHANGE AND EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG POLICIES
As detailed in chapter III, the story of international drug control is intimately tied to the opium
trade and consumption in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, primarily due to its large-scale
cultivations of the coca crop, South America became an important target for drug control
advocates. Despite some resistance, since the early 20th century South American governments
introduced new laws restricting the production, sale, and consumption of mood-altering
substances. Although the region largely followed the parameters of the IDCR, the trend towards
criminalization and higher penalties was not a mere imposition. Simultaneous to the advance of
global prohibition, several actors from South America were pushing for tighter restrictions. In
1973, governments from the region established the South American Agreement on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (ASEP, “Acuerdo Sudamericano sobre Estupefacientes y
Psicotrópicos”), which became an important driving force in advancing prohibition in the region.
In the 1980s, drug policy in South America went through a process of securitization and
militarization, with large-scale U.S.-backed military campaigns to eradicate drug production
taking place in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. As detailed in the previous chapter, the failure of the
“war on drugs” to contain the drug trade and its harmful side-effects drove the contestation
against prohibition and allowed harm reductionists to make a strong case for alternative policy
models. In the following decades, drug policies in South America became increasingly diverse.
While several countries stayed firmly within a prohibitionist framework, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Uruguay moved closer, or showed signs of moving closer, to harm reduction.
However, the move towards harm reduction is far from uniform. Most countries from the region
have been displaying partial or complete returns to prohibition in recent years.
In the current context of normative change, the volatility and diversity of policy choices
make the region an interesting laboratory to explore why countries pursue different approaches.
The present chapter thus sets the stage for the case studies in chapters VII to IX, which examine
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in greater detail how domestic and international incentives compelled governments to opt for
different policies. The chapter starts with an examination of South America’s relationship with
INCB and traces how the region as a whole has become more prohibitionist over time. It ends
with an assessment of drug policies in the contemporary period and restates why this dissertation
chose Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru for its case studies.
5.1 South America in the IDCR
South America’s initial engagement with the emerging IDCR was reluctant and
pragmatic. Although all ten states from the region signed and ratified the 1912 International
Opium Convention, only four (Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela) ratified the agreement
before its entry into force in 1919. Argentina (1946), Bolivia (1920), Chile (1923), Colombia
(1924), Paraguay (1943), and Peru (1920), committed to the treaty after it became accepted
internationally. A similar pattern is observable in relation to the International Opium Convention
of 1925. Although all countries, except Peru, ratified the agreement, most of them did so in the
1930s and 1940s (see tables 2 and 3).
Table 2: South America’s Participation at International Drug Control Conferences in the
Early 20th Century
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

1912
-

1925
X
-

1931
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1936
X
X
X
X
X

X = was represented; - = was not represented
Data extracted from United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter VI
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Table 3: South America’s Ratifications of Early Drug Control Conventions

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

1912
1946
1920
1914
1923
1924
1915
1943
1920
1916
1913

1925
1946
1932
1932
1933
1930
1934
1941
1930
1929

1931
1946
1933
1933
1934
1935
1941
1932
1933
1933

1936
1938
1972
1944
-

Data extracted from United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter VI.

In the 1930s, South American states became more engaged with the evolving regime.
While only Bolivia was present at the negotiation of the 1925 International Opium Convention,
seven states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) were present
at the 1931 Conference for the Limitation of Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs. Moreover, five
states (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela) were represented at the 1936
Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs. However, while all states,
except Bolivia, ratified the 1931 Convention, only Brazil (1938) and Colombia (1944) ratified the
1936 Convention, followed by Chile in 1972 (see tables 2 and 3). Despite the relatively high
adherence to the 1925 and 1931 Conventions, McAllister upholds that “few submitted the full
complement of statistics required by the control organs,” while “Coca production continued
unchecked, and various countries became transit centers for opium smuggling.”260 In the 1950s,
under the emerging UN system, many states form South America increasingly cooperated with
the regime, “submitting statistics, promoting police cooperation, and taking halting steps towards
domestic enforcement.”261 At the same time, McAllister states, “coca production remained

260

McAllister, Drug Diplomacy, 119 (see intr., n. 3)

261

Ibid. 199.

103

uncontrolled, opium production recurred sporadically, and illicit trafficking might occur
anywhere in the region.”262
In the 1960s, participation, ratification, and compliance with the IDCR became more
widespread. While seven states participated at the 1961 and 1971 conferences, nine and ten states
were represented at the 1972 and 1988 conferences, respectively (see table 4). Although all of the
treaties and protocols were eventually ratified by all South American states, as shown in table 5
some of them did so reluctantly.
Table 4: South America’s Participation at Major Drug Control Conferences within the UN
System

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

1961
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1971
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1972
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1988
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X = was represented; - = was not represented
Data extracted from United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter VI.

Tables 4 and 5 show that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela were not only
most commonly represented at international conferences on drug control but also the region’s
fastest states to ratify the treaties negotiated at these conferences. Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay were not represented at all of the conferences and often took more time to
ratify the agreements.
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Table 5: South America’s Ratification of UN Drug Control Conventions and Amendments

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

1961
1963
1976
1964
1968
1975
1964
1972
1964
1975
1969

1971
1978
1985
1973
1972
1981
1973
1972
1980
1976
1972

1972
1973
1976
1973
1975
1975
1973
1973
1977
1975
1985

1988
1993
1990
1991
1990
1994
1990
1990
1992
1995
1991

Late ratifications are marked in bold.
Data extracted from United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter VI.

Based on the above data, it is reasonable to assume that, following the IDCR’s
parameters, the region of South America became more prohibitionist over time. At the same time,
the delays in ratification of some states also justify the expectation that not all states implemented
prohibition with the same level of intensity. The following sections tend to confirm these
assumptions. However, the remainder of the dissertation also shows that prohibition was not a
mere imposition from a global regime but enjoyed widespread support throughout the region.
5.2 The Emergence of Prohibition
Coinciding with the formation of the IDCR, prohibition began to emerge in South
America in the early 20th century when Argentina (1924 and 1926), Brazil (1940), Colombia
(1920, 1928, 1936, and 1946), Ecuador (1916, 1923, 1924, and 1926), Peru (1921 and 1949),
Uruguay (1908, 1917, 1934 and 1937) and Venezuela (1930, 1934, 1940, and 1943) designed and
implemented their first drug laws.263 These legislations regulated the legal distribution of narcotic
substances for medical and scientific purposes, and established first control mechanisms over the
export and import of these drugs. Moreover, they penalized the illicit production and commerce
263
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with narcotic substances with monetary fines or low prison sentences. Peru’s Law 4,428 from
1921 and Brazil’s Criminal Code from 1940 foresaw the highest penalties, of one to five years of
prison for high-level trafficking offenses.264 Peru’s Decree Law (D.L.) 11,005 from 1949 even
increased penalties for high-level trafficking offenses up to 15 years.265 However, while Brazil,
Colombia, and Peru (since 1949) did not punish drug consumption, in Argentina and Uruguay
(since 1937) the unlawful possession of even small amounts of drugs was considered a
punishable, though not a criminal, offense. From the available data, it is not clear to what extent
this rather mild form of prohibition extended to Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as Bolivia, Chile,
and Paraguay. While the author was unable access the above-cited drug laws from Ecuador and
Venezuela, there are no traces of drug laws for Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay from the early 20th
century.
The next wave of drug legislations followed the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of the United Nations. During the 1960s, Argentina (1968), Bolivia (1962), Brazil (1966,
1967, and 1968), Colombia (1964), Ecuador (1970), and Venezuela (1964) established new laws.
These laws not only enlarged the scope of punishable drug-related activities, but also increased
the penalties for drug offenses. Argentina’s 1968 reform of the criminal code increased penalties
to a range of one to six years of prison, as compared to six months to two years in previous
legislations. However, the reform decriminalized the possession of drugs for personal
consumption.266 Bolivia’s first drug law penalized participation in the elaboration, commerce, and
supply of drugs with three to ten years of prison, and their possession, even if for personal
264

Ley Nº 4,428 art. 10, Noviembre 21, 1921, Archivo Digital de la Legislación del Perú [ADLP],
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consumption, with two to five years.267 Although Brazil and Colombia did not increase their
penalties, both started punishing the possession of drugs for personal consumption.268
Venezuela’s 1964 Criminal Code sanctioned the illicit commerce, elaboration, storing,
acquisition, supply, and traffic of narcotic drugs as well as the sowing, cultivation, acquisition,
supply, and traffic of seeds and plants needed for drug production with four to eight years of
prison.269 Ecuador ratified international agreements but did not specify penalties for drug-related
offenses until its 1970 “Law of Control and Intervention in the Trafficking of Narcotics” (law
366), which penalized drug offenses with up to twelve years of prison. Although the law did not
criminalize drug consumption, it established mandatory treatment for convicted drug addicts.
Drug users who declined to be treated were to be penalized with one year of prison.270 Ecuador’s
law 366 in many ways set the tone for a new wave of drug laws that emerged during the 1970s,
which continued the trend towards stronger versions prohibition.
5.3 The Deepening of Prohibition in the 1970s
In the 1970s, a series of intertwined developments created an increasingly restrictive
international context. Apart from the 1971 UN Convention and the 1972 amendment to the 1961
Single Convention, in 1971 President Richard Nixon identified illegal narcotics as a threat to U.S.
national security and declared a “war on drugs.” As the world’s primary producer and exporter of
cocaine, South America came under strong pressure to apply more restrictive policies targeting
the production, transportation, and consumption of narcotic drugs. However, the advance of
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prohibition did not exclusively come from abroad but was at least partially driven by intraregional developments. In 1972, representatives of all South American states convened in Buenos
Aires to discuss a regional strategy for the enhancement of drug control mechanisms. In the
conference’s opening speech, the Argentine minister of social welfare, Oscar R. Puiggrós, defined
drugs as a powerful biological and psychological threat against humanity while arguing that the
future of the Argentine nation was in danger.271 In one of the meetings, a delegate Peru referred to
drugs as “a monstrous vice, capable of undermining society in its morality, good living, and its
fundamental cell: the family.”272 The conference’s Commission 2 on Illicit Traffic and Control
used similar security-heavy language when describing the nature of the problem: “the seriousness
of the problem that is invading our society requires and demands the permanent and joint
attention of all the South American countries. A single free flank would mean a dangerous
discontinuity in the fight against this enemy. We aspire to achieve solidary action in the shortest
term, setting clear and well-defined objectives as a starting point for the action to be developed by
all countries.”273
One of the major outcomes of the conference was the decision to establish a regional
drug control framework, the South American Agreement on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (ASEP, “Acuerdo Sudamericano sobre Narcóticos y Estupefacientes”). In April 1973,
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a ministerial meeting took place in Buenos Aires to finalize the negotiations. Through ASEP,
South American states agreed on a series of measures including the holding of annual meetings to
discuss drug-related challenges; creating national drug control agencies; promoting educational
plans to prevent drug use; supporting scientific investigations on drug addiction; enhancing the
training of security personnel to undermine drug consumption; intensifying measures to eradicate
cannabis and coca plantations, and to prohibit the cultivation of opium poppies, except the ones
used for medical and scientific purposes; and creating a permanent secretariat to help implement
the agreement. Most importantly, ASEP signatories agreed to harmonize the region’s drug laws
according to a set of norms defined in the treaty’s First Additional Protocol.274 Said protocol
defined a series of criminal activities that ought to be included in national drug laws. While there
is significant overlap with the punishable offenses listed in UN the Conventions (see chapter III,
note 136), ASEP’s list was more precise and extensive. For example, it included the organization
and financing of drug-related activities and targeted specifically power abuses of professionals
who regulated the licit drug trade.275
The protocol also listed a series of aggravated forms of trafficking offenses. These are
particularly serious offenses that justify higher penalties. They include the promotion and selling
of drugs to minors and psychologically disabled people; the promotion and selling of drugs with
274
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The complete list includes the following activities: a) related to the process of production: sowing,
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the goal to establish or maintain dependencies; the use of violence or scam; the use of
unimputable persons like minors to commit drug-related crimes; being a medical professional;
holding public office; being a teacher or educator; committing drug-related crimes next to
educational or public facilities; and the formation of criminal groups.276 As highlighted in chapter
III, the principle of aggravating circumstances became part of the 1988 Convention, long after it
became a standard in South America.
Another aspect that stands out in the protocol is the criminalization of the possession of
drugs. In the 1972 meeting, countries were divided on how to deal with the issue of drug
consumption and personal possession. While Uruguay made a case for treating drug addiction as
a disease that should not be penalized, delegates from Argentina and Brazil warned that if a law
became too soft, criminal groups would take advantage of it. Their lowest common denominator
was that drug addicts should at least undergo obligatory treatment.277
The global and regional push towards prohibition left its mark on national legislations.
During the decade, Chile (1973) and Paraguay (1972) advanced their first drug laws. Moreover,
Argentina (1974), Bolivia (1972, 1973, and 1976), Brazil (1976), Colombia (1971 and 1974),
Ecuador (1974, 1978, and 1979), Peru (1978), and Uruguay (1974) enacted new laws. Fulfilling
the requirements of the UN Conventions, as well as guidelines of ASEP’s First Additional
Protocol, these laws specified numerous drug-related crimes and defined penalties for these
offenses. As highlighted in table 6, the lowest penalties for drug trafficking, defined here as the
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active involvement in the cultivation, production, manufacture, import, expert, commerce, or
selling of illegal narcotics, for nearly all of the countries were in the range of six months to five
years of prison. The highest legal sanctions for trafficking offenses could be issued in Bolivia,
Peru, and, for a brief period, in Ecuador with up to 25 years of prison (see chapter VII). Peru did
not define a highest penalty in its Decree Law 22,095, but established that several activities were
to be punished with at least 15 years of prison. In practice, this meant that traffickers were often
punished with 25 years of prison, or more (see chapter IX). In the mid-1970s Bolivia began its
first campaigns to eradicate illegal coca, followed by Peru towards the end of the decade.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay all defined 15 years of prison as the highest possible
sanction, while Colombia and Paraguay issued twelve years to be the highest penalty. Venezuela
is the lowest-ranked country in the scale of the highest penalties where traffickers were
sanctioned with no more than eight years (not taking into account aggravated forms of
trafficking).
All countries except Ecuador and Colombia defined a set of aggravated forms or
circumstances that would either increase the sentence (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Uruguay, and Venezuela) or instruct judges to issue the highest possible sanction (Chile and
Peru). At the same time, the region was split on the possession of drugs for personal
consumption. Whereas in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, the possession of
even small amounts of narcotics constituted a criminal offense, penalized with up to eight years
of prison, this was not the case in Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. However, in
each of these countries, drug addicts were obliged to undergo mandatory treatment and would
suffer further penalties if they denied being treated.
In summary, by the end of the decade strong prohibitionist laws existed in Argentina,
Brazil and Colombia whereas Chile and Paraguay had the least severe drug laws. Ecuador, Peru,
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Uruguay, and Venezuela (considering the penalization of drug possession for consumption)
occupied an intermediate position.
Table 6: South American Drug Laws at the End of the 1970s
Highest Penalty
For Drug
Trafficking+1

Arg. (1974) *1
Bol. (1976) *2

Lowest
Penalty For
Drug
Trafficking+1
3 years
5 years

Bra. (1976) *3

3 years

15 years

Highest
Penalty for
Aggravated
Forms
20 years
33 years and 4
months
25 years

Chile (1973) *4

3 years and 1
day
3 years

15 years

15 years

12 years

21 years

6 months

16 years

--

2 years
2 years
2 years
4 years

12 years
at least 15 years
18 years
8 years

-at least 15 years
20 years
10 years and 6
months

Colom. (1974)
*5
Ec. (1970, 1974,
1978, 1979)*6
Par. (1972) *7
Peru (1978) *8
Ur. (1974) *9
Ven. (1964) *10

15 years
25 years

+1

Criminalization of
Possession

Yes (1-6 years)
Yes (2-8 years)
Yes (6 months – 2
years)
No
Yes (1 month – 2
years)
No
No
No
No
Yes (4-8 years)

For the purpose of this table drug trafficking means the active involvement in the illegal cultivation,
production, manufacture, import, expert, commerce, and selling of illegal drugs, as well as the planning and
financing of these activities. Knowledge of these activities and the unlawful prescription of drugs are not
included.
*1 Law No. 20,771, Oct. 3, 1974, [23021] Boletín Oficial [B.O.], 2 (Arg.).
*2 Most aggravated forms of the Supreme Decree 14,203 will lead to penalties within the 25-year frame.
However, when the crimes are committed by a public official, penalties will rise by a third (Decreto
Supremo [D.S.] Nº 14,203, Ley Nacional de Control de Sustancias Peligrosas art. 80, Diciembre 17, 1976,
[896] G.O. [Bol.]).
*3 Lei Nº 6,368, de 21 de Outubro de 1976, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 22.10.1976
(Braz.).
*4 The only aggravating circumstance in Law 17,943 is the sale of drugs to minors. This does not lead to an
increase of the sentences but demands from the judge to apply the highest possible penalty of 15 years.
Although the law does not criminalize the possession of drugs for personal consumption, addicts have to
undergo obligatory treatment. Drug users who are not addicts have to partake in three months of civil
service (Law No. 17,943 art. 6, 10, y 12, Mayo 9, 1973, Diario Oficial [D.O.] [Chile]).
*5 Ley [L.] 1,188, Junio 25, 1972, [D.O.] (Colom.).
*6 Although the possession of drugs for personal consumption is not criminalized, drug users have to
undergo obligatory treatment. Addicts who reject being treated were penalized with one year of prison
(D.L. de 21 de Agosto de 1971. [36] R.O. (Ec.); D.S. Nº 1,139, Febrero 16, 1974, [278] R.O. 1 [Ec.]; D.S.
Nº 2,636, Julio 4, 1978, [621] R.O. 4 [Ec.]; and Ley Nº 366, supra n. 270, art. 22, 24, y 25).
*7 Ley Nº 357, Septiembre 22, 1972, Biblioteca y Archivo Central del Congreso de la Nación,
http://www.bacn.gov.py/leyes-paraguayas/2565/ley-n-357-reprime-el-trafico-ilicito-de-estupefacientes-
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drogas-peligrosas-y-otros-delitos-afines-y-establece-medidas-para-la-recuperacion-de-los-toxicomanos
(Par.).
*8 Decreto Ley [D.L.] 22,095, Ley de Represión del Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas, Febrero 21, 1978, ADLP,
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/22095.pdf (Per.).
*9 D.L. Nº 14,294, Octubre 31, 1974, [Tomo 1, Semestre 2], Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos (Uru).
*10 Art. 367 of Venezuela’s 1964 C.P. is unclear about the possession of drugs for personal consumption
and has been interpreted differently by the country’s judges. In 1974, a ruling of the Supreme Court stated
that any possession of illegal drugs is punishable (C.P. Venezolano art. 357, Junio 27, 1964, Caracas:
Editorial La Torre [Ven.]).

5.4 Militarization and Prohibition in the 1980s
During the 1980s, the “drug war” became a key element of U.S. foreign policy towards
Latin America. In a speech to the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1981, the
country’s newly elected president, Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), proposed a new narcotics
enforcement strategy, which included “a foreign policy that vigorously seeks to interdict and
eradicate illicit drugs, wherever cultivated, processed, or transported.”278 In the following,
between 1981 and 1989, federal spending on international narcotics efforts rose nearly 400
percent, from more 1.2 billion to 5.7 billion.279 Furthermore, in 1986, Reagan signed the National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221, which officially declared drug trafficking to be a threat
to the United States. The document stated that:
(…) the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside
U.S. borders. Of primary concern are those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry,
where a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents,
and urban terrorists can undermine the stability of local government; corrupt efforts to
curb drug crop production, processing, and distribution; and distort public perception of
the narcotics issue in such a way that it becomes part of anti-U.S. or anti-Western debate.
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While these problems are endemic to most nations plagued by narcotics, their effects are
particularly insidious for the democratic states of the Western Hemisphere.280

To implement the U.S. drug control strategy, the NSDD 221 ordered the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General to “develop and implement any necessary modifications to
applicable statutes, regulations, procedures, and guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to
support counter-narcotics efforts more actively.”281 Furthermore, the document directed narcotics
control objectives to be integrated into foreign assistance planning as well as increased support
for anti-drug efforts form U.S. intelligence services.282
To ensure cooperation from Latin American counterparts, the Reagan administration not
only offered military and intelligence assistance to governments from the region, but also
invented a unilateral sanctioning mechanism known as the certification process. This procedure,
which was invented by the U.S. Congress in 1986 as part of a wider anti-drug legislation,
required the President to evaluate each year whether or not the major “producers” and “transitcountries” of illicit drugs have fulfilled U.S. expectations. In case the President did not certify a
country, Congress could suspend up to 50 percent of all financial aid for that fiscal year; suspend
all aid for the following years; and require U.S. representatives in multilateral development banks
to vote against granting loans to the offending country. Moreover, the U.S. could launch further
sanctions, including the suspension of the World Trade Organization’s most favored nations
clause; the imposition of tariffs of up to 50 percent; and the curtailment of air trafficking between
the U.S. and the offending country.283
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Due to the increased pressure, Bolivia and Peru intensified their efforts to eradicate
illegal coca, which were met with significant resistance and ultimately unsuccessful. However,
the increasing U.S. pressure did not only change the operational side of drug control efforts, but
also had repercussions on the region’s drug laws. Throughout the 1980s, Argentina (1989),
Bolivia (1988), Chile (1985), Colombia (1986), Peru (1981), Paraguay (1988), and Venezuela
(1984) created new legislation on drugs.
Hoping to persecute drug-related activities more effectively these laws classified a new
set of drug-related crimes and defined more precise penalties for these offenses. Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela updated their laws, introducing new
penalties for the illegitimate trade with prescription medicines and the promotion of drug use by
traffickers or individuals.284 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay targeted public
officials that facilitate drug trafficking actively and passively. The Venezuelan law targeted
specifically the country’s military personnel.285 Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and
Paraguay criminalized the allocation of properties, goods, and tools used for the illegal
production and manufacture of drugs.286 Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela set up new
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rules and penalties to undermine the diversion of drugs from controlled markets to illicit ones.287
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and Paraguay introduced new restrictions and penalties on the
illicit trade with precursor chemicals.288 Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay penalized the use of
illegal drugs in sporting competitions.289 Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela made punishable the
provision of assistance in covering up drug-related crimes.290 Bolivia and Paraguay penalized the
instigation to commit drug-related crimes as well as the failure to inform public officials about
the occurrence of such crimes.291 Colombia and Paraguay penalized the illegitimate use of
airports as well the use of clandestine airports. Furthermore, both countries prohibited the
production and import of syringes and hypodermic needles, except for authorized medical
professionals.292 Ultimately, Argentina penalized the diffusion of knowledge on how to produce
drugs as well as money laundering or any assistance in utilizing assets obtained from the illegal
drug trade.293
The criminalization of more drug-related activities did not necessarily go hand in hand
with higher legal sanctions. Only Paraguay and Venezuela, both of which had relatively low
penalties in the previous decade (see table 6), brought these penalties up to the regional standard
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(see table 7). Chile and Colombia also increased legal sanctions for aggravated trafficking
offenses. The penalties defined in other countries stayed within the parameters of previous
legislations (see tables 6 and 7). Interestingly, Bolivia and Venezuela decriminalized the
possession of drugs for personal consumption, whereas Argentina and Colombia lowered the
penalties for drug possession. Moreover, the Argentine law allowed for alternative penalties if the
convicted drug user was a first-time offender or drug addict.294 At the end of the decade, Chile,
Peru, and Uruguay had the least prohibitionist drug laws, whereas the strongest forms of
prohibition existed in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia.
Table 7: South American Drug Laws at the End of the 1980s
Highest
Penalty
For Drug
Trafficking+1
20 years

Highest Penalty
for Aggravated
Forms

Criminalization of
Possession

Arg. (1989)

Lowest
Penalty For
Drug
Trafficking+1
4 years

20 years

Bol. (1988)

1 year

25 years

Bra. (1976)

3 years

15 years

33 years and 4
months
25 years

Yes (1 month – 2
years)
No

Chile (1985)

3 years and 1
day
3 years

15 years

20 years

12 years

24 years

6 months
2 years
2 years
2 years
10 years

16 years
25 years
15 years
18 years
20 years

-30 years
at least 15 years
20 years
30 years

Colom. (1986)
Ec. (1979)
Par. (1988)
Peru (1981)
Ur. (1974)
Ven. (1984)
+1

Yes (6 months – 2
years)
No
Yes (1 month – 1
year)
No
No
No
No
No

For the purpose of this table drug trafficking means the active involvement in the illegal cultivation,
production, manufacture, import, expert, commerce, and selling of illegal drugs, as well as the planning and
financing of these activities. Knowledge of these activities and the unlawful prescription of drugs are not
included.
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5.5 Diversification in the 1990s
The beginning of the 1990s were marked by an increasing propensity of the United States
to offer military aid and assistance, as well as the employment of military personnel, to combat
drug supply networks. The inclination to use military force was highlighted by the U.S. invasion
of Panama, which ousted the country’s president, Manuel Noriega (1983-1989). The attack was at
least partially driven and justified by the mounting evidence of Noriega’s involvement in the
illegal drug trade and was widely perceived as an escalation of the U.S.’s anti-drugs campaign.295
Apart from Panama, the U.S. government increased its drug control efforts in Andean region.
Following the assassination of Colombia’s presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán by the
Medellín cartel on August 19, 1989, the U.S. offered $65 million in emergency military aid to the
Colombian government. Subsequently, the government of George H. W. Bush (1989-1993)
launched the Andean Initiative, which was set to distribute over $2 billion of military aid in a
five-year period.296 Parallel to the Andean Initiative, President Bush signed a new classified
NSDD, which allowed U.S. military personnel to accompany local troops on routine missions
outside of military bases.297
To enhance international cooperation, two major drug policy summits were held in
Cartagena (1990) and San Antonio (1992). While the first one included only the United States
and the major producers of cocaine, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, the second summit was joined
by Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela. They were invited because of their geostrategic importance
in the transportation of cocaine to the United States. The goal of these summits was to coordinate
and implement a multilateral strategy to fight and dismantle the major trafficking cartels so that
295
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Ibid. 38-39.
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Michael Isikoff, “Drug Plan Allows Use of Military,” Washington Post, September 10, 1989,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/09/10/drug-plan-allows-use-of-military/e50931987d79-4301-a1ea-529d393672cc/?utm_term=.74b152cc6024.
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criminal networks would have a harder time in supplying drug markets in the U.S. The ambitious
goals of these summits eventually fell apart due to different preferences regarding the role of the
armed forces in the fight against the cartels; fears that deeper U.S. involvement would undermine
national sovereignty; and a lack of U.S. support for alternative development in rural areas that
depended on the coca leaf.298 After the failure of the summits, the United States returned to
pressure countries bilaterally to increase efforts against the drug trade.299 In doing so, the U.S. not
only relied on negative incentives such as threatening decertification, but also provided some
carrots. In 1991, it enacted the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), which eliminated tariffs
for 5,600 products from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
Driven by these measures, Andean countries went through a process of militarization of
their drug policies, which included the fumigation (in Colombia) and manual eradication of coca
crops, the interdiction of drug supplies, the destruction of cocaine laboratories, and large-scale
campaigns against the biggest drug cartels. Apart from these operational changes, the drive
towards militarized law enforcement was also reflected in the new drug laws of several Andean
countries. Venezuela increased the maximum penalties for high-level trafficking offenses from 20
to 25 years, and for aggravated forms of trafficking from 30 to more than 37 years.300 Throughout
the decade, Peru enacted no less than nine changes to its legal framework on drugs. These laws
criminalized numerous activities related to the laundering of illegal assets stemming from the
drug trade, as well as any involvement in the investment, sale, pledge, transfer or possession of
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gains, things or goods stemming from the drug trade.301 Penalties for drug-related crimes were
increased up to perpetual prison for money laundering, heading criminal organizations, and the
compulsion and intimidation of others to cultivate coca or opium poppies.302 Although Ecuador’s
1990 “Law of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances” did not increase the range of penalties for
drug-related offenses, similar to the changes in other countries, it criminalized numerous drugrelated activities including the laundering of illegal assets and any active or passive assistance to
drug traffickers. The most striking aspect about the new law, however, was the criminalization of
drug consumption. While previous laws required drug addicts to undergo mandatory treatment,
the new law sanctioned it with penalties of up to two years of prison.303 The country’s
criminalization of drug use is particularly striking because most countries in the region had given
up the penalization of drug use, including Colombia, whose Constitutional Court (C.C.) decided
that the penalization of the possession of drugs for personal consumption was unconstitutional.304
Outside the Andean region, Brazil and Uruguay started to relax some aspects of their
drug laws. Although Brazil’s law 8,072 from 1990 declared drug trafficking a heinous crime,
which made it incompatible with amnesty, grace, bail, and provisional freedom, Law 9,714 from
1998 allowed to punish drug consumption with alternative penalties, such as communal services
or even the suspension of the penalty under some circumstances.305 Uruguay’s law 17,016
301
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lowered minimal penalties for almost all drug-related crimes (in some cases from six years to 20
months).306 While Chile’s 1994 law updated its provisions on drug-related money laundering and
trade with precursor chemicals, it did not increase the sanctioning range in comparison to
previous legislations.307 Thus, towards the end 1990s, the cocaine-producing countries of the
Andean region moved towards greater restriction, prohibition, and law enforcement. At the same
time, the countries of the Southern Cone (i.e. the southern part of South America) showed first
signs of relaxing their drug laws. Table 8 provides an overview about the region’s drug laws at
the end of the 1990s.
Table 8: South American Drug Laws at the End of the 1990s
Highest
Penalty
For Drug
Trafficking+1
20 years

Highest Penalty
for Aggravated
Forms

Criminalization of
Possession

Arg. (1989)

Lowest
Penalty For
Drug
Trafficking+1
4 years

20 years

Bol. (1988)

1 year

25 years

Bra. (1976,
1998)
Chile (1994)

3 years

15 years

33 years and 4
months
25 years

Yes (1 month – 2
years)
No

3 years and 1
day
3 years

15 years

20 years

Yes (6 months – 2
years)*1
No

12 years

24 years

No

3 years

25 years

25 years

2 years
2 years

25 years
lifelong

30 years
lifelong

Yes (1month – 2
years)
No
No

12 months
6 years

18 years
25 years

20 years
37 years and 6
months

Colom. (1986,
1994)
Ec. (1990)
Par. (1988)
Peru (1990,
1993)
Ur. (1998)
Ven. (1993)
+1

No
No

For the purpose of this table drug trafficking refers to the active involvement in the illegal cultivation,
production, manufacture, import, expert, commerce, and selling of illegal drugs, as well as the planning and
financing of these activities. Knowledge of these activities and the unlawful prescription of drugs are not
included.
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Law No. 19,366, Enero 30, 1994, D.O. (Chile).
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*1 Law 9,714 from 1998 allows for alternative penalties, such as communal services or even the suspension
of the penalty under some circumstances (Lei Nº 9,714, de 25 de Novembro de 1998, D.O.U. de
26.11.1998 [Braz.]).

5.6. Continued Diversification in the First Decade of the 2000s
In the 2000s, the United States extended trade preferences in exchange for counternarcotics cooperation through the 2002 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA) and kept investing billions of dollars in counter-narcotics programs, especially in
Colombia and Central America. Nevertheless, two interrelated factors started to create a more
favorable context for less prohibitionist drug policies. In the first place, after September 11 and
the subsequent “global war against terrorism” combating the illegal drug trade ceased to be a top
priority for the U.S. government. In the second place, due to the rampant violence and
inefficiency of the militarized drug policies implemented in the previous decade, the criticism of
prohibition and the “war on drugs” kept growing. While academics and non-state actors had been
raising their concerns for many years, as highlighted in the previous chapter in the 2000s
prominent public intellectuals as well as former and incumbent presidents from Latin America,
with different ideological inclinations, joined them. The first high-profile call for a radical shift in
drug policy came from Uruguay. In the year 2000, the country’s newly elected president Jorge
Batlle (2000-2005) issued a statement that called his regional peers to legalize all drugs. His main
argument was that drug legalization represented the most effective way to eliminate organized
crime. The country’s minister of the Supreme Court, Gervasio Guillot, supported the president,
claiming that drug legalization should proceed step-by-step, starting with widely consumed and
less dangerous drugs like marijuana.308 Although Batlle’s government never acted upon its
proposals, it paved the way for a more open discussion about drugs in Uruguay and other
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countries. Some of the region’s new drug laws reflected, at least to some extent, the changing
international context.
Chile’s 2005 Law 20,000 decriminalized, for the first time, the self-cultivation of
cannabis exclusively for personal consumption, thereby equivalating it with possession for
personal consumption.309 A year later, Brazil’s law 11,343 decriminalized the use and possession
of drugs for personal consumption and, similar to Chile, decriminalized self-cultivation for
personal consumption. Although the new law increased the sentencing range for drug trafficking
from three to 15 years to five to 20 years (as compared to 1976), article 33 §4 allowed to lower
penalties up to two thirds if the drug offender had no criminal history and was not part of a
criminal organization. Moreover, the law references harm and risk reduction and has incorporated
several harm reduction principles. These include “respect for the fundamental rights of human
persons, especially with regard to their autonomy and liberty,” the “strengthening of individual
autonomy and responsibility in relation to the improper use of drugs,” and ensuring the
“recognition of risk reduction as a desirable result of prevention activities.”310 Peru’s drug policy
changes were more ambivalent. Although its Law 28,002 from 2003 abolished perpetual prison
and limited the penalties for aggravated forms of trafficking to 35 years of prison, it also
increased the minimal penalty for micro-trafficking offenses by a year.311 At the same time, Peru
showed an increasing trend in the repression against illegal coca cultivation and cocaine
production (see chapter IX). Bolivia, however, started a more tolerant approach to coca
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cultivation, raising the amount of coca that farmers were allowed to cultivate legally from 30,000
to 50,000 acres.312 In 2017, the new approach was finally incorporated into a new law.313
Similar to other countries, Ecuador’s 2008 constitution decriminalized the consumption
of illegal narcotics and established that addictions were to be treated as an issue of public
health.314 Moreover, in July of the same year, the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017)
enacted a measure called the “drug mule pardon.” The pardon applied to people that were
sentenced for trafficking offenses, who had declared guilty, were first time offenders, had been
found in possession of no more than two kilograms, and had completed at least 10 percent or one
year of their sentences. This measure led to the release of 2,221 prisoners.315 In line with the
increasing trend towards depenalization, at the end of the decade a ruling of Argentina’s Supreme
Court declared the penalization of the possession of drugs for personal consumption as
unconstitutional.316
Against the regional trend, in 2009 Colombia approved a constitutional reform that
prohibited the possession and consumption of a minimal dose. However, the reform did not
establish new punishments but obliged drug addicts to undergo a series of educational measures
and allowed for the possibility to undergo voluntary treatment.317 Venezuela’s 2005 law went
even further. Although possessing a minimal dose of drugs for personal consumption remained
312
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decriminalized, it criminalized the possession of drugs with one to two years of prison. Whether
or not the dose was for personal consumption was to be decided by a judge.318 While the 2005
law lowered some penalties for drug-related crimes, these changes were reversed by a new law in
2010 whose penalties superseded the ones of the law from 1993.319 Under the new legislation,
drug traffickers could be penalized with up to 45 years of prison, for aggravated form of
trafficking. These legal changes have been accompanied by a sharp increase of drug-related
arrests, from only 3,374 in 2001 to 112,010 in 2011.320
Overall, at the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the penalties for trafficking offenses
stayed largely the same as compared to the previous decade. While Peru moderately lowered
penalties for trafficking offenses, Brazil and Venezuela increased theirs. However, the most
important development was the continued decriminalization of drug consumption. By the end of
the decade, all countries in the region had decriminalized, in one way or another, the possession
of drugs for personal consumption. However, most laws did not specify how much possession
was legal and left the fate of drug users in the hands of the judges. This meant that drug users
were sometimes sent to prison if they could not prove that they were not trafficking drugs. Even
when users could convince the judge that they were no traffickers, in most countries they
continued to face legal repercussions, especially when they were caught repeatedly, such as
monetary fines, community work, educational measures, and obligatory treatment. Nevertheless,
the decriminalization of drug users established clear limits on how strongly users could be
318
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punished. Table 9 summarizes the diverse regional picture of penalizations for drug-related
crimes at the end of the first decade of the 2000s.
Table 9: South American Drug Laws at the End of the First Decade of the 2000s
Lowest
Penalty For
Drug
Trafficking+1
4 years

Highest
Penalty
For Drug
Trafficking+1
20 years

Highest Penalty
for Aggravated
Forms

Criminalization of
Possession

20 years

No

1 year

25 years

No

Bra. (2006)

5 years

20 years

Chile (2005)

3 years and 1
day
3 years

20 years

33 years and 4
months
33 years and 4
months
20 years

12 years

24 years

No

3 years

25 years

--

No

2 years
3 years
12 months
6 years

25 years
30 years
18 years
30 years

30 years
35 years
20 years
45 years

No
No
No
No

Arg. (1989,
2009)
Bol. (1988)

Colom. (1986,
2009)
Ec. (1990,
2008)
Par. (1988)
Peru (2003)
Ur. (1998)
Ven. (2010)

No
No

+1

For the purpose of this table drug trafficking refers to the active involvement in the illegal cultivation,
production, manufacture, import, expert, commerce, and selling of illegal drugs, as well as the planning and
financing of these activities. Knowledge of these activities and the unlawful prescription of drugs are not
included.

5.7 The Legalization of Marijuana and Cannabis-Based Medicines
The most important development of the most recent decade is an increasing trend towards
the legalization of cannabis and cannabis-based medicines. The most far-reaching initiative in this
regard is Uruguay’s 2013 drug policy reform. The law 19,172 legalized and regulated the sale and
use of marijuana for recreational purposes by allowing registered users to purchase up to 40
grams of marijuana a month in registered pharmacies; growing up to six plants on their own; or
joining a so-called grower’s club with up to 45 members that are allowed to cultivate up to 99
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plants.321 Through these measures, Uruguay has become the first country in the world to have
legalized recreational marijuana, followed most recently by Canada. However, Uruguay is not the
only country in the region that has made important steps towards the legalization of cannabis.
In 2012, Colombia’s Constitutional Court declared that the possession of drugs for
personal consumption remained legal and that it understands the consumption of drugs as an
activity that is protected by the right to the free development of personality.322 The decree 2467 of
2015, issued by President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), not only legalized and regulated the
market for medical marihuana, but also legalized the self-cultivation of up to 20 cannabis plants
without having to apply for a license and register with state authorities.323 These changes were
refined and further integrated into the country’s legal framework by the law 1,787 from 2016 and
the decree 613 from 2017.324 In 2015, Chile’s lower house approved a legislative project that
allowed for the legalization of medical marijuana and the self-cultivation of up to six cannabis
plants for personal consumption. Although the project was stalled in the country’s Senate, Chile’s
Supreme Court issued a ruling that not only confirmed the legality of cultivating cannabis plants
for personal consumption, but also the legality of collective cannabis cultivation if it is
exclusively for personal consumption.325 Furthermore, in the same year, the Chilean government
issued a decree that allowed for the production and sale of cannabis-based medicines, under
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certain restrictions.326 In 2017, both Argentina and Peru enacted new laws that established a
regulatory framework for medical and scientific investigations, as well as the import and possible
national productions, of cannabis-based medicines. However, different to the developments in
Colombia and Chile, these laws do not tolerate the self-cultivation of cannabis plants.327 Table 10
summarizes the most recent developments regarding the legality of cannabis and cannabis-based
medicines.
Table 10: Legality of Cannabis and Cannabis-Based Medicines

Arg. (2017)
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile (2015)
Colom. (2012,
2015, 2017)
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru (2017)
Ur. (2013)
Venezuela

Legalized
CannabisBased
Medicines
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Legalized SelfCultivation of
Cannabis

Legalized Sale for
Recreational Use
of Cannabis

No
No
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
Yes
No

No
No
No
Yes
No

No
No
No
Yes
No

Although the trend towards the decriminalization of drug use and greater tolerance
towards cannabis and cannabis-based medicines indicates a softening of prohibition, this is not a
uniform development. Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela, for instance, stayed firmly within a
prohibitionist framework. Moreover, some countries that have moved closer to a framework of
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harm reduction enacted a partial return towards harder forms of prohibition. The most prominent
case in this regard is Ecuador. After having decriminalized drug use in its 2008 constitution and
pardoned 2,221 convicted “drug mules” (see above), in 2014 the country deepened its less
repressive approach in a new criminal code (“Código Orgánico Integral Penal,” COIP). The new
piece of legislation not only confirmed the depenalization of drug use and distinguished between
different levels of responsibility within the drug trade, but also lowered penalties for several
trafficking offenses. According to the new COIP, the highest penalty that small-scale traffickers
could receive was six months of prison, while medium-size traffickers could be penalized with
one to three years.328 However, soon after the COIP was passed Ecuador enacted a new piece of
legislation, which uplifted the penalties for small-scale trafficking to one to three years of prison,
and for medium-level trafficking to three to five years.329 Moreover, the National Council on the
Control of Psychotropic Substances and Narcotic Drugs and (“Consejo Nacional de Control de
Sustancias Psicotrópicas y Estupefacientes,” CONSEP) presented a new table, which limited the
possession for low-level trafficking to 0.1 grams for heroin, 1 gram for cocaine, and 20 grams for
marijuana.330 Critics of the new scale argue that it became so restrictive that it is effectively
punishing drug consumption, thereby violating the 2008 constitution, and the 2014 COIP, both of
which propose the opposite.331
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A similar trend is observable in Colombia where the newly elected president, Ivan Duque
(2018-) issued a decree that ordered the police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs it
encounters, even if it is for personal consumption.332 Critics argue that this administrative
measure constitutes a new form of penalizing drug use and that it goes against personal liberties
guaranteed by the constitution.333 Argentina is another case where law enforcement and
prohibition are defining the country’s drug policy. In 2015, the country’s newly elected president
Mauricio Macri (2015-) declared the extinction of the drug trade as one of the three main goals of
his presidency. In January 2016, as one of his first measures, Macri legalized by decree and
without any parliamentary negotiations the shooting of airplanes used for drug trafficking.334 In
the same year, he sent 3,000 additional forces of the National Gendarmerie, a military style police
force, to the province of Santa Fe, one of the most affected areas by the drug trade. Ultimately, he
launched a plan called “Argentina Without Drug Trafficking,” which suggests increasing
sentences for drug traffickers and plans to specialize federal and provincial police forces for the
fight against drugs.335
The most recent developments in Argentina, Ecuador, and Colombia indicate a growing
diversity and volatility in drug policy choices. This raises the question of what explains the
growing diversity and what factors induced governments to change, or abstain from changing,
their drug policies in a particular way. Moreover, the developments outlined in chapter IV draw
attention to the query of how the international contestation of prohibition and the rising
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prominence of harm reduction affect drug policies of particular states and why harm reduction
policies appear to be taking root in some countries but not in others. In other words, as stated in
the introduction, the present dissertation seeks to explain different policy choices within a similar
international normative environment.
To tackle this issue, it examines in greater detail the drug policies of Uruguay, Ecuador,
and Peru. These cases were selected because each of them has chosen a different approach
regarding their drug-related challenges. Uruguay’s 2013 regulation of the recreational cannabis
market has brought the country closer to a framework of harm reduction and a tolerance of drug
consumption than any other state in the region. Ecuador is relevant for this dissertation because it
presents the clearest case of a country that has moved closer to a framework of harm reduction
and decided to abandon this approach. Peru was selected, because, against the regional trend and
despite its recent legalization of cannabis-based medicines, it has become more prohibitionist in
recent years, eradicating more hectares of coca and arresting more drug users.
Although all cases were selected on the basis of developments of the past two decades,
each country’s drug policy trajectory offers additional incentives for in-depth research. Despite
increasing penalties for drug-related crimes in 1974, Uruguay’s 14,294 constituted one of the
mildest forms of prohibition of the 1970s. Furthermore, despite the country’s previous
penalization of drug consumption, lawmakers legalized the possession of drug for personal
consumption. In the 1990s, when several other countries advanced “drug-war” policies, Uruguay
lowered several penalties for drug-related crimes. Ecuador’s trajectory is striking because it
modernized its legal framework on drugs in 1970, ahead of its regional peers and prior to the UN
treaties of the early 1970s as well as the negotiations of ASEP in Buenos Aires. Moreover,
against the regional trend, Ecuador’s 1990 law 108 criminalized, for the first time in the country’s
history, the possession of drugs for personal consumption. Peru’s case is relevant because it
constitutes the last country that implemented UN and regional rules in the 1970s. However, after

131

it did so, it joined the “war on drugs” with full force. In the 1990s, Peru established one of the
most restrictive legal frameworks in the region, allowing lifelong prison sentences for some drugrelated crimes. Hence, the three countries represent a strong degree of diversity in policy choices
in different time-frames, which elevates their importance for the present dissertation. The
following chapter VI establishes a theoretical framework that enables me to study and trace
empirically the causes of puzzling drug policy changes.
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VI. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND POLICY CHANGE: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK

The present chapter picks up on the theoretical discussion of chapter II, with a more specific
emphasis on how norms affect the policy choices of particular states rather than explaining the
spread of similar policies across different contexts. While the mechanisms outlined in chapter II
aim at explaining similarity (in policy) despite difference (referring to the different characteristics
of particular cases), this chapter seeks to provide a framework to explain different policy choices
in a similar normative environment. As outlined in the previous chapter, although all South
American states became more prohibitionist over time, there are significant differences in the
timing, the degree of penalization, and the criminalization of drug consumption. These variations
are even more pronounced in the current era in which some states are moving more closer to a
framework of harm reduction, whereas others have stayed or returned to a more prohibitionist
model. The framework outlined below seeks to show how international norms and their advocacy
interacts with domestic actors and processes. Therefore, it is not only better equipped to illustrate
how the regional prominence of the same norm (such as prohibition) can lead to different policy
outcomes, but also how the contestation and advocacy of competing norms (like prohibition and
harm reduction) influence policy choices across different cases.
The framework engages and draws inspiration from the three major theoretical and
epistemological paradigms that have shaped the debates on international norms: rationalism,
sociological institutionalism, and post-positivism. While the framework is based on strong
rationalist assumptions, it incorporates insights from the other two paradigms. Specifically, it
includes considerations about governments’ identities, the uniqueness of particular cases, and the
fluidity of norms as an analytical category. In doing so, it illustrates new ways in which the three
approaches can be combined to study empirical cases. Before discussing in detail, the role of
norms in each approach, the following section briefly outlines their epistemological differences.
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6.1 Epistemological Differences
Rationalism and sociological institutionalism are based on a positivist epistemology,
which assumes that we can explain the social world objectively if we follow strict methodological
procedures of theory building and hypothesis testing. Embedded in this view is the hope we can
detect in the social world the same law-like generalities that we can observe in the natural world.
Post-positivism is more skeptical or agnostic about the existence of an objective reality and
recognizes that our perception of the social world is biased by our senses, language, and the
concepts that we use. Thus, for them, knowledge is always contextual and circumstantial and
depends on our interpretation rather than actual, value-free facts. Moreover, post-positivists are
more cognizant about the complexity of the social world, in which entities are hardly ever fixed
and multiple processes are in constant interaction, which makes it more difficult to identify the
precise causes of social events and outcomes. According to this view, rather than explaining the
social world, social inquiry should try to understand outcomes from the perspective of the actors
involved, taking into account their desires, beliefs, and reasons for acting in a certain way.336
Scholars from each of these traditions attach important roles to norms but differ in their
assumptions on how these norms affect political outcomes.
6.2 Norms from a Rationalist Perspective
The concept of rationality comes with a lot of baggage and is employed in different ways
by scholars discussing the impact of norms on policy outcomes. One group of scholars envisions
rationality as a way of lesson learning from other country’s policy choices.337 According to this
view, if evaluated correctly, norms in terms of policy proposals may help governments to
336
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improve the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of their policies. Though not discarding the fact
that sometimes governments show evidence of rational learning, this dissertation employs a
broader notion of rationality, which assumes that the social and political behavior of actors is
motivated by strategic, utilitarian, and instrumental means-ends calculations.338 According to this
logic, policy makers may “rationally” opt for an inefficient policy if it helps them to stay in office
or advance objectives.
Rationalism’s ontology is strongly individualistic and based on a cost/benefit calculation
of self-interested actors.339 March and Olsen have described this theory of political and social
action as a logic of anticipated or expected consequences (LoC): “Those who see actions as
driven by expectations of consequences imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by
evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other
actors are doing likewise.”340 According to this logic, preferences are usually taken as given, and
expectations of consequences are taken as determined by the state of the external world.
Within this framework, norms are vital because in their presence, actors recalculate how
to achieve their given interests.341 In other words, norms create and alter incentives for
governments to act in particular ways. As outlined below, they often do so by influencing the
preferences and strategies of domestic actors or creating different types of international
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pressure.342 Norms are particularly important in this approach when they are advocated or
enforced by powerful international actors, including states and formal international organizations.
6.3 Norms from a Sociological Institutionalist Perspective
Sociological institutionalism is a major alternative to rationalism in the social sciences.
Whereas rationalist approaches explain social action on the basis of aggregations or consequences
of individuals’ attributes or interests, sociological institutionalists follow a structuralist ontology
according to which the actors, their interests, and preferences must be analyzed and explained as
the products of intersubjective structures and social interaction.343 They regard the international
system as an institutional environment regulated by social factors (including norms, identities,
rules, values, ideas, and beliefs), and reject rationalism’s main assumption that states and other
actors generally act egoistically and instrumentally.344 Instead, they see rationality as constructed
and context-bound, while social actors are following a logic of appropriateness (as opposed to a
rationalist logic of consequences [see above]). In a logic of appropriateness (LoA), actions are
seen as rule-based: “Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities
to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities
between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and
situations.”345 Hence, scholars committed to this position, “see political actors as acting in
accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and
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accepted.”346 According to Sending, “The implications following from this line of thought are
directly connected to the idea that actions are directed towards being appropriate, since standards
of appropriateness cannot be established apart from the institutional context in which these
actions take place, the meaning of which is defined by certain constitutive rules.”347
In this perspective, states that share a collective identity of an international community
tend to adhere to its values and norms: “This collective identity generates a general commitment
to the community and a general interest in upholding and disseminating its values and norms.”348
Some scholars even go as far as arguing that there is a world culture, which sets standards of
behavior in multiple issue areas and has led to a high degree of sameness across multiple regions.
According to Meyer et al., “Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action,
shaping the structure and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually
all domains of rationalized social life—business, politics, education, medicine, science, even the
family and religion.”349
While most institutionalist scholars recognize that there may be good instrumental
reasons for becoming part of an international organization or community of states (such as
economic gains), and thereby committing to its norms and values, they also stress that under
some circumstances actors can be persuaded rather than incentivized to follow certain norms.
This argument is based on notions of complex learning, drawn from cognitive and social
psychology, where individuals, when exposed to new information and values, promoted by
international norms, adopt new preferences and interests. According to them, this often happens
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in the absence of obvious material incentives to do so.350 Checkel refers to this process as norm
empowerment: “Norm empowerment occurs as agents are taught new values and interests; their
behavior comes to be governed by logics of appropriateness that are learned, through a process of
interaction, from global norms.”351 While many authors highlight how states themselves socialize
other states into new normative structures, Nadelmann emphasizes the role of transnational moral
entrepreneurs in the creation of prohibitionist norms.352 Keck and Sikkink highlight the
socializing role of transnational advocacy networks.353
Several authors committed to a sociological institutionalist framework have recognized
that despite forming part of an international community with a strong common identity, “actors
often develop and instrumentally pursue egoistic, material interests that compete with their
commitment to the community values and norms.”354 However, they can be brought to focus on
their collective interests and honor their community’s obligations through rhetorical strategies
that undermine the deviant actors’ reputation and standing. Shaming, the public exposure of
illegitimate goals and behaviors, is a prominent tool to remind such actors of their community’s
350
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obligations. Schimmelfennig argues that in order to be effective, “shaming requires that actors
have declared their general support of the standard of legitimacy at an earlier point in time—
either out of a sincere belief in its rightfulness or for instrumental reasons. When, in a specific
situation, actors would prefer to deviate from the standard because it contradicts their selfinterest, members of their community can shame them into compliance by exposing the
inconsistency between their declarations and their current behavior.”355 Through shaming and
similar techniques, the failure to comply with a norm may result in a loss of international standing
and prestige, especially among those states that share a common identity. In this sense, actors do
not necessarily follow a LoA because of a deeply held-conviction, but because of the social
pressure upheld by other actors.
In addition to the regulative function of norms, which tends to constrain political
behavior through an overarching social structure that induces actors to follow them, Klotz
highlights that norms also have a constitutive role.356 According to her, under certain conditions,
global norms have the capacity to reconstitute state interests, even of the most powerful states.357
She presents evidence for her claim in a case study of how global norms on racial equality have
entered the domestic political debate in the United States, where prominent civil society
organizations pressured congressional leaders to take a tougher stance on the apartheid regime.
This led to congressional sanctions against the South African government, even though these
sanctions contradicted U.S. economic and strategic interests. According to Klotz, “Focusing in
this way on transnational transmission mechanisms and connecting congressional sanctions
policy with a global norm opens domestic political processes directly to systemic influences and
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demonstrates a broader role for norms, including substantive effects on states' definitions of their
interests. (…) Norms are not simply an ethical alternative to or constraint on self-interest. Rather,
in the constructivist view, system-level norms play an explanatory role.”358
The theoretical and empirical illustrations that norms play important regulative and
constitutive roles in world politics raise the question of how norms come into existence, and how
scholars explain their varying influence over time? Recognizing that norms come in various
levels of strength and with different levels of agreement, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that one
way to understand the dynamics of normative influence is by a model they call the “life cycle of
norms.”359 The “life cycle” consists of three stages, each of which entails a different logic of how
norms are expanded, and how they come to matter. During the first stage, ‘norm emergence,’ socalled norm entrepreneurs, inspired by altruism, empathy, and ideational commitment, seek to
establish norms by persuading other actors to follow them. In other words, norms are actively
built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.
This stage does not proceed in a normative vacuum, but a highly contested normative space,
where they compete with other norms and perceptions of interest. To challenge existing logics of
appropriateness, activists may need to be explicitly inappropriate.360 A common tool used by
norm entrepreneurs is framing, the construction of a cognitive frame, which calls attention or
creates issues by “using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”361 One way of
exerting pressure on governments is through linkages with domestic actors that are able to put
pressure on their respective governments and push for a policy change.
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The second stage, labelled as ‘norm cascade,’ follows after a critical mass of states has
been persuaded to become norm leaders and adapt new norms. At this moment, the norm reaches
a threshold or tipping point: “What happens at the tipping point is that enough states and enough
critical states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behavior for the identity called “state”
or some relevant subset of states.”362 After the tipping point has been reached, more countries
begin to adopt new norms, even without strong domestic pressure. During this second stage, a
process of international socialization induces norm breakers to become norm followers.363
Motives for following and advancing norms include legitimacy, reputation, and esteem.
In the third stage, called ‘internalization,’ norms become so deeply embedded in
institutions and social practices that they cease to be a topic of debate and contestation. According
to the authors, it is because of this “taken-for-granted quality” that political scientists often ignore
internalized norms.364
Checkel has called attention to the fact that even though sociological institutionalists
often rely on social pressure (through international organization and social movements) rather
than direct material incentives to explain norm following, the choice mechanism is highly
rationalist based on a consequentialist theory of action:
Although not using the same terminology, constructivists have documented how
compliance—especially at the elite level—is a game of cost/benefit analysis, with the
diffusion of new social norms changing such calculations. Like many regime and
bargaining theorists, these scholars emphasize the role of sanctioning in promoting
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compliance. The sanctioning force (a social norm) and the mechanism (NGO shaming)
are different, but the behavioral logics and choice mechanisms appear similar.365

Following Checkel’s critique, this dissertation views a large part of the sociological
institutionalist scholarship as an extension of rationalism. While sociological institutionalists
acknowledge that social actors sometimes pursue non-material goals and may dedicate their lives
to moral and idealistic causes, most actors adapt and follow norms not necessarily because they
believe in them, but because they have material and social incentives to do so. This behavioral
claim is also present in some of the post-positivist scholarship. However, as outlined in the
following paragraphs these scholars pay more attention to agency and the diffuse nature in which
norms emerge, change, and affect behavior.
6.4 Norms from a Post-Positivist Perspective
While

post-positivists

reject

rationalism’s

epistemological

assumptions

and

methodological tools, much of their scholarship seeks to contest the concepts, theories, and
methods embedded in sociological-institutionalist approaches and its logic of appropriateness.
Sending argues that the LoA has a structural bias regarding both the explanation and
understanding of individual action, despite claiming to be a theory of individual action.366
According to him, in the LoA the actor is motivated to follow rules that specify appropriate
actions only and exclusively by a norm with objective authority over the agent. Hence, the actor
in the LoA does not have the capacity to reflect upon, evaluate and possibly challenge the
365
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structurally or institutionally defined norms explaining why actors act appropriately.367 Moreover,
the LoA can neither account for the process by which changes in ideational structures get off the
ground and are advocated by social agents, nor “the process by which certain actors advocate,
disseminate and in some way get others to accept and internalize new norms.”368
As outlined above, Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s “norm life cycle” model seeks to
overcome some of these shortcomings by theorizing about the processes that may lead to the
development of well-established norms (see above). However, Krook and True problematize the
static and unitary conception of norms and their content within the prominent model. They argue
that “the norms that spread across the international system tend to be vague, enabling their
content to be filled in many ways and thereby to be appropriated for a variety of different
purposes.”369 In contrast to more fixed notions, they view norms as ‘processes,’ as works-inprogress, rather than finished products: “Our contention is that norms diffuse precisely — rather
than despite the fact that — they may encompass different meanings, fit in with a variety of
contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors.”370 Furthermore, they consider norms as
anchored in language and revealed by repeated speech acts, leading to a semblance of
permanence or institutionalization. Through the ongoing constitution of norms, social agents
identify and give meaning to policy problems. Thus, scholars should focus on how norms get
constructed and evolve over time, first, in response to debates over their ‘internal’ definition,
related to competing meanings of the norm (internal dynamism), and, second, in interaction with
the ‘external’ normative environment, consisting of other norms that are themselves ‘in process’
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(external dynamism).371 Therefore, “The life cycles of international norms do not resemble linear
models of norm emergence and diffusion; rather, these trajectories are fraught with contestation
and reversals as state and non-state actors compete to identify, define and implement these
norms.”372 Ultimately, they argue that dynamism is a double-edged sword. While it promotes the
creation of new norms, it also increases possibilities for advocates to lose control over their
meanings and, in turn, over how new norms are implemented.373
Building on the critiques expressed by Sending, and Krook and True, Hofferberth and
Weber propose to conceptualize norms as points of moral orientation and reference for creative
social agents. For them, norms can be utilized by agents in two major ways:
Firstly, by drawing on norms, actors are able to make sense of indeterminate situations
with which they are constantly confronted. As conscious and familiar manifestations of
often unconscious, deep-seated beliefs and patterns of interpretation, agents refer to
norms for guidance. Needless to say, in all but the most routinised situations, agents can
— and at the same time have to — choose from a variety of different and often
conflicting norms and relate them creatively to the situation at hand. Secondly, in the
process of referring to norms in a particular context, actors not merely invoke them as
they are, but reinterpret their meaning. While every reference to a norm, whether it be
affirmative or critical, acknowledges and in this sense strengthens the existence of the
norm, these references together have significant implications for its content because they
offer particular readings. By virtue of being referred to, norms are constantly in the

371

Krook and True, “Rethinking the Life Cycles,” 105.

372

Ibid. 106.

373

Ibid. 109.

144

making; they are neither ‘internalised’ by agents nor do they have a particular meaning
independent of varying interpretations and references.374

In this sense, while norms structure human action, they are also being structured by
human action.375 Given the dynamic nature of norms and the capacity of agents to alter their
content, post-positivists encourage researchers to focus on the communicative processes that
accompany social interactions with a particular focus of how social agents refer to norms to
legitimize their actions.
While post-positivist scholarship shows a greater flexibility in their assessment of how
norms operate and affect political outcomes, similar to sociological institutionalism, some of its
scholarship is based on strong notions of rationality. For example, Hofferberth’s and Weber’s
view of norms as guiding devices in indeterminate situation is a mechanism of imparting
rationality in uncertain settings. Though norms may not provide perfect solutions for a specific
problem, given the constraints of time and resources norm-based decision making may help
governments to understand and tackle a pressing issue. As argued by Kratochwil, in choice
situations with many uncertainties, norms reduce complexity and impart rationality by offering
practical guidance and delineating the factors governments must take into account.376
Another example is Towns’ work on international norms and the introduction of female
suffrage, national women’s bureaus, and gender quotas in national parliaments.377 Towns argues
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that norms not only “set the terms for what can be said and done as a certain kind of actor,” and
“set out what has to be said and done in order to be regarded as a certain type of actor,” but also
rank actors in terms of a social hierarchy,” meaning “the ordering of actors as superior or inferior
to one another in socially important respects.”378 According to her, “In defining what is normal
and desirable, norms set the terms for what is abnormal and undesirable behavior and provide the
means for ranking those states that do not meet a norm as deficient and inferior.”379 This provides
small states that lack rank and status with incentives to promote normative change: “States that
are devalued in some respect, identified as a less developed or less civilized than other states, may
be under more pressure to initiate change than those validated through their performance.
Devalued social agents may attempt to rise in rank within the existing order, they may challenge
the belittling interpretation of their behavior or they may reject the normative context that debases
their performance more fundamentally.”380
Towns finds evidence for her claim in the fact that female suffrage was first introduced
“in lesser places in the geography of wealth and power,” namely New Zealand (1893), Australia
(1902), Finland (1906), and Norway (1907), and then spread to more central locations of the
world.381 Similarly, parliamentary gender quotas, which were considered to improve a state’s
perception as a modern market democracy and attract foreign investment, developed primarily
out of Latin America in the 1990s.382 The mechanism she uses to explain these policy choices is
highly rationalist. Governments do not advance them because they believe that this is the right
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thing to do but because they want to gain in international standing, rank, and prestige as well as
improving the country’s outlook to foreign investors.
After having summarized the principal characteristics of the main approaches on
international norms, the following sections combine these approaches and create a theoretical
framework, which can be applied to study drug-policy changes in different cases.
6.5 Towards a Rationalist Framework
While all three perspectives offer important insights about how norms work and affect
political outcomes, the framework established in this chapter sides most with the rationalist view.
It assumes that policy changes are more likely to occur as a result of norm-driven incentives that
influence the power-based calculations of governments. Prioritizing rationalist choice
mechanisms is not only based on the recognition that all three perspectives on international norms
employ them (see above), but also on the assumption that governments have two overarching
objectives that are relatively fixed: First and foremost, all governments’ predominant objective is
to stay in office. Even though governments have numerous goals and preferences, which may
vary according to party ideology, personal preferences of presidents and ministers, the political
culture of a country, its relations with its neighbors, and numerous other factors, none of them can
be realized if it loses power. Therefore, the present dissertation considers other goals and
preferences as less important. To achieve the primary objective of staying in power,
governments’ members—including presidents, ministers, parliamentarians, and state officials—
will have to sacrifice some of their normative and moral preferences and desist from actions that
would undermine their shared goal.
A second reason why this dissertation sides with the rationalist approach is that it expects
most governments and state officials to care about the international standing and long-term
strategic objectives of their states. Even without direct and immediate security threats, states are
constantly affected by developments outside of their borders, be they in the areas of inter and
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transnational security, trade and finance, the environment and cross-national ecosystems, and
socio-cultural developments. In general, governments tend to be better off when cooperating with
other governments. Therefore, being seen as reliable, stable, cooperative, innovative, and able to
compromise can be a valuable asset. In this sense, to the extent that governments worry about
their states’ international standing, they may feel compelled to implement, or refrain from
implementing, particular policies even if these decisions may be unpopular domestically. This is
particularly relevant for small states with few resources given that these states tend to be more
vulnerable to external influences.
Despite following a rationalist perspective, this dissertation acknowledges that there is a
role for considerations of appropriateness (in comparison to interest-driven considerations) in
explaining norm-driven policy changes. However, as mentioned above, policy makers’
considerations about what is good or bad are relevant only to the extent that they are not expected
to impose great costs on their governments.383 Therefore, the present dissertation argues that any
analysis of (drug) policy changes (or the lack thereof) should start with an examination of the
incentives that governments encountered. But what are the incentives may drive a government to
change a particular policy, and how are they related to international norms? Considering that
(drug) policy choices have both domestic and international repercussions, the following two
sections provide an attempt to flesh out the three most important domestic and international
incentives and discusses how these incentives are related to international norms.
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For example, even though leaders may seek to implement new policies, which reflect their normative
preferences or which they conceive to provide better solutions to drug-related problems, they can do so
only to the extent to which their citizens are willing to follow them. Certainly, leaders can use their
popularity and political capital to design and implement unpopular policies. However, this may affect their
capacity for leadership in other issue areas, or even result in electoral losses. Similarly, there may be
international repercussions for implementing some policies.
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6.6 Domestic Incentives
On the domestic side, changes in drug policies may respond to three types of incentives.
In the first place, a policy change may reflect, or try to please, the overall preferences of the
public (incentive D1). This dissertation assumes that governments prefer to design and implement
policies that are popular in their societies, especially when policy issues become entrenched in
national debates and prominent domestic actors mobilize in favor of a certain policy. An example
is the current wave of legalizing medical and recreational marijuana in the United States, as well
as Canada, which has been driven by public support and referenda. The other way around, going
against the will of the public carries the risk of losing popularity or votes in upcoming elections.
Therefore, legalizing or decriminalizing a drug in a society that prefers prohibition and
punishment may result in high political costs. Global or regional norms may play into this type of
incentive in two interconnected ways: First, transnational debates, norm advocacy and
contestation, and policy changes elsewhere have the potential to shape opinions and influence the
preferences of a society. Second, international norms constitute a strategic and discursive
resource that domestic actors can utilize when pressing for their claims and campaigning for
public support.384
In the second place, even if the majority of a population favors the status quo or another
type of policy, governments may be compelled to push for a policy shift to satisfy the demands of
important domestic actors such as parts of the state bureaucracy, civil society organizations,
religious affiliations, or important demographic groups (incentive D2). Demands from such actors
are particularly important when these groups have the potential to affect effective governance or
facilitate the survival of a government. Once again, the demands or preferences of significant
domestic actors may be shaped by regional and global norms, while providing these actors with
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discursive resources. Furthermore, powerful international actors may compel important domestic
actors to push for the following of a particular norm by offering them resources they need or
desire. Logically, such a manipulation of the domestic incentive structure is easier in
environments where resources are scarce. As shown in the three case studies, the United States
was able to alter domestic incentive structures by providing financial support, access to
technologies, and specialized training to anti-narcotics units in the police and military, as well as
the countries’ judiciaries, in return for their support of prohibitionist drug policies.
In the third place, governments may be confronted with a new challenge or crisis, which
incentivizes them to act and respond in unprecedent ways (for example, a sudden increase of drug
consumption; the emergence of a new drug; the spread of a criminal network; an increase of drugrelated violence, etc. [incentive D3]). As outlined above, Kratochwil and others argue that norms
reduce complexity and import rationality in choice situations with many uncertainties by offering
practical guidance and delineating the factors governments must consider.385
The impact of international norms on domestic preferences and incentives is strongly
related to the domestic strength or salience of a particular norm; in other words, the extent to
which a global or regional norm, or the values attached to them, are shared by domestic-level
actors matters. Norms that are reflected in the overall preferences of a society are more likely to
have an impact than norms that represent the preferences of a minority. However, as laid out
above, strong normative preferences of an articulate minority may also incentivize a policy. This
may be the case when the rest of society has other views on an issue like drug use but does not
defend or express them with the same rigor as the minority or is further detached from decisionmaking processes.
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While international norms, their advocacy and contestation, and the promise of resources
attached to norm-following may alter the domestic incentive structure, there also is a high degree
of overlap and interaction between the three domestic incentives. For example, an unexpected
event or crisis (corresponding to incentive D3) may alter the preferences of important domestic
actors (incentive D2) or the public in general (incentive D1). At the same time, the preferences
and proclamations of influential domestic actors may lead to changes in public opinion (D1) or
alter the perception of a problem, thereby compelling the government to act in unprecedented
ways (D3). Yet, as the following three case studies show, all three domestic incentives offer
possible independent pathways to a policy choice.
6.7 International Incentives
This section outlines three types of international incentives that may influence the drug
policies of states. In the first place, incentives to follow global or regional norms are particularly
strong when the norm reflects the interests of the most powerful state, or group of states, in a
specific region (incentive I1). Governments may decide to follow the interests of more powerful
states to maintain a good relationship with them. However, in case a weaker state is hesitant,
stronger states can try to pressure them to follow norms through material incentives (offering
additional, or threatening to withdraw, military aid, market access, and economic assistance and
sanctions). A prominent example of this logic, which comes close to the ‘coercion’ or ‘external
pressure model’ outlined in chapter II, is the U.S. role as a driving force in South America’s drug
policies since the 1970s. As highlighted in chapter V, whether or not a state followed the U.S.-led
“war on drugs” had significant material implications in terms of market access, financial aid, as
well as military assistance and training. Although Florini is right in arguing that the spread of
norms cannot be explained by the mere exercise of material power, direct material repercussions
certainly provide a strong incentive to follow a particular norm, especially if the norm-following
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state is in a situation of dependency with the one advocating it.386 As outlined in the previous
section on domestic incentives, powerful states can also push for norm-following by altering the
domestic incentive structure, offering resources to domestic actors that can help them to achieve
their goals. This raises the question of when the offering or the threat to withdraw resources is an
international incentive or a manipulation of the domestic incentive structure. Although in practice
the two processes cannot always be separated, this dissertation views offers that are made from
government to government (such as market access or the provision of credits) as international
incentives, and offers that are made to specific domestic actors (such as the police or the military)
as alterations of the domestic incentive structure. As highlighted in the three case studies, the
United States usually tried to influence policy choices through both mechanisms.
In the second place, norm following may result from a state’s fear of losing its
international standing and reputation when failing to adhere to a specific norm (incentive I2). As
outlined by the sociological institutionalist literature (see above), this is most likely the case,
when a norm is deeply internalized and engrained in the identity of a group of states or the
international community as a whole. For example, the decade-long dominance of prohibition in
the international community made it harder for countries to implement policies that deviated too
much from this guiding norm. The other way around, the declining prominence of prohibition and
the “war on drugs” in Latin America decreased the costs of implementing alternative drug
policies.
In the third place, states may decide to follow a norm to claim a leadership role in their
region or among a group of states that is important to their interests (incentive I3). Leadership
opportunities through norm-following usually arise when new norms offer alternative policy
choices that have yet to be explored. For example, when dominant policy models, such as
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prohibition, are in crisis, a country that is able to implement alternative policies successfully
might be able to offer guidance and function as a model for others. Such a leadership role may
help this country to increase its international standing and prestige, provide it with an important
voice in collective decision-making, and allow its interests and ideas to be taken seriously by the
states that form part of the same regional order.
However, international policy leadership can also be exercised through the degree of
which long-established norms are followed. As highlighted in the previous chapter, although
prohibition took hold in all South American states, some of them embraced the approach much
forcefully more than others. While the embrace of prohibition could be the result of domestic
incentives, or material or social international pressures, government may also advance prohibition
to claim a leadership role in advancing this approach. In doing so, they can appeal to stronger
states or the international community, showing that they are worthy of further support. In the area
of drug policy, indicators of such leadership are quick implementations of new UN regulations,
enacting disproportionately high penalties in drug laws, seeking elections into IDCR bodies, or
any other behavior that is not done out of necessity or pressure, but to appeal to other actors. A
clear example of this type of leadership was Ecuador’s successful attempt to gain access to the
ATPA in the early 1990s by underlining its commitment to the “war on drugs” through a highly
prohibitionist new drug law (see chapter VIII).
Similar to manipulations of the domestic incentive structure by stronger states, small
states with fewer resources can be expected to be more susceptible to international incentives.
Yet, as shown in the three case studies, international incentives are most effective, when they
interact and overlap with domestic ones. After having outlined and discussed the most important
domestic and international incentives that may induce governments to change their drug policies
(see table 11 for a summary), the following section discusses how this framework can be applied.
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Table 11: Domestic and International Incentives to Change Drug Policies
1.
2.
3.

Domestic Incentives
Overall preferences of the public (D1)
Demands of parts of important domestic
actors (D2)
Crisis or choice situation that requires a
new state response (D3)

International Incentives
Pressures and material incentives by a regional
leader (I1)
Loss of international standing and reputation
when failing to comply with a norm (I2)
Leadership through norm-following to gain
prestige or resources (I3)

6.8 Applying the Framework
The above-outlined framework is theoretical in the sense that it follows a rationalist logic
of how international norms work, specifies the most important incentives for governments to
change their drug policy, and discusses how each of these incentives are related to international
norms. Moreover, after having outlined the most important domestic and international incentives,
it is possible to make a series of theoretically founded claims to further specify how these
incentives may influence drug policies: First, logically, the more incentives there are for a
government to follow a norm, the more rises the likelihood that it will happen. Second, the
incentive structure may pull governments in different directions. In such cases it matters, which
incentives a government views as more important. Third, in general, domestic incentives are more
important than international ones. This is because the goal to stay in power outweighs the goal to
maintain good international standing and relationships. And fourth, as outlined above countries
with fewer resources are more likely to respond to international incentives or be subject to
manipulations of their domestic incentive structure, given that they are more vulnerable to outside
influences, and depend more on cooperation with others.
Though these assumptions provide some guidance on when governments may opt for a
policy change, which types of international or domestic incentives matter most cannot be
assumed a priori but needs to be detected through in-depth research. Moreover, as the abovestated incentives exemplify diverse ways in which norms operate, this dissertation’s framework
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does not offer a coherent and parsimonious theory of how drug-policy changes happen. In its
stead, it constitutes a theory-driven research strategy and toolkit to investigate different policy
choices of states that form part of the same normative environment. In this framework, each
incentive constitutes a possible cause for a policy change. Through the analysis of the process and
sequence of events that have preceded major policy changes, researchers can gather evidence in
favor or against each of these incentives, thereby detecting which of them mattered, and
evaluating which ones were more important than others. This includes an assessment of the
domestic and international actors that have advocated (or rallied against) policy changes; the
strategies these actors used to bring about policy change, including their utilization of
international norms; how governments responded to domestic and international demands; and
how governments justified changes of their respective policies. To detect and reconstruct which
types of incentives induced governments to change their policies at a given moment, researchers
can draw from a wide range of sources, including newspaper articles and media reports; the
communicative trails of the actors involved in the debates on drug policy (policy briefs, position
papers, statements to the public, etc.); public opinion data; parliamentary debates and protocols of
parliamentary commissions; diplomatic cables; expert interviews; and the available secondary
literature.
6.9 Why Rationalism Is Not Enough: Identity, Context, and the Dynamic Content of
Norms
As explained above, this dissertation’s framework is rationalist in the sense that it
assumes that political decisions are primarily based on instrumental means-ends calculations,
rather than considerations of appropriateness and goodwill. However, when determining which
types of calculations and incentives mattered most to a government, researchers inevitably have
to confront considerations about identity, which are central to sociological institutionalism, as
well as several unique characteristics of the cases, which are prominent in post-positivism. This
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dissertation also acknowledges the post-positivist insight that the content of norms is fluid and
contested rather than fixed. The following paragraphs will explain in greater detail how these
considerations interact with rationalism’s key assumption, thereby combining and reconciling the
three approaches.
Identity-related questions are important, for example, when considering how
governments relate to their regional peers, especially the most powerful states. Rationalism in its
purest form would expect most governments to follow the instructions and policy prescriptions of
the most powerful states in their region (except if drug-related activities are so deeply embedded
in national culture that it becomes an issue of resistance). This fits nicely with the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, when most countries in South America accepted U.S. policy prescriptions while
facing serious and direct material repercussions if they did not cooperate (although the case
studies below illustrate that U.S. pressure only tells half of the story). However, since the late
1990s several governments in the region came to power on a strong anti-U.S. discourse, adapting
an anti-hegemonic identity. Often these governments cited the “war on drugs” as a case of U.S.
imperialism and were quick to expel DEA agents, shut down military bases, and, in the case of
Bolivia, provided a new legal framework for the cultivation of coca plants, which is at odds with
U.S. interests. This indicates that even small states with few material capabilities do not
necessarily follow the policy prescriptions of the region’s most powerful state, especially if their
identity is based on opposing its influence in the region. At the same time, holding an anti-U.S.
identity does not necessarily mean that these governments will adapt less prohibitionist drug
policies and embrace harm reduction. In fact, as outlined in chapter V, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela tend to see drug users as criminals and focus their law-enforcement efforts on lowlevel traffickers. This implies that, considering their anti-U.S. identity, these policies are unlikely
the result of U.S. pressure and that researchers need to consider other causes.
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Apart from paying attention to questions of identity, researchers should be equally
attentive to the unique characteristics of particular cases. Understanding the socio-political
context in which a government operates may turn out to be crucial to explain a country’s drug
policy trajectory and particular policy choices. Contextual features range from the characteristics
of the political system, party behavior, institutional cultures, relationships between the
government and civil society, demographics, and geographic features. Post-positivism stresses the
uniqueness of specific cases and political phenomena and therefore encourages researchers to
acquire in-depth knowledge of their cases while going beyond the consideration of only a few
“variables.” Even though this dissertation does not share post-positivism’s suspicion of research
seeking to identify the conditions and causes of social outcomes, and analyzing the world as
objectively as possible, it identifies with its skepticism of the possibility to detect law-like
generalities as well as its emphasis on the distinctive characteristics of states and other units of
analysis.
Another influence of post-positivism is its depiction of the content of norms as dynamic
and fluid, embodying different meanings in different contexts. Although some drug policy norms
are relatively static and leave less room for interpretation (see chapter II), this does not apply to
its most prominent guiding norms, prohibition (“governments should prohibit all activities
facilitating recreational drug use”) and harm reduction (“governments should accept drug use and
try to deal with its most dangerous effects”), which can be interpreted and applied in various
ways. For example, prohibition can range from very high penalties for the possession of particular
drugs (or substances used for their production) to comparatively mild ways of punishing their
possession. However, a change from strong to milder penalties can be interpreted as a move away
from prohibition towards harm reduction. Moreover, a decision by a government to enforce with
greater rigor its relatively mild drug laws, can be construed as a move towards prohibition.
Similarly, increasing the funding for addiction treatment can be associated with prohibition and
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harm reduction, depending on whether or not the treatment is voluntary or forced, or by what
mechanism it seeks to assist drug users. Ultimately, the paradigm of harm reduction includes a
multiplicity of measures, including the distribution of clean syringes, testing the content of drugs,
and legalizing and regulating drug markets. Thus, how harm reduction should be done can lead to
various interpretations, even in one and the same cultural setting. These examples highlight that
intimate knowledge of context and meaning are extremely important when it comes to evaluating
the impact of global and regional norms on drug policies at the domestic level, as well as the
precise nature of the analyzed policies.
After having outlined the most important influences of sociological institutionalism and
post-positivism on the primarily rationalist framework, the following section goes a step further
highlighting how the three perspectives can be merged into a common framework.
6.10 Merging the Parts
Rationalism, sociological institutionalism and post-positivism represent the three major
perspectives on international norms. These perspectives differ in terms of their epistemological
foundations, ideas about what motivates political action, conceptualization of international norms,
and theorizing of how they work. Even though some of their positions are difficult to reconcile,
especially their epistemological assumptions and ideas about what motivates political action,
researchers should pay attention to all three perspectives when trying to explain policy outcomes.
While rationalism provides the most convincing logic of how drug policy changes happen
and how they are related to international norms, in and of itself rationalism is not enough to
explain why sometimes governments go against the will of the public, pick up fights with states
that are much stronger than them, or advance policies that will hurt the country’s long-term
interests. To understand why and how a particular policy was designed, and why a government
valued some incentives over others, scholars need to comprehend the political and social
environment in which they operate, as well as their identity and intrinsic characteristics. While

158

many empirical studies do so implicitly, the present dissertation tries to make these influences
more explicit.
Most importantly, sociological institutionalism and post-positivism raise awareness, and
take note, of the contextual features in which policy decisions are taking place. In other words,
the two paradigms are useful to think about and structure the underlying conditions of policy
changes. In doing so, they help to specify, which types of incentives mattered to a particular
government. Of course, the universe of factors influencing a country’s socio-political context is
huge and without being a country expert, it is impossible to know the crucial ones beforehand.
However, when tracing the process and events that have led to policy changes, these issues will
come to light and thereby find their way into the final work.
After having completed the establishment of a theoretical framework, the following
chapters, VII to IX, will apply the framework to analyze drug policy changes in Uruguay,
Ecuador, and Peru since 1971. As outlined in the introduction, the author selected each of these
cases because, despite being from the same region and therefore exposed to the same normative
environment, in recent years each of them has selected a different approach in dealing with their
drug-related challenges. Moreover, all three cases have a different historic trajectory of drug
policies, thereby offering a high degree of variance in this dissertation’s dependent variable. Each
chapter will start with a small reminder of why the country was selected and a summary of what
is known about their drug policies prior to 1971. The following parts of the chapter will present
the main characteristics of policies to be analyzed and carry out a detailed analysis of the
incentives driving major policy changes.
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VII.

URUGUAY’S PATH TOWARDS MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION

The Uruguayan case is relevant for the analysis of South American drug policies in three major
aspects. First, despite being ruled by a military government from 1973 to 1985, during that period
the country never criminalized the use of drugs and established lower penalties for drug-related
crimes than the rest of the region. Second, in the 1990s, when several South American countries
were increasing penalties for drug-related offenses, Uruguay was one of the first ones to lower its
legal sanctions. Third, despite domestic opposition, in 2013 it became the first country worldwide
to legalize and regulate the market for recreational marijuana. Therefore, analyzing the
Uruguayan case will provide new insights on the factors that help explain why a country may
decide to move closer to a framework of harm reduction and potentially provide some answers on
how new drug policy norms take hold in the international community.
Based on the above reasons for selecting Uruguay, the chapter focuses on the country’s
three most important drug policy reforms since 1971: the Decree Law 14,294 from 1974, Law
17,016 from 1998, and Law 19,172 from 2013. At the beginning of each analysis, there is a brief
summary of the laws’ major changes and aspects that are puzzling and deserve special attention.
In the following, the chapter will lay out, which types of domestic and international incentives
best explain the reform process. The chapter starts with a brief summary of Uruguay’s drug
policy trajectory prior to 1971.
7.1 Uruguay’s Drug Laws Before 1971
Similar to the United States, at the beginning of the 20th century, most narcotic drugs
were legally available at pharmacies without prescription. According to Garat, drugs enjoyed a
relatively high level of tolerance in Uruguayan society: “In the public sphere, drugs were used as
a medicine. In the private context of households, drugs were used for recreational purposes.”387
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The first measure to limit their use was introduced in 1908 when President Claudio Williman
approved a decree that prohibited selling a drug for a second time without medical prescription.388
The next measures to control drugs resulted from Uruguay’s interaction with the nascent
and increasingly important IDCR. In 1914, Uruguay ratified the 1912 Opium Convention.
Subsequently, in 1917, the country’s National Board of Health created the first commission to
regulate drug use and trade and comply with the Convention’s instructions.389 In the following,
both conservative and left-leaning media outlets heavily campaigned against recreational drug
use, which was portrayed as a grave problem for public health and security.390
Uruguay’s interaction with the IDCR not only led to administrative changes but also to
new linkages with international civil society groups campaigning for prohibition. The small
country maintained a strong diplomatic representation at the League of Nations and, since 1933,
integrated in its OAC. In the League, Uruguay presented itself as a regional leader in advancing
prohibition and IDCR regulations, and announced plans for a Latin American initiative to contain
the illicit drug trade.391 Although such an initiative did not emerge until the 1970s, when the
countries from South America formed ASEP (see chapter V), in the 1930s the dictatorship of
Gabriel Terra launched two decree laws that restricted recreational drug use and the illicit
narcotics trade. The country’s criminal code from 1934 contained an article that penalized the
illicit trade with narcotics drugs with six months to five years of prison.392 Backed by Uruguayan
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diplomats, in 1937 the country’s General Assembly approved a more complex law, which sought
to implement IDCR regulations. Law 9,692 regulated the licit trade of narcotic drugs, prohibited
all drug use for non-medical purposes, codified a series of drug-related offenses and specified
penalties for these offenses. Art. 9 and 10 declared the possession of drugs without medical
prescription as an infringement, punishable with one to two years of prison. Although convicted
drug users did not face time in jail, they had to undergo mandatory treatment. The sale of drugs to
minors was punished with two to four years of prison, while repeated offenses would double the
sanction.393 The highest penalties, however, could be issued if drug use would lead to a serious
illness (six to eight years) or death (ten to twelve years).394 The law also stipulated occupational
bans for drug offenders working in the public sector, a medical profession, or the arts.395
Despite the introduction of new penalties for drug-related crimes, surprisingly, law 9,692
was not applied in criminal trials until the early 1970s.396 At the time, Uruguayan politics was
shaped by the emergence and terrorist attacks of left-wing guerilla groups like the “Tupameros,”
rising authoritarianism, and, since 1973, a military dictatorship. According to Silva Forné, within
this setting drugs were increasingly associated with a disobedient lifestyle called “mala vida,”
which was persecuted and repressed by the authorities.397 This domestic development coincided
with the rising prominence of drug control efforts both globally (see chapter III) and regionally
(see chapter V). In this context, at the end of 1972, Uruguay’s president, Juan Maria Bordaberry,
who in 1973 became the country’s dictator, created a parliamentary commission on drug
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addiction (“Comisión de Toxicomanía”), which was set up to create a draft for a comprehensive
drug policy reform. In April 1973, the draft was presented to the Uruguayan parliament to be
discussed by the Commission on Constitution, Codes, General Legislation and Administration.
On April 26, the commission approved the law’s first nine articles.398 After the dissolution of the
parliament, following a coup d’état from June 27, the same legislative project was presented to
the State Council, the dictatorship’s legislative body, where it was treated and discussed on
March 19, June 12, August 20, August 27, and October 23 of 1974, when it was ultimately
approved.399 The following section provides a brief overview of the Decree Law 14,294 and
highlights aspects that are puzzling and deserve special attention.
7.2 The Decree Law 14,294 from 1974
Uruguay’s first legislation on drugs since 1937 translated the prescriptions of the UN
conventions from 1961 (and its amended protocol from 1972) and 1971, as well as the guidelines
established by ASEP into a comprehensive document of domestic legalization. In doing so, it
generated major changes to the country’s institutional and legal framework on narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances.
Chapter I created a state monopoly for the import and export of all substances included in
the schedules I and II of the 1961 Convention, and schedule I of the 1971 Convention; issued that
all substances included in the schedules III and IV of the 1961 Convention and II, III, and IV of
the 1971 Convention could only be imported with prior authorization of the Ministry of Public
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Health; introduced numerous regulations regarding the import, export, and distribution of these
substances; and prohibited the cultivation of any plant from which narcotic drugs could be
processed, except for medical and scientific purposes and with prior authorization.400
Chapter II assigned the Ministry of Public Health with the authority to carry out
educational campaigns and prophylactic measures to prevent drug use; provide medical assistance
and social rehabilitation to drug users; typify and classify all drugs that produce dependency;
control the distribution of drugs for medical and scientific purposes; and elaborate the statistics
that are to be submitted to the drug control organs of the UN. Moreover, chapter II created the
National Commission to Combat Drug Addiction (“Comisión Nacional de Lucha contra las
Toxicomanías”), which was empowered to prepare plans for preventing drug use; supervise these
plans; propose legal changes to the Ministry of Public Health; promote the creation of specialized
clinics to tackle drug addiction, and assure that all treatments are free of charge; and create a
register of all cases of drug addiction.401
Chapter III committed the Ministry of the Interior to prevent, control, and repress all
activities

related

to

the

illicit

import,

export,

production,

fabrication,

trafficking,

commercialization, and use of illegal drugs, as well as the collaboration with the international
community to fight back drug trafficking networks. To fulfill this purpose, it created the
Honorary Commission and the General Directorate for the Suppression of Illicit Drug
Trafficking. The General Directorate was tasked to form a National Anti-narcotics Brigade; train
its personnel; create a register to keep track of all drug-related crimes; establish a laboratory to
analyze suspicious substances; supervise customs controls; prepare and train customs personnel;
cooperate with the international community; and produce the required reports for the UN drug
400
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control organs. The Honorary Commission was set up to establish the overall guidelines
according to which the Directorate should work; provide advice to the Directorate; evaluate all
programs and activities to combat the illicit drug trade; and coordinate joint activities with the
National Commission to Combat Drug Addiction.402
Chapter IV classified several drug-related crimes and established penalties for each of
them. Most importantly, art. 30 and 31 penalized the illicit production, as well as the import,
export, transportation, distribution, storage, and sale of illicit drugs, including their organic
ingredients, with three to ten years of prison. However, despite the law’s prohibitionist orientation
art. 31 stated the possession of a minimal quantity of drugs for personal consumption was exempt
from any prison sentence. Art. 32 penalized the organization and financing of the above-listed
activities with six to 18 years. Art. 33 and 34 sanctioned with two to eight years the illegal
introduction of drugs to other countries, and several activities related to the supply of drugs. Art.
36 listed a series of aggravating circumstances that justified penalties of four to 15 years,
including the following conditions: the selling of drugs to minors; a serious illness or death as the
consequence of illicit drug sales; forced drug consumption or drug use without consent; illegal
drug sales by someone working in the medical sector; and carrying out of drug offenses close to
educational, medical, athletic, and cultural facilities, as well as prisons. Furthermore, art. 40
imposed that drug addicts had to undergo mandatory treatment, including social rehabilitation.403
Another important novelty of the decree law was its art. 48, which allowed members of
the General Direction to Repress Illicit Trafficking to inspect pharmacies, restaurants, shops,
cafés, bars, and hotels without a search warrant if they suspected drug-related activities to be
taking place. Although these changes entrenched prohibition in the Uruguay’s legal framework,
the penalties for drug-related crimes were lower than in most parts of the region (see table 6).
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This aspect deserves particular attention in the following section, which not only establishes the
main incentives for Uruguay’s government to reform its drug laws but also seeks to explain the
law’s most puzzling elements.
7.3 Analysis of the Decree Law 14,294 and Its Aftermath
Although Uruguay’s rising authoritarianism as well as the military dictatorship’s tough
stance against the “mala vida” lifestyle, disobedient behavior, and political opponents favored the
government’s decision to change its drug laws, U.S. pressure and support for domestic drugcontrol efforts appear to be the principal driving force behind the reform. The changing
international context in the early 1970s (see chapters III and V) provided additional incentives for
Uruguay to reform its drug policy. The following paragraphs briefly discuss each one of the
domestic and international incentives outlined in the previous chapter. It then moves on to
analyze the most puzzling aspects of the law, namely the decision not to criminalize drug
consumption as well as the comparatively lower penalties. The section ends with an evaluation of
the law’s application and developments in the drug policy field until the 1990s.
Representatives from the Uruguayan government claimed that the law’s multiple
institutional and regulatory novelties constituted a comprehensive response to combat a sudden
rise in drug trafficking and consumption (corresponding to incentive D3). Castro cites a statement
of the minister of the interior, Néstor Bolentini, claiming that the government was compelled to
act facing a new set of facts: “As the drug problem kept growing and infiltrated Uruguay, we
discovered international connections, and, therefore, for reasons of fact, we began taking on the
problem. When we saw that Uruguay was a center of drug distribution—and, where there is
distribution there is also consumption—we decided to analyze the problem.”404
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An examination of the country’s most influential newspaper, “El País,” provides some
evidence that drug consumption and trafficking activities were possibly increasing. In January,
February, and June 1971 there were no reports on drugs, except for an article on the apparent
drug-related death of the boxer Charles Sonny Liston from January 8.”405 In April 1973, when the
Commission on Drug Addiction handed a first draft of the new drug law to the country’s
parliament, the newspaper featured several reports related to drug trafficking, the content of the
law, and drug consumption.406 Similar to the statement of Bolentini, an op-ed from the newspaper
claimed that police information showed rising levels of drug consumption and that Uruguay was
transforming into a hub for traffickers, introducing drugs into the entire Southern Cone. However,
it did not provide any data or numeric evidence to back up the claim.407 During March, July, and
October 1974, prior to further discussions of the law within the military dictatorship’s State
Council, the reporting on drugs was less frequent.408 “El País” did not even mention the State
Council’s sessions on the new law. The relatively scarce reporting on drugs during these months
seems to corroborate Garat’s claim that “Although drug use was on the rise, its relevance was
marginal in Uruguay,” adding that “There were no dealers, and the common population didn’t
know but what they heard from the media about drugs. Few people had access to drugs, with only
some travelers, mostly artists, having occasional possibilities to access cannabis, LSD, or
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cocaine.”409 In April 1974, a cable from the U.S. embassy confirmed: “There is little addiction
here, although there are some cases of cocaine users.”410
Castro argues that the “drug problem” was actually created by the government, through a
promotion of prohibitionist discourses and its influence on the media. According to him, the
government’s goal was to provide a justification for the new law, rather than reacting to a real
problem.411 Further evidence suggests, that the U.S. embassy was one of the driving forces behind
creating an awareness. Due to its large coast and navigable rivers, in 1970 a report from the U.S.
embassy in Uruguay identified the country as a potential hub for the trafficking of illicit narcotics
and raised concerns that Uruguayan authorities were not taking the problem seriously enough.
Subsequently, officials from the U.S. embassy began alerting government agencies and local
media about the possibility of becoming a trafficking hub (see above).412 According to
Ambassador Siracusa, “Inasmuch as this country had had [sic.] little experience with drug abuse,
we used various elements of the country team to create an awareness of the world problem both
among the public and in the government. Given our success in creating an attitudinal base, a
variety of domestic and international initiatives became possible.”413
In any case, although “El País” and “El Diario” (another major newspaper in the 1970s)
frequently reported in highly moralistic terms about drug use and trafficking as a serious social
problem, as highlighted above, even when Uruguayan authorities discussed the new law, drugs
did not constitute a major issue in some of the country’s most important media outlets. This
409
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shows that although the generation of awareness helped create a more favorable context, the law
was not driven by public opinion (incentive D1). Moreover, there are no traces of demands and
advocacy for the law by important social and political actors, or evidence of government actors
pushing for the law internally (incentive D2). However, the Unites States cooperated and
supported numerous domestic actors, providing scholarships and support for individuals showing
leadership in the area of drug control, offering regular training to custom and police officials, and
helping finance drug control operations of Uruguay’s Anti-narcotics Brigade.414 In March 1974,
the U.S. held a two-week DEA seminar in Montevideo. “Police officers from every department in
Uruguay, maritime police, army, navy and air force personnel, customs officers and
representatives of other government agencies” were among the 80 participants.415 It is reasonable
to assume that police units and other actors that received U.S. support were favorable to a reform
of Uruguay’s drug laws.
Ultimately, the government’s claim that D.L. 14,294 was taking a tough stance against
rising levels of drug consumption was very likely to be popular among conservative Uruguayans
and supporters of the dictatorship. On November 1, 1974, “El Diario” reported that through D.L.
14,294 the fight against drugs would be more effective, stressing the new control mechanisms on
pharmacies, the institutions created within the government, and tougher penalties.416
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In any case, although strong domestic incentives for the reform existed, it is unlikely that
Uruguay would have reformed its drug law without the changing international context reflected in
an increasing U.S. interest in drug control and global and regional pushes towards prohibition. By
1974, a total of 100 countries had ratified the 1961 Single Convention, thereby creating new
standards of behavior in the area of drug control.417 In 1971, UN membership negotiated a new
convention prohibiting several synthetic drugs (see chapter III). Moreover, under Argentine
leadership, in 1972 and 1973 representatives of South American countries met, negotiated, and
established ASEP, the first regional mechanism to take on drug-related challenges. Uruguay not
only participated intensely in the negotiations of the agreement, but by signing it, its government
committed itself to modernize its drug laws under the principles elaborated together with its
South American peers (see chapter V). The 1974 law explicitly references the UN conventions
and translated their instructions, as well as those of ASEP’s first additional protocol, into
domestic legislation. Although Uruguay could have resisted pressures of the international
community for some time (as did Peru [see chapter IX]), sooner or later it would have led to a
loss of standing and reputation (incentive I2).
Furthermore, the United States not only altered the domestic incentive structure by
influencing public opinion and key domestic actors, but also made a series of attempts to
influence the Uruguayan government directly. In May 1972, a delegation of the FBN visited
Uruguay. Although they encountered Uruguayan authorities well-disposed to cooperate with the
United States, they highlighted the government’s principal concern was left-wing terrorism. The
delegation also concluded that Uruguay’s current legislation was too soft, that the failure to treat
drug users as criminals provided loopholes for traffickers, and that President Bordaberry should
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be pressured to ratify the 1961 Single Convention.418 Furthermore, in July 1972 Uruguay’s
ambassador to the United States, Héctor Luisi, was invited to participate at a conference of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), where he interacted with the Bureau’s
director John Ingersoll. A month later, Luisi sent a letter to President Bordaberry in which he
recommended the establishment of an anti-narcotics body to fulfill intelligence and repressive
functions; a revision of national legislation; a quick ratification of the 1961 Convention and its
amended protocol; a quick ratification of a bilateral anti-narcotics agreement with the U.S.; a
strengthening of police and intelligence activities; and a reactivation of an inter-ministerial
commission to coordinate the government’s activities in the area of drug control.419 Few months
later, President Bordaberry set up the Commission on Drug Addiction—integrated by a lawyer,
two medical professional, and a representative of the Ministry of the Interior (see below)—which
elaborated the first draft of the law. In an embassy cable to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
Siracusa stated that “Largely through U.S. efforts there has been created a public and official
awareness of the drug problem which has resulted in improved local legislation and enforcement,
the assumption by the GOU of increased international obligations and positive GOU cooperation
which has helped us to interdict international trafficking.”420 Overall, the U.S. did not encounter
great difficulties to convince the Uruguayans. As highlighted by the Ambassador, “The GOU has
since the inception of our Narcotics Control Actionprogram [sic.] taken one important step after
another, both domestically and internationally, to meet our program objectives and has
cooperated fully in our enforcementefforts [sic.] as well.”421
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Given the above account, Uruguay’s decision to reform its legislation on drugs in 1974
can be well explained by the favorable international and domestic contexts, creating multiple
incentives for the Uruguayan government to advance the reform. However, there are two aspects
of the law that are puzzling and deserve further attention. First, the law did not criminalize the
possession of drugs for personal consumption. Second, the law’s minimum penalty for activities
related to the trafficking of drugs, of two years, is among the lowest in the region. At the end of
the 1970s, only Paraguay and Peru allowed for the possibility to penalize convicted traffickers
with only two years. These decisions are striking given that high penalties and a criminalization
of drug users was not only favored by the United States but would have provided the military
dictatorship with a more repressive legal framework.
A first answer to this puzzle lies in Uruguay’s liberal political culture. According to
Garat, liberalism was an important principle for politicians since the governments of José Battle y
Ordoñez (1903-1907 and 1911-1915), which allowed divorce only by the will of the woman,
separated the church from the state, and tried to build a state monopoly on alcohol.422 A second,
and more direct, answer lies in the composition of the Commission on Drug Addiction, which
redacted the first draft of the law. The commission was directed by the law professor and head of
Uruguay’s “Children’s Council,” Dr. Adela Reta. Garat highlights that Dr. Reta believed that
personal conduct, as long as it does not affect others, should always be licit. Moreover, as a
lawyer she defended drug users in trials, and wrote several articles defending recreational drug
users, even during the military dictatorship.423 The other members of the commission Dr. Ofelia
Bianchini and Dr. Susana Cano from the Ministry of Public Health, and Dr. Santos Veiga from
the Ministry of the Interior shared the view that drug addiction constituted a disease that ought to
be cured and not punished. As Dr. Reta explained in an article in “El País:” “The drug addict will
422
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be treated as someone who he is, a sick person, and in this sense he has to be given special
considerations that disappear when confronting the true criminal of the sad story of drug
addiction: the trafficker, the organizer, the capitalist, and the trader, who for their personal gain
take advantage of human misery.”424
When the State Council finally discussed the reform, Mario Gaggero, a member of the
organ’s Commission on Public Health, which had reviewed the law, presented it to the Council’s
23 members. Gaggero emphasized the importance of education and treatment in preventing drug
use. Furthermore, he shared the interpretation that drug users are no criminals but sick people and
should be treated as such.425 None of the Council’s other members sought to defy this logic.
Chapter IV on the law’s penalties was the only chapter of the law that was approved without a
single dissenting vote.426
Despite the law’s strong emphasis on treatment and the decriminalization of drug use, the
implementation of D.L. 14,924 was much more repressive. Especially article 34 and 35 gave the
police a strong mandate to arrest drug users. These articles penalized the supply of schedule I and
II, and schedule III and IV drugs of 1961 Convention, with two to eight years and 24 months to
four years, respectively. As marijuana was often consumed in groups, in which a marijuana
cigarette was passed from one person to the next, the police frequently arrested groups caught
smoking, accusing its members of illegally supplying drugs to others. Although several times
judges declined to apply the law, due to the heavy minimum penalties for supplying drugs, most
of the arrested consumers were still facing preliminary time in jail.427 Between 1972 and 1978,
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Uruguay’s police arrested 1054 drug users, most of whom were young adults. 425 of them went
to criminal courts where they had to prove that they were no traffickers. 217 of them went to a
psychiatric hospital.428
In December of 1980, the military government created another repressive tool for the
police. Through the Decree 690/980, it allowed the detention of suspects when investigating
crimes.429 Within the framework of said decree, the police often arrested drug user, which later
had to prove their innocence in a criminal court.430 This type of repression continued even after
Uruguay returned to democracy in 1985. Between 1986 and 1987, the police made 1,470 drugrelated arrests.431 Between 1987 and 1990, 3,613 such detentions were carried out. According to
government data, more than 60 percent of them were marijuana users.432 Julio Calzada, who
worked with drug users in the 1990s and was secretary general of the National Drugs Board
(“Junta Nacional de Drogas,” JND) from 2010 to 2015, explains that many of these arrests
happened because the police had to fulfill a certain quota of detentions and drug users, although
not committing any crime, constituted easy targets.433
However, the return to democracy also paved the way for more critical voices. These
included leftist youth organizations such as “Brigada Luca Pradon,” associated with the Socialist
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Youth, campaigning for a liberation and less severe persecution of marijuana smokers;434
sociologists like Rafael Bayce, who published studies highlighting flaws in the dominant
discourses, police statistics, and media reports on drugs;435 and lawyers and legal experts
criticizing the penal persecution of drug user while promoting the legalization of cannabis for
personal use.436 The early 1990s also witnessed the emergence of NGOs like “El Abrojo” or
“Grupo de Cavia,” which provided help and social services to drug users, based on harm
reduction. For the first time, these groups provided a practical alternative to the dominant
approach that drug users should undergo mandatory treatment in a psychiatric clinic.437 In this
context, the first debates on a new drug policy reform emerged.
During the first presidency of Julio Maria Sanguinetti (1985-1990) from the centrist
Colorado Party, in 1987 the Uruguayan Chamber of Representatives created a Special
Commission on Drug Addiction to obtain a more complete picture of the drug-related challenges
that Uruguay was facing. The commission was integrated by members of all major parties, and
met several times during 1987, 1988, and 1989. One of the commission’s mandates was to
discuss possible reforms to D.L. 14,294.438 Although the Commission upheld that Uruguay’s
drug-related problems were negligible compared to the ones in other countries, its members
expressed concern about the rising consumption of cocaine, heroin, as well as legally available
gases that could be inhaled. They also noted that law enforcement efforts concentrated on drug
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users and low-level suppliers, while no drug trafficker was in jail.439 Both among the
Commission’s members, as well as their invited speakers, there was no agreement on how much
repression was adequate, whether or not the possession of drugs for personal consumption should
be legal, how to carry out effective prevention and treatment, whether or not Uruguay should
follow the UN drug schedules or create national ones, and how to conduct scientific studies about
drug use without generating curiosity among the study’s subjects. However, all members shared
the view that the minimal penalties for drug-related offenses were too high.440 The commission
also analyzed and discussed two proposals for a new legislation on drugs that were submitted to
the commission by the executive. The first one made a series of adjustments to D.L. 14,294. The
second one incorporated three instructions from the UN 1988 Convention, including an article on
chemical precursor chemicals, an article regulating the destruction of highly profitable
confiscated drugs like cocaine, and an article on the possible extradition of foreign traffickers.441
Even though the discussions of the new law were far advanced, Uruguayan legislators
were running out of time as their term finished at the end of 1989. On November 26, Uruguay
held general elections and, led by the new president, Luis Alberto Lacalle Herrera (1990-1995),
the more conservative National Party became the strongest political force. This signified changes
at all levels of the government, including the composition of the parliamentary commission on
drug addiction. The new members were no experts in the field and out of touch with the debates
that had taken place before. In a meeting with the newly appointed minister of the interior, Raúl
439
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Itarria, and representatives of different sections of the ministry, held on December 2, 1993, the
commission’s members inquired several times about the ministry’s views on the current legal
framework, an issue that the minister declined to answer, explaining the he needed to study it
first.442
Although Uruguay’s Chamber of Representatives rejected a reform of the country’s drug
laws, which had been approved by the country’s Senate in 1992, during the legislative period
from 1990 to 1995 its parliament approved bilateral treaties of mutual judicial assistance between
Uruguay and Paraguay, the United States, and Brazil, as well as the U.N. Convention on the
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances from 1988.443
On April 8, 1996, the government of Julio M. Sanguinetti, who was elected for a second
time in November 1994, submitted a new proposal for a drug policy reform to the Uruguayan
parliament. On September 17, 1997, the Uruguay’s Senate unanimously approved a slightly
modified version of the reform, and, a year later, on October 7, 1998, the country’s Chamber of
Representatives gave the reform the final, unanimous, approval. The following section briefly
highlights the most important novelties of the law and outlines those aspects that deserve
particular attention.
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7.4 Law 17,016 from 1998
Law 17,016 constituted a modification and extension of the 1974 decree law. While the
legislators kept several of the original articles, they slightly modified the articles 3, 15, 30 to 35,
and 50 from the original law and added five new chapters, updating Uruguay’s legislation
according to the standards of the 1988 Convention. Similar to D.L. 14,294, Uruguayan legislators
decided not to penalize the carriage of a minimal quantity of drugs to be used exclusively for
personal consumption, with the novelty that it was up to the judge’s “moral conviction” to decide
whether a specific quantity was for consumption or other purposes.444 The lawmakers hoped that
this would prevent drug traffickers from using this liberty as a loophole to avoid penalization.
The most important innovations of the law were outlined in article 5, which included all
five new chapters. Chapter IX typified crimes related to the laundering of illegal assets stemming
from the drug trade and specified legal sanctions for these crimes, with penalties between twelve
months and ten years of prison. Aggravating circumstances could increase these penalties up to
15 years. Chapter X established new guidelines for the decommission and destruction of goods
prevailing from drug trafficking, as well as the destruction of drugs themselves. Chapter XI
created new procedures and licensing requirements for legal uses of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances in the areas of medicine and research, as well as the use of precursor
chemicals that can be used to produce drugs that require chemical processing. Hoping to
undermine the laundering of illegal assets, Chapter XII set forth new guidelines and rules for
financial institutions (registration, information and identification of account holders; establishing
records of financial transactions; following the guidelines of the Uruguayan Central Bank; and
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capacitation of personnel). Ultimately, chapter XIII laid out new guidelines and rules for
international judicial cooperation in drug-related cases.445
As outlined above, the new chapters followed from Uruguay’s ratification of the 1988
Convention, which committed the country to carry out comprehensive reforms to undermine the
profitability of the drug trade (by making it harder to launder and use illegal assets). The most
interesting part of the law, however, is a modification of the scale of the penalties for the drugrelated crimes typified in D.L. 14,294. Although Uruguay was already among the countries with
the lowest minimum penalties for trafficking offenses, the country’s government decided to lower
these penalties even further. The minimum penalties for the offenses outlined in art. 30 and 31
were dropped from three years to 20 months of prison; the ones in art. 32 from six years to 20
months; the ones in art. 33 and art. 34 from two years to 20 months, and the ones in art. 35 from
two years to 12 months.446 Under Uruguayan criminal law, listing the minimum penalties in
months, as compared to years, allowed the country’s judges to issue alternative penalties or
probation so that minor offenders did not necessarily have to face time in jail. This introduced a
greater degree of proportionality and flexibility to the sentencing scale.
Uruguay’s decision is particularly interesting, because at the time only Bolivia had a
similarly low minimum penalty, of one year, for the illegal cultivation of coca. However, the
lowest penalties for the fabrication and supply of drugs in Bolivia were much more severe, with
five and eight years respectively.447 As shown in table 8, the minimum penalties of the other
South American countries were between eight years (Ecuador) and two years (Paraguay and
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Peru). The following section analyzes in some detail the principal incentives for the reform and in
particular the decision to lower the minimum penalties.
7.5 Analysis of Law 17,016 and Its Aftermath
Similar to D.L. 14,294, Uruguay’s domestic context provided several incentives to
reform the country’s legislation on drugs. However, the more important ones were international.
Despite some reservations, Uruguay saw itself obliged to ratify the 1988 Convention. Moreover,
at a time when the United States intensified the militarization of the “war on drugs,” Uruguay
acquired a reputation for being a safe haven for the laundering of assets stemming from the illegal
drug trade, which created strong pressure on the government to criminalize multiple activities
related to the laundering of illegal assets and increase regulations for the financial sector. The
paragraphs below analyze, one by one, to how the different incentives outlined in the previous
chapter contributed to the new law.
Although there is no reliable data on the public’s perception of drug-related challenges
from the 1990s, Uruguayan legislators and government representatives often mentioned that the
public was becoming increasingly concerned about rising levels of drug consumption (incentive
D1).448 However, rather than favoring a reform, public opinion was considered as a constraining
element to some legislators, which, overall, supported a lowering of the sentencing scale (see
below). In one of the last meetings of the Chamber of Representative’s Special Commission on
Drug Addiction, which lasted from 1987 to 1989, its ad-hoc president, Dr. Mario D. Lamas,
stated the following:
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I have some doubts regarding the last paragraph of article 31 of the decree law, contained
in article 2 [of the new proposal], although I basically agree with the proposition to lower
the minimum penalties included in the same article.
As far as I understand, this is a controversial topic considering public opinion and I do
not think it is reasonable that, at a moment when the public expects severe measures from
the parliament, the only one that the parliament advances can be interpreted as something
that makes the current legislation more benign.449

It is not difficult to encounter traces of the legislator’s concerns in the country’s media.
An op-ed from “El Observador” titled “Uruguayans Have Fear” argued that Uruguayans were
increasingly concerned about the country’s deteriorating public security situation, including
robberies and acts of violence.450 In another op-ed, the same newspaper advocated lowering the
age at which minors can be convicted.451 Within this context, drugs, drug users, and traffickers
were constantly characterized as instigators of the worsening security situation.452
Given this setting, it is highly unlikely that public opinion was the primary cause or
incentive for a law that lowered the minimum penalties for drug-related crimes. A more likely
scenario is that the criminalization of multiple activities related to the laundering of illegal assets,
new rules on international judicial cooperation, as well as tighter restrictions on banks and the
449
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trade with chemical precursors chemicals allowed the government to brand the reform as a
repressive law, which was popular among the population. In line with this interpretation, in a
message of the Executive to Uruguayan legislators, the Uruguayan government stated that the law
would “situate the country within the scheme of frontal action against drugs and the financialeconomic activities that help to sustain them.”453 The reporting of two of Uruguay’s biggest
newspapers provides further evidence of this view. A day after the Chamber of Representatives
passed the law, “El País” titled on page one: “Total Combat Against Drug Trafficking.” The
newspaper characterized the new law as one of the most important laws of the legislative period
and highlighted the heavy legal sanctions for drug-related crimes.454 “El Observador” even
reported twice that the law was actually increasing legal sanctions, even though this was
untrue.455
The branding of law 17,016 as a repressive piece of legislation raises the question why
the government decided to lower minimum penalties for drug-related crimes. The answer lies in
the persistent advocacy of lawyers and legal experts, which almost unanimously denounced the
minimum penalties for the supply of drugs, which, in their view, were disproportionate (incentive
D2). As outlined above, the criminalization of supplying drugs led to numerous arrests of
marijuana smokers, who were simply sharing the drug with their friends. All experts invited to
the Special Commission on Drug Addiction (1987-1989) agreed that the minimum penalties for
the supply of drugs were disproportionately high, and essentially obliged judges to jail marijuana
users, even though consumption was technically legal. Experts in criminal law and drug use did
not only consider this type of penalizing consumption as ethically wrong, but also pointed out that
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almost all judges stopped applying the law due to these concerns. Although some legislators
raised concerns that the public might consider a lowering of the penalties as unfavorable (see
above), none of them opposed the opinion of the legal experts. While the persistent advocacy of
legal experts, such as Adela Reta, who had been Minister of Culture and Education from 1985 to
1990, and the entire faculty of criminal law professor from the University of the Republic, as well
as the practical problems in the application of the law that they pointed out, provided a strong
incentive for the government, it was not decisive. If it would have been a primary cause, the
reform would have happened much earlier.
However, the lowering of the minimum penalties enabled the government to accompany
the repressive discourse by a more liberal and rights-based one. This likely helped the
government to obtain the support of legislators that believed that drug users should not be
repressed. In the message of the executive to Uruguayan legislators, the government stressed that
the law was based on liberal and democratic values and that the revision of articles 30 to 35 took
in mind the most modern requirements of criminal policy. It also referenced the criteria that
informed previous efforts to reform Uruguay’s drug laws from 1988 and 1989.456
When expressing his support for the law, Carlos Pita, a member of the Chamber of
Representatives (MCR) for the leftist Broad Front party (FA, “Frente Amplio”) criticized the
ongoing “satanization of drug consumption.”457 Furthermore, he criticized the definition of drug
use as a social vice, and argued in favor of a multidisciplinary, health-based approach. Ultimately,
he issued a critique of repressive strategies, which have confused trafficking, abuse and
consumption as one and the same thing.458 It is highly unlikely that the law would have received
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unanimous support in both chambers, had the government not accommodated the views of Pita
and other parliamentarians favoring less repression.
Similar to incentives D1 and D2, the third domestic incentive outlined in chapter VI was
not decisive. Although, as outlined above, Uruguay’s media and citizens were increasingly
concerned about drug use and public security, these concerns were expressed since the late 1980s
and thus do not help to explain the reform. Although, according to most experts, Uruguay
experienced more drug consumption, including cocaine and heroin, they also felt that Uruguay’s
problems were negligible in comparison to other countries.459 The justification for the law from
the executive included five pages of references to Uruguay’s international commitments, while
citing recent laws from other countries as a point of reference. However, there was only one
vague sentence on the situation of the problem in Uruguay: “Known is the degree to which the
activity referred to in this legislative project affects contemporary society, with the Executive
Branch particularly concerned about the qualitative and quantitative growth of activities linked to
this topic.”460 The following paragraphs substantiate that international factors, especially concerns
about Uruguay’s prestige and international standing, were more decisive for the reform.
Since the late 1980s, the international context was shaped by an intensification and
militarization of the U.S.-led “war on drugs.” Simultaneously, the international community
negotiated a new convention, which aspired to dismantle criminal networks through international
judicial cooperation, new restrictions on trade with precursor chemicals, and, most importantly, a
series of new tools that would make it more difficult for criminal groups to use their assets in the
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licit economy (see chapter III). Hence, the centerpiece of the new convention were new
regulations and restrictions for each country’s financial sector.
Due to the low level of restrictions for all types of banking operations, in the late 1980s
Uruguay gained a reputation for being a fiscal paradise and a potential hub for money laundering.
In a meeting with the Special Commission on Drug Addiction in 1989, Jonathan Mueller from the
U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs raised his government’s
concerns to Uruguayan authorities: “In Uruguay, what worries me the most are the possibilities of
laundering, which are given because of its banking laws, and their modification, which facilitate
drug trafficking.”461 Accusations of money laundering were also raised by Argentina, whose
minister of the interior, José Luis Manzano, accused Uruguay of being the Western Hemisphere’s
principal center for money laundering, next to the Bahamas, and the Caiman Islands.462
Furthermore, in November 1994, the argentine judge Juan José Galeano confirmed that Uruguay
was laundering US$ 70 million for the Medellín cartel, leading to the arrest of 12 subjects.463
There are some traces that the pressures and accusations of the United States and
Argentina (incentive I1) played into the calculations of Uruguayan decision makers. In a report to
the Uruguayan Senate, Sen. Reinaldo Gargano from FA, head of the Commission on International
Matters (“Asuntos Internacionales”), referenced U.S. denunciations as one of the reasons for
supporting the ratification of the 1988 Convention: “the Ministry of Justice of North America
refers to our country as an area for the laundering of narcodolars, and where huge anomalies in
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the balance of payments have been detected by the International Monetary Fund. All of this
proves the existence of money from criminal activities. Our country cannot be indifferent to this
type of accusations that appear in international publications that study the issue.”464 However,
Gargano’s statement also reveals that he appears to be more concerned about Uruguay’s
international standing and prestige (incentive I2) than direct pressure of the U.S. and other states.
An analysis of the legislative documents accompanying the reform provides further evidence that
Uruguay’s international obligations, standing, and prestige, were decisive in the country’s
decision to reform its drug laws.
The message of Uruguay’s executive to the country’s lawmakers justified the need to
reform the country’s drug laws primarily on Uruguay’s obligation as an active member of the
United Nations. According to the text, Uruguay’s adaptation of the 1988 Convention, through law
16,579 from November 1994, obligated the country to reform its drug laws and implement the
Convention’s regulations.465 The same argument was echoed by the senator Walter Santoro
(National Party) from the Commission of Constitution and Legislation, who presented the law to
the entire Senate.466 Therefore, the parliamentary debates of the ratification of the 1988
convention reveal further insights about why Uruguay decided to create a new legislative
framework.
During the above-cited report by Gargano, the senator explained that the Commission on
International Matters was ready to approve the treaty, but not without some objections. Most
importantly, he criticized that all legal instruments at the time were focusing exclusively on
producer countries, and not on consumer countries, which shared a large portion of the
464
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responsibility. Second, he stressed that the Convention relied entirely on repression, which, he
believed, was unlikely to work: “it will not eliminate the presence of the ‘cartels’ that are
trafficking drugs, which have immense economic power as well as political corruption.”467 After
his critique, he explained: “Nevertheless, there are political reasons that explain our affirmative
vote, although with reservations.”468 Alberto Zumaran from the conservative National Party, who
described drugs as the biggest scourge (“flagelo”) facing humanity, explained his affirmative
decision in the following terms: “Uruguay subscribes to this Convention and becomes one of the
countries that lines up to fight against drug trafficking or remains out of this international effort.
We think that the prestige and the good name of the country can only place us in one side: in
those who are determined to face drug trafficking.”469 The explanation of Juan Carlos Blanco
Estradé from the Colorado party went in a similar direction: “After what has been expressed, I
believe it opportune for our country to approve this Convention as a political expression of our
firm will to fight drug trafficking.”470 After his statement, the Senate approved the ratification
unanimously.
Uruguay’s legislators also stressed that law 17,016 was adapted to Uruguay’s own
national context, values, and legal standards. However, as mentioned above, these did not
constitute a primary cause of the reform, but an adaptation and translation of international norms
into a domestic legislation. New regulations and the establishment of new drug-related crimes
allowed the government to promote the law as a repressive tool, even though it lowered many
minimum penalties. As highlighted, this helps to explain the unanimous support for the reform in
both chambers.
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The last international incentive, of gaining prestige and recognition through leadership
(I3), is the only incentive that does not have any explanatory power. Apart from highlighting
Uruguay’s obligations as a UN member, the message of the executive explaining the need to
reform the country’s drug laws also made reference to recent reforms by Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panamá, indicating that Uruguay was lagging behind the rest
of the region.471 A report from the Commission on Constitution and Legislation of Uruguay’s
Senate, also highlighted that, apart from the above-mentioned countries, current laws from
Germany, Japan, and the United States informed the reform. The innovative parts of law, i.e. the
introduction proportionality and flexibility in the sentencing scale, were a consequence of
domestic pressures and deliberations and not designed to acquire a leadership role. However, they
may have served as an example for other countries that introduced more flexible penalties.
While international incentives played a crucial role in explaining Uruguay’s 1974 and
1998 reforms, the type of incentives leading to Uruguay’s 2013 decision to reform its marijuana
market changed dramatically in comparison to previous laws. A public security crisis (D3),
advocacy from important domestic actors (D2), and, to some extent, the possibility to gain
international prestige through leadership and innovation (I3) became important driving forces.
Public opinion (D1), direct pressure other states (I1), and the potential loss of international
standing (I2) ceased to be important factors. The following section outlines the most important
elements of the new law, followed by another section, reconstructing the processes and incentives
that explain the reform.
7.6 The Regulation of the Marijuana Market through Law 19,172
By regulating the production, sale, and recreational consumption of marijuana, Law
19,172 from 2013 constitutes one of the most far-reaching drug policy reforms in recent history.
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Under the new legislation, recreational marijuana users have three legal ways of obtaining the
previously forbidden narcotic: (1) it allows the self-cultivation of up to six marijuana plants,
producing no more than 480 grams of psychoactive cannabis; (2) cannabis users may become part
of a cannabis club, which can have between 15 and 45 members and are allowed to cultivate up to
99 plants containing flowers with THC content; and (3) cannabis users can purchase up to 40
grams a month at a pharmacy licensed to sell marijuana.472 The three mechanism are mutually
exclusive meaning that any person who decides to purchase state-controlled marijuana is not
allowed to grow plants or be part of a cannabis club. To control that a person does not exceed the
limits provided by the law, every consumer needs to register with the Institute for the Regulation
and Control of Cannabis (IRCCA, “Instituto de Regulación y Control del Cannabis”), which also
gives licenses to businesses wanting to grow marijuana as well as pharmacies wanting to sell the
product to consumers.473
According to the text, the reform is embedded in a framework of harm reduction. Art. 1
states: “It is in the public interest to protect, promote, and improve the public health of the
population through a policy oriented in minimizing the risks and reducing the harms of the use of
cannabis, promoting appropriate information, education, and prevention, on the consequences and
harmful effects linked to such consumption as well as the treatment, rehabilitation and social
reintegration of problematic drug users.”474 An entire chapter deals with the health and education
of the population and drug users. Another official objective of the law is to protect Uruguay’s
citizens from the risks implied in the illegal commerce and trafficking of drugs, by reducing drug
trafficking and organized crime. As highlighted below, both objectives played important role in
the political process that led to the new law.
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The law entered the parliament on August 8, 2012, containing a single article stating that
the executive will take charge of the regulation of the marijuana market. The Chamber of
Representative’s Special Commission on Drugs and Addiction studied the proposal and, instead
of giving the executive a free pass, in the process of 15 session redacted an entirely new draft.
The law was discussed by the Chamber of Representatives on July 31, 2013 and approved on the
following day with a tiny majority of 50 out of 99 votes all of which came from the governing
party FA. On December 12, 2013, the Senate gave the final approval with 16 FA Senators voting
in favor and 13 Senators against the law.475
After both chambers approved the reform, the implementation of the new law was
relatively slow but steady. In August 2014, IRCCA began registering home growers and in
October of the same year cannabis clubs were allowed to register.476 Despite a change in the
presidency in early 2015, from José “Pepe” Mujica, a crucial supporter of the reform (see below),
to Tabaré Vázquez, who, although from the same party never supported it, the implementation of
the law continued. In October 2015, IRCCA issued two licenses, out of twenty applicants, for the
production of marijuana in Uruguay, to supply the sale in pharmacies. However, due to quality
controls and the introduction of a new fingerprint system, to confirm that buyers were registered
at IRCAA, it took until July 2017, until the first marijuana was sold.477 The fingerprint system
became necessary to avoid that foreigner could buy marijuana, which carried the potential of
upsetting Argentina and Brazil.
Despite reservations that marijuana consumers may be unwilling to register at a
government agency to have legal access, the registry did not become an obstacle for the reform.
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Within the first month, registrations to purchase marijuana rose from 4,900 to 14,900.478 As of
January 2019, 35,513 individuals have registered to purchase marijuana in one of the 17 licensed
pharmacies. Furthermore, there are 6,870 registered home growers and 114 cannabis clubs.479
Although there are still numerous challenges in terms of guaranteeing a steady supply to the
registered consumers, finding pharmacies willing to sell the product, sanctions from U.S. banks
(see below), and facilitating better access to cannabis-based medicines, marijuana has become
part of public life and Uruguayan culture, which will make the reversal of the above-outlined
measures very difficult. Furthermore, over time public opinion has become more favorable.
According to the latest data, at the end of 2017, for the first time more Uruguayans supported the
regulation of the marijuana market (44.3 percent) than the ones that were against it (41.4
percent).480 However, as illustrated below this was not always the case. The following section
analyzes, one by one, each of the possible incentives that could have led to law 19,172. The
analysis shows that despite the ongoing support of civil society groups and state officials
(incentive D2), the determinant cause of the law was a public security crisis, which provided
strong incentives for the government to act in unprecedented ways (incentive D3). However, the
reform depended on a complex set of domestic and international conditions, which fulfilled a
multiplicity of functions and were necessary for the reform to occur.
7.7 Analysis of Law 19,172
Discussions about marijuana legalization are nothing new to the Uruguayan public. In a
1988 meeting of the Special Commission on Drug Addiction, the ad-hoc president of the
commission, Daniel Lamas from the Colorado party, noted: “there is a movement, which is
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organizing at the international level and has its representatives at the local level, which proclaims
the necessity to depenalize or liberalize the consumption of marijuana.”481 The commission’s
invited speaker, Dr. Ottati Folle, responded that although he holds this position to be absurd it is
supported by very intelligent people and academics of high prestige.482
In 1998, during the debate of law 17,016 in the Chamber of Representatives, Daniel
Gallo from “Frente Amplio” stressed that if the new regulation failed to undermine drug
trafficking, in the new century the parliament should consider and discuss new solutions,
including drug legalization.483
In March 2000, the newly elected president Jorge Battle, a liberal in the European sense,
expressed his position in favor of legalizing drugs in a meeting with the leftist magazine
“Brecha.” According to him, drug legalization was the only feasible way to end illicit
trafficking.484 In June of the same year, the sub-secretary of the presidency, Leonardo Costa,
clarified that the president only expressed a personal philosophic opinion and that Uruguay will
not act unilaterally without reaching an agreement with other states from the region first. At the
same time, he explained a discussion about the legalization of drug consumption was taking place
within MERCOSUR, South America’s principal trading bloc.485
At the 56th General Assembly of the Inter-American Press Association in Chile, in
October 2000 Battle put forward his ideas to the directors of the major newspapers from Latin
America. He declared that drug trafficking was the principle instigator of violence in the region,
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and that in the future drugs will be produced in laboratories and the problem will be solved. Once
again, he clarified that his proposition would only work if adopted by the entire region: “If I
liberalize drugs consumption, all will come to Uruguay.”486 A month later, Battle repeated his
position at the 10th Inter-American Summit in Panamá. Specifically, he stated that governments
ought to find ways to make drugs cheaper, because this would undermine the financial incentives
for illegal traffickers.487 Although Battle failed to convince his regional peers, his remarks may
have paved the way for other, former and incumbent, presidents to come forward. Furthermore,
even though he did not persuade most Uruguayans that drug legalization was a good idea, he may
have sensitized the public for an open discussion about drug policy, thus providing a more
favorable context for future reforms.
All public opinion surveys estimated that prior to law 19,172, at least 60 percent of all
Uruguayans disapproved marijuana legalization, while approximately 34 percent supported it.488
As highlighted by Queirolo et al., even a year after the reform, these numbers did not change
significantly, although the most recent data indicated a growing approval (see above).489
While public opinion was clearly not a driver of the reform (incentive D1), it is also
evident that it was not a strong constraining element. While there was a lot of mobilization in
favor of the reform, there was very little mobilization against it. According to Sebastián Sabini,
MCR for FA and one of the editors of the new law, this is because marijuana legalization was not
an important issue to most Uruguayans: “Normally countries are afraid to take on the issue
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because of electoral costs. But in Uruguay this was not a problem. (…) The people have more
important problems than the use of cannabis. (…) The people have bigger problems in terms of
finding employment, health, and education. If this was a law that concerned 200,000 or 300,000
people, the large majority of the population is far detached from this. I think because of this, it
was not a problem.”490 Milton Romani, former secretary general of the JND, raised a similar
view, stating that for many sectors the legal status of marijuana was not important. Instead, he
argues, that FA would have risked losing part of key voters, had the party decided to abandon the
reform (incentive D2).491
Public opinion data and the results of the next general elections confirm these views.
Despite the overall opposition to the reform, President Mujica finished his term with high
approval ratings of 63 percent, or even 65 percent according to some surveys.492 Furthermore, in
the following general election, his successor Tabaré Vázquez, who was also his predecessor,
comfortably won the presidency with 56.62 percent, a slightly higher margin than Mujica in 2009
(54.63 percent). The Broad Front also remained the strongest party in both houses, despite losing
one seat in the Senate.
Although a majority of Uruguayans was critical of marijuana legalization, there were at
two important domestic actors that were crucial for the new law: (1) a social movement
campaigning for the legalization of cannabis, and (2) a network of state officials and
professionals with close relations to the FA government favoring marijuana legalization and harm
reduction policies. As outlined below, although both actors played important roles in advancing
490

Sebastián Sabini, in discussion with the author, February 2018.

491

Romani, in discussion with the author, January 2018.

492

LaRed21, “José Mujica culminó su mandato con un 65% de aprobación a su gestión,” 26 de febrero de
2015, http://www.lr21.com.uy/politica/1218626-jose-mujica-culmino-el-2014-con-un-65-de-aprobacion-asu-gestion; and Telemundo, “Encuesta Cifra: Mujica se va con 68% de simpatía y 63% de aprobación,” 2
de marzo de 2015, https://www.teledoce.com/telemundo/nacionales/encuesta-cifra-mujica-se-va-con-68de-simpatia-y-63-de-aprobacion/.

194

the regulation of the marijuana market, their support alone was not sufficient to explain the
government’s decision (incentive D2).
Since 2005, a network of activist groups like “PlantaTuPlanta,” “Red de Usarios de
Drogas y Cultivadores de Cannabis,” “Movida Cannábica de Florida,” and “Proderechos”
(previously “Prolegal”) were campaigning for marijuana legalization.493 These groups upheld that
even though technically drug consumption was legal, the cultivation marijuana plants, even if for
personal consumption, was not. This obliged drug users to become engaged with the illicit
economy and criminal actors. Hence, their campaigns focused primarily on the right to selfcultivate cannabis plants for personal consumption. Apart from a big yearly mobilization, “the
marijuana march,” which attracted crowds of up to 6,000 people, around 2008 their events were
still relatively small, with no more than 500 participants. Gustavo Robaina, a former member of
Proderechos, explained that their main goal at the time was to visualize and destigmatize
marihuana use by smoking in public at so-called “fumatas” as well as to defend the right to selfcultivate and smoke without persecution.494 Julio Calzada, former secretary general of the JND
upheld that these types of activities helped marijuana to become more entrenched in Uruguayan
society, which changed the imagination of the public.495
In 2010 and 2011, the Uruguayan police arrested a series of individuals for cultivating
marijuana at their homes. The most prominent case was the one of Alicia Castilla, a 66-year old
Argentine writer, who was detained on January 30, 2011, for having 29 marijuana plants, and
spent 95 days in jail.496 Following the arrests, the movement for the legalization of cannabis grew
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in numbers and soon covered the entire country.497 Politicians from different sectors soon picked
up on the developments. In November 2010, Luis Lacalle Pou, MCR for the National Party and
son of the former president Luis Alberto Lacalle Herrera (1990-1995), presented a first project to
legalize self-cultivation for personal consumption, while suggesting heavier penalties for all other
drug-related offenses.498 Months later, following the arrest of Alicia Castilla, MCR’s from FA
(Sebastián Sabini and Nicolás Nuñez), the Colorady Party (Fernando Amadeo), and the
Independent Party (Daniel Radío) presented a similar project with a less repressive emphasis than
Lacalle Pou’s proposal.499 However, while the legislators’ effort appeared to respond directly to
the movement’s request to legalize self-cultivation for personal consumption, the lawmakers
failed to convince the country’s leadership. In May 2011, almost jokingly, President Mujica
stated the following: “And right now we are going to discuss if half a dozen of marijuana plants
should be legal, or nine? I have to fight for the railways, work and the man of the street.”500
The failure of the legislative proposals and Mujica’s statement provide strong evidence
that the activists’ efforts were not sufficient to convince the government. When asked, whether or
not his group was surprised about the government’s decision to regulate the marijuana market,
Robaina responded: “Yes, there was a lot of surprise. There were already two projects, one by FA
and one by Lacalle Pou, which stressed the right to cultivate, both of which were rejected, and
what the government suggested went a lot further.”501
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While the social movement for the legalization of cannabis contributed to provide a more
favorable context for the reform, their greatest impact came after the government decided to
regulate the marijuana market. Even though the government was keen to regulate the marijuana
market, they lacked the expertise and resources to run a well-managed campaign. “Proderechos”
and other groups, however, helped to give the project an aura of legitimacy and may have made
Uruguayan legislators as well as part of the public more amenable to the reform. Through
financial and strategic support of OSF and the DPA, they were able to run a months-long
campaign, which, according to the activists changed public opinion by eight points within half a
year.502 Following a series of focus group studies, the members of “Proderechos” gave up on their
initial goal to link the marijuana legalization to Uruguay’s long history of accomplishments in the
area of civil rights and the right to pleasure for marijuana smokers. Instead, under the slogan
Responsible Regulation (“Regulación Responsable”), the campaign ran a strong harm reduction
discourse, stressing the health and social benefits of regulation.503 Building on the activist’s
campaign, the JND organized more than 30 events in all of Uruguay’s 19 departments, in which
members of the government engaged with citizens and explained the goals of the reform.504 While
these efforts were unable to shift public opinion decisively, the may have helped to alleviate some
of the public’s fears and made the reform a feasible political project.
Further evidence of the importance of the social movement for the legalization of
cannabis is the fact that President Mujica initially did not want to include self-cultivation and
cannabis clubs into the project. However, these elements were the most important demands of the
social movement, the only relevant actor outside the government that supported the reform, which
was obliged to concede on this aspect. As explained by Sabini: “I think Mujica understood that he
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could not go against the only people that were in favor. Because the only ones that would defend
the law were the ones that were in favor of self-cultivation.”505 Augustín Lapetina from the
Ministry of Public Health also underlined the importance of civil society stating that limiting the
purchase of marijuana to 40 grams a month could have been much more restrictive if civil society
groups had not pressured for more.506
The second important domestic actor, an older generation of government officials and
professionals with close relations to the FA government who favored legalization and harm
reduction policies, were equally important in advancing the new law. Many of them held
important positions within the government, such as Julio Calzada (see above), who is considered
one of the architects of the law, and Milton Romani, who was secretary general of the JND from
2005 to 2011 and for a second time from 2015 to 2016. During his first tenure at the JND,
Romani represented Uruguay at the CND at the UN. Furthermore, from 2012 to 2014 he was
Uruguay’s ambassador at the OEA in Washington DC.
Calzada’s expertise on drug-related matters goes back to the early 1990s when he was
active in the NGO “El Abrojo,” which initially started to defend the civil rights of drug users and
did pioneering work in implementing harm reduction approaches in Montevideo. From early on,
“El Abrojo” had close links to harm reduction academics and practitioners from Europe and
North America.507 Members of the organization, such as the physician Dr. Gabriel D. Rossi
Gonnet and the sociologist Augustín Lapetina, both of whom work for the Ministry of Public
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Health, describe their training and engagement with drugs as a collective experience in which
knowledge and training acquired abroad were shared with the rest of their community.508
Even though as a trained psychopathologist and social worker Milton Romani was always
critical of the prohibition of drugs and persecution of drug users as a mechanism of social control,
his primary engagement with drugs was through his position as secretary general of the JND
during the first presidency of Tabaré Vázquez.509 During his tenure, he developed close ties with
actors from civil society, both from Uruguay and the global scene. After informal talks with
WOLA and TNI in 2007, he decided to use Uruguay’s election into the CND to insert the notion
of human rights as a point of reference in the IDCR, thereby establishing the country as an
important participant in the global debates on drug policy (see chapter IV).510
Calzada, Romani, and their associates not only supported the government’s decision to
legalize marijuana, but, after the decision was taken, they provided technical expertise to the
executive and the parliament’s Special Commission on Drugs and Addiction (Chamber of
Representatives) and the Commission on Public Health (Senate).511 Through this work they
helped to convince legislators from FA to advance the project. According to Romani, there was a
strong sense of conviction among most FA legislators that the regulation of the marijuana market
was the right thing to do.512 While their support and expertise was crucial in translating the
proposal of legalizing marijuana into an acceptable and implementable political project, it is not
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sufficient to explain why the government decided to advance the reform. At the beginning of
Mujica’s government, Romani presented to him a list of proposals in the area of drug policy,
including the idea of regulating the marijuana market. However, at the time the president did not
pay any attention.513
This raises the question of what brought the government to consider, and eventually
decide, to legalize recreational marijuana. The answer lies in three brutal killings in May 2012,
which shocked many Uruguayans, caused a wave of public outcry, and incentivized the
government to act in unprecedented ways to deal with the rising challenges related to crime and
violence (incentive D3). On May 11, two adolescents entered a branch of the popular restaurant
“La Pasiva” in the center of Montevideo. After ordering a Coca Cola, one of them took out a gun
and shot a 34-year old waiter and father of five children. Two days later, a beheaded woman
appeared in the town of Pando in the outskirts of Montevideo.514 On May 22, an 18-year old girl
was stabbed in the city of Suarez. The televised images of the crimes led to a wave of public
outcry, followed by large-scale mobilizations of Uruguayans concerned about what they
perceived as a deteriorating public security situation, such as the “Indignants March” from May
15 whose organizers demanded immediate action from the government. Furthermore, the media
associated the crimes with rising drug consumption and drug trafficking, despite the fact that
none of the cases was related to drug use or gang violence.515
Within this context, President Mujica convened an ad-hoc Security Cabinet, composed of
six ministers, which met at least ten times in the following weeks to discuss how to respond to the
perception of public insecurity.516 On June 19, the government presented the Strategy for Life and
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Coexistence, which included fifteen different measures to improve public security. While some of
them can be considered as firm hand (“mano dura”) policies, such as an increase of the penalties
for police corruption and the trafficking of cocaine paste, as well as a lowering of the punishable
age, a series of softer measures focused on education, social rehabilitation of criminals and drug
users, and the creation of safe public spaces. The document also included a long set of harm
reduction policies focused on heavy drug users, most importantly better medical attention and
treatment options. The most surprising element of the strategy, however, was the “controlled and
responsible legalization of marijuana.”517 This measure was not only surprising because a vocal
part of the public demanded a tougher stance on drugs and crime, but also because previous
initiatives to soften the legal framework on marijuana were rejected by the government. Lapetina
and Rossi explained that even though they thought that marijuana legalization was long overdue,
they were struck by surprise. After having argued in its favor for many years, from a health-based
perspective, they did not think that it was politically viable at the time.518 What, then, explains the
change of mind?
Querirolo et al. argue that the “public insecurity mood” provided the growing number of
government officials favoring legalization and harm reduction with a “window of opportunity” to
plant marijuana regulation as a viable policy option.519 The inclusion of several harm reduction
measures into the Strategy for Life and Coexistence provides strong evidence in favor of this
conclusion. A complementary answer can be found in the reconstruction by Müller Sienra and
Draper, which claims that the government’s decision emerged from a narrower discussion on the
growing importance of drug trafficking organizations in Uruguayan society. In one of first
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meetings of the Security Cabinet, police officials reported about the increasing role of traffickers,
their strategies to exercise control through threats and intimidation, and the use of assassination to
resolve disputes with other groups. In the Cabinet’s discussion, the minister of defense, Eleuterio
Fernández Huidobro, argued that drug trafficking cannot be combated by repressive means, but
only through economic ones, by taking away their market. He further elaborated that illegal
trafficking will continue with prohibition, as it occurred during alcohol prohibition in the United
States. His arguments in favor of marijuana legalization resonated with the small group of
ministers, and, most importantly President Mujica.520 Marijuana was not only Uruguay’s most
widely-consumed drug, thus constituting a large source of income for the country’s criminal
groups, but cannabis legalization was already accepted among significant parts of Uruguayan
society and state officials.
Although Mujica was originally against marijuana legalization, the extraordinary
circumstances from May 2012, which could have been the cause of a more prohibitionist policy,
incentivized him to reconsider and open up to pro-legalization and harm reduction arguments.
Although the decision was based on the calculation that it would present a significant strike
against drug trafficking, it fulfilled a series of inter-related purposes. The minister of social
development, Daniel Olesker, hoped that making marijuana legally available would allow the
government to separate the marijuana market from the ones of potentially more damaging drugs
such as smokable cocaine paste.521 Moreover, Queirolo et al. argue that through marijuana
legalization the FA government could balance some of the firm-hand policies, which were
unlikely to resonate with some of the its key electorate.522 As outlined below, marijuana
legalization also enabled the country’s leadership to portray Uruguay as a leader and innovator in
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the area of drug policy and a potential model for other countries. Daniel Radío, MCR for the
Independent Party from the opposition, also raised the concern that the primary goal of the reform
was to make President Mujica an international phenomenon.523
It is likely that it was this multiplicity of purposes that made marijuana legalization so
attractive to Uruguayan decision makers at the time. In any case, there is an overwhelming
consensus that the reform would not have happened had another president been in power.
According to Rossi, although rejecting marijuana legalization initially, Mujica’s openness to
discuss and consider even controversial proposals allowed the project to be considered.524 While
Milton Romani highlights the president’s role as a political communicator who is able to translate
complex issues and make them comprehensible to diverse audiences, Calzada emphasizes that
Mujica put all his political capital behind the reform, both nationally and internationally.525
Eduardo Blasina, an agro-economist, founder of Montevideo’s cannabis museum, and member of
one of the businesses that obtained a license to cultivate cannabis, believes that no other president
than Mujica would have done the same, given that public opinion was not favorable.526 Sabini
stresses that Mujica, as a political heavyweight, was able to secure the law the necessary votes by
protecting FA legislators from criticism: “he carried on his back a large part of the critiques.”527
Furthermore, Sabini underlined the positive role of the president’s age: “It is different when
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someone older than 70 says that Uruguay should legalize marijuana as compared to someone like
me, who is 35 or 36 years old.”528
Although everybody agrees that Mujica’s support was absolutely crucial, the above
analysis shows that he could not have advanced the project without the support from civil society
and parts of his government. Furthermore, there are two factors related to Uruguay’s political
culture that facilitated and help explain the success of the initiative. The first one is Uruguay’s
long tradition of regulating so-called social vices. According to Calzada, “In the 1930s everything
gets regulated. When United States prohibited alcohol, our state said we are going to produce it
ourselves. Gambling gets regulated. (…) Here everything is legal. Prostitution is regulated, since
the 1930s. Most recently, I told Chilean journalists that Montevideo regulated Uber, something
that several European countries were not able to do.”529 Uruguay’s tradition of regulation
provided a more favorable political context by allowing the legalization advocates to place the
reform in a long-standing tradition, which prioritizes pragmatic choices over moral convictions.
The second facilitating condition is Uruguay’s strong party discipline, especially within
FA. As all opposition parties opposed the law, despite the fact that several MCRs expressed
support and voted in favor of certain articles, FA needed to advance the law with thin majorities
of 50 out of 99 MCRs in the Chamber of Representatives and 16 out of 30 legislators in the
Senate. This meant that if only one FA legislator would have voted against the law, it would not
have passed. Thus, for Sabini, the biggest challenge to advance the reform was to assure the
necessary votes.530 The most significant setback materialized in the Chamber of Representatives
where Dario Pérez expressed his concerns about starting a massive government-sponsored sale of
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marijuana and going against with will of the public.531 Furthermore, he claimed that the right
thing to do was to hold a public referendum on the initiative. Although Pérez eventually voted in
favor of the law, in December 2017 he expressed to regret his vote.532
The above analysis shows that Uruguay’s reform to regulate the recreational marijuana
market was driven by a complex set of domestic conditions and circumstances, which not only
provided incentives for the government to advance the reform (especially incentive D3) but also
made it a feasible political project despite significant opposition. However, law 19,172 cannot be
explained in isolation to the international context outlined in chapter IV, which favored the
reform process in multiple ways. Most importantly, the incentives I1 and I2, which were crucial
to explain previous, more prohibitionist, policies, ceased to be an important constraining force in
moving towards harm reduction. Although Uruguay faced some criticism as well as significant
financial restrictions as a consequence of the reform, these constraints did not impress Uruguayan
decision makers.
The strongest criticism came from the INCB, which protested Uruguay’s decision
arguing that the country was violating its international commitments.533 Apart from the intent to
publicly shame Uruguay for the reform, Rossi reports of a threatening letter the INCB sent to the
Ministry of Public Health.534 However, the evident failure of the INCB’s prohibitionist model and
the growing criticism of the IDCR made these accusations less forceful. Sabini dismissed the
protest, arguing that this was carried out by people fearing to lose their jobs. He further stated that
Uruguay responded by sending a note, asking the UN to include drug-war deaths in the World
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Drug Report, the UNODC’s principal annual publication.535 According to JND officials from the
area of international cooperation, the initial criticism of the INCB eventually turned into an open
dialogue in which Uruguay was able to show that law 19,172 was a responsible reform focused
on health benefits and the human rights of drug users, rather than promoting the use of
marijuana.536 Apart from the INCB, there was no significant international opposition. Calzada
explains that most voices from Argentina and Brazil expressed interest in observing how the
implementation developed, rather than challenging the initiative.537 Romani, who took on his
position as Uruguay’s ambassador at the OEA to defend the reform internationally, stated that
although international reaction were mixed, all countries accepted Uruguay’s decision as a policy
done by a sovereign country.538 Daniel Radío, a MCR for the Independent Party, who, despite
supporting self-cultivation, opposed the reform because it violated international law, admitted
that in practice it is unlikely to change Uruguay’s international relations and that his concerns
about violating international law were primarily ethical.539
A more serious challenge, however, materialized in 2017, briefly after Uruguayan
pharmacies had started to sell marijuana to registered users. Despite the ongoing wave of
marijuana legalization in the U.S., to the surprise of the Uruguayan government U.S. banks
announced that they would stop doing business with any banks that provided financial services to
pharmacies selling marijuana.540 This obliged the pharmacies involved to become cash-only
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businesses, a prospect that brought several ones that initially signed up to resign. However, these
financial constraints were unable to halt or reverse the reform. As of February 2019, a total of 17
pharmacies are currently selling marijuana, covering significant parts of the country’s territory.541
Currently, the Uruguayan government is working on alternative points of sale, which would
exclusively sell marijuana on a cash-only basis.542
While protest and criticism were unable to halt the reform process, Uruguay received
overwhelming support from pro-legalization advocates from across the world. While OSF and
DPA helped planning and financing Proderecho’s campaign (see above), the former presidents
Fernando Henrique Cardoso from Brazil, César Gaviria from Colombia, and Vicente Fox from
Mexico, as well as the recipient of the Nobel Price of Literature, Mario Vargas Llosa, most of
whom are members of the LACDD and GCDD, expressed their support.543 In August 2012,
Gaviria even travelled to Uruguay to participate in a discussion on the legalization process.544 A
week before the vote in the Chamber of Representatives, the head of the OEA at the time, José
Miguel Insulza, stated that not only did he not have any objections, but believed that this was the
way to move forward, wishing the Uruguayan experience success.545 Uruguay’s pro legalization
efforts also received support from drug policy experts from Transform Drug Policy, TNI, and
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WOLA, who gave testimonies to Uruguay’s Chamber of Representatives’ Special Commission
on Drugs and Addiction, as well as talks and conferences open to the public.546 Ultimately, media
outlets from around the world covered, often positively, Uruguay’s reform process, which they
associated with Mujica’s government’s rights-based agenda, legalizing abortion, same-sex
marriage, and marijuana. One of the highest expressions of praise came from The Economist,
which named Uruguay country of the year in 2013.547 According to Rossi, the positive news
coverage about Uruguay was very helpful in moving the reform process ahead.548
The changing normative context, both globally in regionally, not only enabled or
facilitated the reform, but also incentivized some of Uruguay’s decision makers, who saw the
project as a means to increase Uruguay’s prestige by becoming a policy leader and innovator
(incentive I3). As highlighted by Romani: “Uruguay is not an economic power, but it can position
itself in the international arena on the basis of intangible goods, in the area of human rights and
innovative policies, which may help with other things: investments, that Uruguay will be seen
positively in multilateral fora, all of this has a domino effect.”549 In an interview, Romani
expressed disappointment that the administration of Tabaré Vázquez did not exploit the reform
more forcefully, arguing that under Mujica it would have been handled differently. However,
despite what he referred to as a missed opportunity, he upheld that Uruguay gained prestige
through the reform.550 Blasina from the cannabis museum argues that by presenting itself as a
modern country that converts a problem into a solution, Uruguay could improve its image as a
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liberal, democratic, and open country. For him, Uruguay is already seeing the benefits through a
strong increase of tourism since the reform took place.
Mujica’s multiple addresses and interactions with international audiences suggest that the
reform was at least partially driven by hopes to increase Uruguay’s prestige and leadership.
Uruguay’s former president often framed the project as a reaction to the failed policies of the
“war on drugs,” and as a potential model for the region: “The situation in Mexico has shattered
my soul. (…) What frightens me are not the drugs, but the drug trade. If we continue to repress,
this is a lost war, and we are losing it in all parts of our region.”551 Regarding Uruguay’s role in
regional drug policy initiatives, he outlined that “Someone has to start to demystify the use of
marijuana in Latin America. There is a lot to demystify. Uruguay, as a small country, is in a
condition to do that.”552 Moreover, “I am proud that Uruguay can be a laboratory of policies,
which may be applied by other countries.”553
Although the Vázquez government has kept a much lower international profile, these
statements show that under Mujica Uruguay was seeking a leadership role in the regional debates
on drug policy, inserting itself as an innovative force and potential model. Hence, the growing
criticism of prohibition, and the increasing popularity of harm reduction outlined in chapter IV
not only provided a less restrictive international context, but also created significant incentives for
the Uruguayan government to advance the reform.
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Taking into consideration the interplay between domestic and international factors, this
chapter concludes that Uruguay’s drug policy reform was incentivized and set in motion through
a public (in)security crisis, which demanded the government to act and favored unprecedented
behavior (incentive D3). However, the decision to regulate the marijuana market was far from
obvious and depended on a complex set of domestic and international conditions, fulfilling a
multiplicity of functions, which were necessary for the reform to happen. Based on the above
analysis this chapter identifies six conditions that were necessary and three further conditions that
facilitated the reform (see table 12). This implies that advancing similar reforms in other
countries where public opinion is unfavorable is not an easy task. Most importantly, it requires a
strong and popular president willing to put his political capital behind a controversial reform,
parliamentary majorities, a well-organized social movement, and several government officials
that favor marijuana legalization, conditions that are not easy to achieve. Nevertheless, a possible
success of Uruguay’s experiment, however one may define it, may be able to shift public opinion
elsewhere. Furthermore, the Uruguayan project has shown that public opinion may become more
favorable over time, which may lower the perception of risks of decision makers in other
countries. The following case studies on Ecuador and Peru indicate that, despite a certain
flexibilization in their drug policies, these countries are still very far away from trying something
similar.
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Table 12: Causes and Conditions Enabling Uruguay’s Marijuana Legalization

Cause / Condition

Immediate Cause /
Trigger Event

Necessary
Conditions

Public (in)security crisis /
demand for action

• Started government discussion and effort
to improve public security
• Provided strong impetus for
unprecedented action

Support from a
strong president

• Put his political capital behind the reform
• Took away pressure from
parliamentarians amid public rejection

Several prolegalization
advocates within the
governments

• Convinced Pres. Mujica that marijuana
legalization would enhance public security
• Provided expertise and know-how
• Explained the law to the public
• Establish links to international actors

Strong social
movement for the
legalization of
cannabis

• Provided the reform with support and
legitimacy
• Helped ameliorate unfavorable public
opinion

Global and regional
normative change
(prohibition vs. harm
reduction)

• Limited international protest and
opposition as well as concerns about
international standing
• Created possibility to improve Uruguay’s
image and prestige

Parliamentary majority and
strong discipline of
government party

• Parliament voted in favor of the law
amid public rejection and opposition of
all other parties.

Limited domestic
opposition

• No high risk of losing votes

Strong liberal tradition
and values

Facilitating Conditions

Functions

Culture and tradition of
regulating “social vices”

Support from transnational
advocacy network and
global media
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• Favored support from civil society, the
president and numerous government
officials
• Limited the opposition (no relevant
actors mobilized against the law)
• Made decision makers more amenable to
the reform
• Enabled government to relate the reform
to previous policies of regulation
• Helped finance pro regulation campaign
• Provided expertise and know-how to
Uruguayan government and civil society
• Created additional legitimacy

VIII.

ECUADOR’S JOURNEY BACK TO THE PAST

The Ecuadorian case was selected because of its recent prohibitionist turn, which reversed a
series of policy measures that had brought the country closer to a framework of harm reduction.
Between 2008 and 2014 the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017) decriminalized
recreational drug use, pardoned convicted “drug mules,” and distinguished between different
levels of responsibility in trafficking networks in a new criminal code. However, since 2015
Correa’s government decided to abandon this approach by launching a “war” against microtrafficking. Against the nature of the country’s 2008 constitution, his government enacted tougher
penalties on the possession of drugs, which, in practice, recriminalized their use. Analyzing these
changes helps to understand why a country that has moved closer to a framework of harm
reduction may decide to abandon this approach and why prohibition continues to be popular in a
region that has experienced and suffered from its worst effects.
On top of these recent developments, Ecuador’s drug policy history is marked by
surprising decisions and developments that deserve special attention. In 1990, Ecuador
criminalized, for first time in the country’s history, the possession of drugs for personal
consumption. This decision contradicted the regional trend, which at the time tended towards
decriminalizing drug use. In the 1970s, Ecuador enacted series of decrees, which culminated, for
a brief moment, in some of the highest penalties for drug-related crimes in all of South America.
Ultimately, the country decreed a major reform of its drug laws in 1970 (Law 366), slightly
before the period that this dissertation examines. This is surprising given that most drug laws in
the 1970s were designed and implemented after President Nixon declared the “war on drugs,” and
the international community created the 1971 Convention and the 1972 Protocol to the 1961
Convention.
According to the framework of this dissertation, this chapters briefly presents the most
important novelties of each policy change, followed by an analysis of the incentives that
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compelled the respective government to enact these changes. Similar to the Uruguayan case, the
U.S. was successful in promoting prohibitionist drug policies in the early 1970s through constant
interactions with top government officials, and the provision of training and resources to the
country’s police and customs officials. At the same time, Ecuador sought to impress the U.S.
through its drug control efforts to obtain preferred access to technology. However, the close
cooperation cooled down in the second half of the 1970s after the U.S. had denied Ecuador the
provision of new helicopters.
Coinciding with the intensification and militarization of the “war on drugs,” closer
cooperation in controlling narcotics picked up again in the second half of the 1980s. Once more,
Ecuador was not a passive recipient of U.S. policy proposals but was hoping to take advantage of
increased U.S. financial and technological support for drug control initiatives. Furthermore,
Ecuador’s goal to become part of the ATPA and gain preferred market access to the U.S. provides
the strongest explanation for Ecuador’s controversial drug policy reform from 1990. Yet, around
the same time prohibitionist discourses in Ecuador’s media and domestic demands to enhance
drug control became a more important force in shaping Ecuador’s drug policy.
During the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017) domestic incentives became even
more decisive and can account both for the flexibilization of Ecuador’s drug laws and the return
to prohibition since 2015. Before analyzing these processes in greater detail, the following section
provides a brief overview of the country’s relationship with IDRC and its drug laws prior to 1971.
An important part of the section focuses on the of the “Law of Control and Intervention in the
Trafficking of Narcotics,” Law 366 from 1970, which constituted the basis of Ecuador’s drug
legislation until the early 1990s.
8.1 Ecuador’s Drug Laws Before 1971
Different than Uruguay, in the early 20th century drugs did not play an important part in
Ecuadorian social life. As stated by Bonilla: “The evidence is clear: apparently Ecuador did not
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consider drug consumption as one of the problems affecting its population. It is not a historical
theme, and the state has not taken any initiatives; on the contrary, it was the international
environment that configured its policy.”554 Hence, up until the 1970s the primary sources of
Ecuadorian drug policy were laws that reproduced the content of international treaties.555 Despite
an inconsistent participation at international drug control conferences (see tables 2 and 4), since
the early 20th century Ecuador ratified almost all major drug conventions, except the 1936
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (see tables 3 and 5).
However, the relatively scarce literature on Ecuador’s drug laws features very little information
on how the country, if at all, implemented the IDCR’s requirements before the 1990s.556 This is
striking given that art. 47 of the 1970 “Law of Control and Intervention in the Trafficking of
Narcotics,” cites a large number of previous legislations including the 1916 Law on the
Commerce of Opium and other Drugs (“Ley del Comercio del Opio y demás drogas”); a reform
of the same law from 1923; a new version of the Law on the Commerce of Opium and other
Drugs from 1924; a regulation on the application of the 1924 law from 1926; the Law on the
Traffic of Organic Raw Materials, Drugs and Prepared Narcotics from 1958 (“Ley sobre el
Tráfico de Materias Primas, Drogas y Preparados Estupefacientes”); and the 1960 Law on the
Traffic of Narcotic Drugs (“Ley sobre Tráfico de Estupefacientes”), which was changed through
decrees from 1960, 1963, and 1964.557
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Even the sub-secretary of public health in the year 1970, Dr. García Jaime, does not
appear to be aware of Ecuador’s long list of drug laws when explaining the need to reform the
country’s legislation to the General Commission of the Judicial Commission. This Commission
constituted the legislative body of the 5th government of José María Velasco Ibarra (1968-1972),
who, though democratically elected, in June 1970 had transformed the country into a de facto
dictatorship. According to his testimony from August 5, 1970, García Jaime explained that
Ecuador’s legislation on drugs reached back to 1916, one year after the government ratified the
1912 Opium Convention. According to him, the Law on Opium and other drugs (“Ley de Opio y
demas drogas” [sic.]), was slightly modified in 1923 and has not been changed until the current
law.558 In his exposition, Garcia stressed that Ecuador’s drug control apparatus was in a
catastrophic state. Most importantly, the implementation of Ecuador’s drug control obligations
had been in the hand of regional social assistance boards (“Juntas de Asistencia Social”), which
operated in Guayaquil, Quito and Cuenca. However, these boards had merely regulated the licit
import of narcotic drugs to be used in the medical sector and completely ignored other aspects of
drug control. Furthermore, the law in place was so poorly written, he stated, that a literal
interpretation did not allow judges to penalize the cultivation and harvest of illicit crops as well as
the elaboration of alkaloids, salts, and their derivates.559
According to García Jaime, because of these insufficiencies Ecuador had not only
transformed into a trafficking hub and suffered from increased drug consumption, especially in
the coastal region and among students, but had also failed to comply with the IDCR’s standards:
“The control of narcotics has been maintained completely bad, and I have to say that the report
that Ecuador has sent to the international organisms, which I revised, is shameful. There is no
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information about anything: about drug plantations, about addicts, about treatment, about
consumption. There is no control whatsoever, and there have been cases where large amounts of
drugs have been lost and in the Board and nobody knows what happened to these drugs.”560
Garcia Jaime also mentioned that Ecuador risked losing access to international credits since large
amounts of drugs had been shipped from Ecuador to the United States.
As outlined above, his remarks sought to promote a new anti-narcotics law, which,
according to him, constituted a long-term effort by the minister of public health and himself to
update and modernize Ecuador’s national legislation on illicit drugs. The law, initially elaborated
by the Ministry, was discussed and modified by the Judicial Commission on August 5, 6, 11, 12,
and 13 before it was sent back to the executive for the final signature.561 The judicial experts did
not debate or question the law’s underlying assumptions or the need to reform the country’s drug
law, but primarily discussed its linguistic and technical aspects. When debating the penalties, the
Judicial Commission increased those for the falsification of medical prescriptions to obtain drugs
from a scale of one to three years to one of two to five years of prison.562 Furthermore, it decided
to codify as a crime and penalize, with one to three years of prison, the dispersion of drugs to
another person without that person’s consent.563 After the law was sent back to the executive, it
was issued as a Supreme Decree by president Velasco Ibarra on August 31, 1970. As the law
constituted the basis of Ecuador’s legislative framework on drugs until 1991, its content deserves
some attention.
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The first paragraph cited a series of justifications for the law, which strongly coincide
with the ones exposed by Dr. Garcia to the Judicial Committee. First, that the previous legislation
had not incorporated several of the dispositions of the 1961 Convention, to which Ecuador
adhered in 1964. Second, that the previous legislation had not included any regulation on
psychotropic substances (i.e. drugs of purely chemical composition), stating that the new law
wanted to follow the recommendations of the WHO and the specialized UN organs in this matter.
Third, that the previous law was anti-technical and had several contradictions, which posed
difficulties to the prevention, control and sanctioning of improper drug use and illicit trafficking.
Interestingly, in the entire paragraph, there is no reference to Ecuador’s specific drug-related
challenges.564
Title I of the law prohibited all activities related to the illicit production and commerce of
narcotic drugs, while establishing regulatory mechanisms for the import, production, distribution,
and sale of drugs for medical and scientific purposes.565 Title II established a series of rules on
how Ecuadorian authorities should deal with drug addicts and provide effective treatment (see
below). Title III created the National Department of Control and Inspection of Narcotic Drugs,
which was authorized to regulate all activities related to the licit import, production, distribution,
sale and use of narcotic drugs. Furthermore, it received a mandate to interact and write reports for
the respective international drug control organs; store confiscated drugs; launch studies on the
causes of drug addiction; and carry out educational campaigns to prevent drug use.566
Title IV established the penalties for all drug-related activities prohibited by this law. Art.
30 penalized with eight to twelve years of prison the sowing, cultivation, and harvesting of all
plants that can be used to produce narcotic drugs; all unauthorized activities and processes related
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to the manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; and all activities related to the
illicit trafficking and commercialization of narcotics and psychotropic drugs.567 Owners of
properties or means of transportation used for the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, who
know but do not report such crimes to the police faced penalties of one to three years. Art. 33
punished the supply and dispersion of drugs to users with four to eight years (gang members were
to receive the maximum penalty). If the drug user was a minor or had not given consent, the
penalty rose up to eight to twelve years. According to art. 34, owners of establishments where
drugs were sold and consumed were penalized with three to six years. While pharmacists who
illegitimately sold medicines with narcotic-drug content faced only monetary fines (art. 35),
individuals who falsified prescriptions faced two to five years of prison (art. 36). Medical
professionals, who wrongfully prescribed medicines with drug content, were penalized with six to
nine years of jail. Ultimately, art. 38 stated that owners of pharmacies where medicines with drug
content disappeared would be punished as drug traffickers according to art. 30.568
In comparative perspective, the law’s penalties stand out in two major ways. On the one
hand, the lowest penalty for a trafficking offense with four years for the supply of drugs to the
end user, was among the highest at the time. Only Venezuela had an equally high minimum
penalty. On the other hand, the highest possible penalty for trafficking offenses, of twelve years
was relatively low (see table 6).
Although the Judicial Committee followed the recommendation of the Ministry of Public
Health, which considered drug addiction as a disease, not to penalize the mere possession of
drugs, title II established that all recreational drug users had to undergo mandatory detoxication
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and rehabilitation for a period determined by a doctor. It also obliged police agents to detain all
individuals that appeared to be under the influence of drugs and take them to the nearest hospital.
Furthermore, all cases of drug use and addiction, including the personal details of drug users,
were issued to be kept in a national registry. Addicts and drug users that declined to undergo the
obligatory treatment were to be penalized with one year of prison.569
8.2 Stronger Prohibition in the 1970s
Throughout the 1970s, different Ecuadorian governments changed and adjusted the
existing legislation several times, in each instance by a supreme decree. Until the very end of the
decade, each decree reinforced prohibition and the repression of activities involving illicit drugs.
Under the civil dictatorship of Velasco Ibarra, D.S. 26 from 1971 introduced a series of technical
changes about the sale of drugs in pharmacies.570 Under the military dictatorship of General
Guillermo Rodríguez Lara (1972-1976), D.S. 909 from 1974 incorporated the terms and
instructions of the 1971 Convention into the existing law, created an inter-ministerial commission
on drugs, and expanded the role of the police in drug control measures, including the permission
to carry out undercover missions. Furthermore, it included inducing others to commit drug-related
crimes as a crime in itself, to be penalized with eight to twelve years of prison. Interestingly, the
law also introduced milder penalties for the cultivation, production, and commerce with
marijuana, which was Ecuador’s most widely-consumed drug (six months to five years of prison,
depending on the age of the offender).571 Under the triumvirate led by Admiral Alfredo Poveda
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(1976-1979), D.S. 1,139 from 1977 created new rules on how confiscated drugs should be
destroyed.572 However, the most draconian changes came with the 1978 Supreme Decree 2,636.
Different to the previous changes of Ecuador’s 1970 drug law, the decree from 1978 not
only aimed at changing the legal framework on drugs, but also enacted numerous novelties to
Ecuador’s criminal code and criminal procedure code (“Código de Procedimiento Penal”),
including the introduction of penalties of up to 25 years.573 The decree’s section on Ecuador’s
drug law, focused almost exclusively on its sanctions, introducing much stronger penalties for the
crimes established in D.S. 366. Sanctions for the crimes outlined in art. 30 (see above) were
increased from a range of eight to twelve years, to one of 16 to 25 years of prison. Penalties for
the provision of properties and means of transportation to carry out drug-related crimes rose from
a range of one to three years, to three to five years. Gang members who sold drugs received the
highest increase, from eight years in the previous law to a range of 20 to 25 years. Owners of
establishments where drugs were sold and consumed, were now punished with twelve to 16 years,
as compared to three to six years before.574
For a brief moment, this unprecedented increase of sanctions transformed Ecuador’s legal
framework into one of toughest ones in the region. At the time, no other country had higher
minimum penalties for trafficking offenses. Furthermore, at the end of the 1970s, only in Bolivia,
Brazil, and Peru was it technically possible to issue penalties of 25 years of prison or more (see
table 6). However, the draconian drug law did not last very long. In its first year in office, the
democratically-elected government of Jaime Roldos Aguilera abrogated D.S. 2,636 through the
Legislative Decree from August 21, 1979 as one of its first measures.575
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The following paragraphs examine the reasons for Ecuador’s prohibitionist trend in the
1970s. As international drug trafficking in Ecuador was still in its footsteps and drug
consumption limited to marijuana, the role of the U.S. is crucial in explaining the intensification
of drug prohibition. Several calls on Ecuadorian authorities as well as close cooperation and
coordination with Ecuador’s police and the Ministry of the Interior in the area of drug control are
well documented. Cables from the U.S. embassy in Quito also suggest that in the first half of the
decade Ecuador was seeking a leadership role in drug control efforts to impress the U.S. in order
to obtain access to technology and resources. Towards the end of the decade, however, the sharp
increase of drug-related penalties appears to reflect the personal preferences of Ecuador’s military
leaders rather than responding to international or domestic incentives.
An examination of the biggest newspapers from Guayaquil (“El Universo”) and Quito
(“El Comercio”) in the month prior the decrees in 1974 and 1978 indicates that Ecuador’s most
significant legal changes were not driven by public opinion or pressure from civil society.
Although both newspapers reported about drug-related cases in Ecuador, “El Comercio” eight
times in August 1974 and five times in June 1978, and “El Universo” six times in 1974 and two
times in 1978, there are no traces of public demands to change the legislative framework or nongovernment actors pressing for such adjustments (incentives D1 and D2).576 Hence, it is not
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surprising, that the military government justified D.S. 909 entirely on the need to implement the
terms of the 1971 Convention, without any reference to Ecuador’s domestic context.577 This
changed, however, with regard to D.S. 2,636, from 1978 whose justification stated the following:
That the country is going through a severe aggravation of the problem of crime, with
serious danger to the security and integrity of the people and to the peace and tranquility
of the republic. (…) That the monstrous incidence of illicit drug trafficking and
consumption is turning Ecuador into a country of production, processing, transit and
consumption of all types of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, a situation that
threatens the lives of the people and especially the youth. (…) That it corresponds to the
Government of the Armed Forces and all entities and organisms of the State to arbitrate
the legal measures conducive to avoiding, persecuting, sanctioning and eradicating crime
in any of its forms.578

According to this statement, the military government was responding to a sharp increase
in criminal behavior, drug trafficking, and drug consumption (corresponding to incentive D3).
However, the analysis of various sources corroborates that this is a sharp exaggeration. Media
reports and U.S. embassy cables illustrate that since the late 1960s Ecuador gained a reputation
for being a transit country for the various routes of trafficking cocaine into the United States, and,
to a lesser degree, for the processing of cocaine base into cocaine powder.579 As a consequence,
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since the early 1970s, the United States threatened to withdraw foreign aid, if Ecuador did not
enact stronger controls on its illicit narcotics trade.580 Furthermore, through an exchange of letters
between President Richard Nixon and Ecuador’s military dictator, General Guillermo Rodríguez
Lara, in 1972, as well as U.S. embassy personnel, including DEA agents, the United States
undertook a large-scale effort to encourage the Ecuadorian government to take a stronger stance
against the drug trade.581 Throughout the decade, U.S. embassy officials held occasional meetings
with top government officials as well as monthly meetings with lower-ranked officials in a
Narcotics Action Committee.582 Furthermore, the United States provided aid, equipment, and
training to the National Police, the Customs Police, and border control units.583
Despite ongoing concerns that Ecuador played an important role in the supply of drugs to
the U.S. market, there is no evidence to suggest that trafficking activities increased heavily prior
to the rise of the penalties in 1978, as stated in the law’s justification. In fact, arrests for
trafficking and drug possession, as well as seizures of cocaine sulfate, were significantly lower in
1978 than in the previous years.584 Furthermore, while in the mid 1970s there were some traces of
concerns in the Ecuadorian government about rising marijuana consumption, there is no evidence
Department of State/Secretary of State, “Narcotics: Country Problem Assessment Papers,” October 15,
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580

El Comercio, “Estados Unidos cesaría ayuda a Ecuador si no controla narcóticos,” 11 de julio de 1970,

1.
581

U.S. Embassy in Quito to Department of State/Ecuador Guayaquil/Secretary of State, “Conversation
with Minister of Government Poveda on Narcotics Enforcement,” August 15, 1974, PLUSD.
582

U.S. Embassy in Quito to Argentina Buenos Aires/Department of State/DEA Washington/Ecuador
Guayaquil/Secretary of State, “Monthly Narcotics Report – Ecuador January 1974 (December Statistics),”
February 7, 1974, PLUSD; and U.S. Embassy in Quito to Department of State/Ecuador
Guayaquil/Secretary of State, “Conversation on Narcotics with GOE Minister of Government,” February
11, 1974, PLUSD.
583

U.S. Embassy in Quito to Department of State/Ecuador Guayaquil/Secretary of State, “Semi-Annual
Narcotics Report,” July 16, 1974, PLUSD.
584

U.S. Embassy in Quito to Department of State, “Annual Narcotics Status Report for 1978,” March 16,
1979, PLUSD.

223

suggesting that drug consumption increased towards the end of the decade.585 The 1978 Annual
Narcotics Status Report of the U.S. embassy stated that “since there is no apparent drug abuse
problem, there seems to be little detectable effort at demand reduction.”586
The above paragraphs show that there were no strong domestic incentives to enact
increasingly prohibitionist drug laws, except for the government agencies that benefitted from
U.S. assistance and likely supported U.S. drug control proposals internally. Combined with
continued pressure on top government officials, the manipulation of the domestic context through
the provision of technology, training, and financial support provides a strong explanation for
Ecuador’s prohibitionist trend. This is particularly compelling regarding the changes enacted in
the 1974 decree.
The principal goal of the U.S. throughout the decade was to improve the operational
capacity of the Ecuadorian state to investigate and combat trafficking activities. This included
establishing a professional narcotics unit within Ecuador’s National Police; professionalizing the
“sloppy” customs procedures as well as and border controls; and fighting corruption in the police,
judiciary, and penitentiary system.587 Some of the changes of D.S. 909 promised better
enforcement, especially new powers given to Ecuador’s police and the creation of an interministerial commission to coordinate drug policy.588 Hence, U.S. embassy officials applauded
these novelty as an important step in enhancing drug control. As Ambassador Brewster stated on
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October 4, 1974: “Mission is generally pleased with amendments, which are viewed here as
helpful to GOE narcotics enforcement efforts.”589 This coincided with an overall positive
assessment of Ecuador’s drug policy by the ambassador: “In Ecuador, as a result of greater effort
on the part of DEA and a series of high level calls on important GOE officials, there has been a
drastic change in the enforcement effort in Ecuador.”590
However, Ecuador’s determination to strengthen drug control were not only a
consequence of direct U.S. pressure and cooperation, but also formed part of a strategy to obtain
access to resources and technology. On multiple occasions, Ecuadorian authorities tried to link
talks about drugs to the possibility of purchasing helicopters, financed by special discounts and
U.S. credits.591 In line with this view, Ecuador’s quick ratification of the 1971 Convention and the
1972 Protocol, both in 1973, suggest that Ecuador wanted to improve its relationship with the
U.S. by being a regional leader and responsible ally in drug enforcement efforts (incentive I3). As
Ecuador was the 13th country to ratify the 1971 Convention, and also the 13th country to ratify the
1972 Protocol, there was no risk of losing international standing or prestige (incentive I2) by
delaying ratification a few more years.592 Furthermore, after the U.S. government declined the
request to sell helicopters at a special discount, their assessment of Ecuadorian drug control
efforts changed quite dramatically. On March 16, 1979, Ambassador Gonzalez stated that “The
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GOE’s ‘war on drugs’ faded into a skirmish soon after its inception.”593 In May 1979, he
assessed: “Certainly the present military government could more easily and arbitrarily punish
corrupt military, police, and penal officials than will the upcoming civilian government. That this
was not done, we assume resulted from a lack of will and ability, and because of corruption of top
levels of the GOE.”594
Other reports about Ecuador were even more negative. In 1978, the Ecuadorian embassy
in Washington D.C. informed the Foreign Ministry about two articles published in the
Washington Post, which reported about Ecuador in highly unfavorable terms.595 The first article
relied on a report of the chairman of the congressional Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and
Control, Lester Wolff, who traveled to several Latin American countries to assess their drug
control efforts. According to Wolff, only Chile took the matter seriously. His report accused Peru
and Bolivia of flouting international laws, and Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia of allowing drug
traffickers to flourish. Regarding Ecuador, the article cited the following quote from Wolff’s
report:
The investigators came back with “the distinct impression that law enforcement… is
weak [and] corruption is widespread: Many instances of high-ranking government
officials involved in cocaine trafficking have been reported and documented… Judges
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have been known to vie for major [drug] cases, knowing that the right verdict can bring a
sizable payoff.”596

The second article, published two months later, relied on an unpublished DEA report.
Once again Ecuador came under attack:
We can now know the name of Ecuadoran kingpins. Federal Drug Enforcement
Administration files identify him as Francisco Adum-Adum, a prominent lawyer. The
confidential DEA report states that Adum-Adum is known to have “upper-level”
government contacts. Investigators found he used his political connections to achieve his
dominant position in smuggling operations.597

Given Ecuador’s declining reputation, the 1978 decision of drastically increasing all
drug-related penalties (see above) can be interpreted as a gesture to signal continued willingness
in the fight against drugs to the U.S. However, the military government must have been aware
that the country’s declining reputation was not due to its penalties, but a lack of enforcement.
Similarly, there was no discussion of penalties in the ASEP meetings from 1978.598 Hence,
increasing penalties in and of itself could do little to improve the country’s standing in the eyes of
the U.S. and Ecuador’s regional peers. Not surprisingly, the reaction of the U.S. ambassador was
not enthusiastic. The embassy’s annual narcotics report for 1978 merely mentioned the increase.
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In the same paragraph it emphasized that “the general consensus is that any major trafficker can
influence the prosecution of his case (no juries are used) or, if sentenced, can make necessary
arrangements to facilitate his early release.”599
Ultimately, it is evident that, different to the early 1970s, Ecuador did not seek a
leadership role in drug control efforts (incentive I3). The country took on a low profile during the
ASEP meetings in Buenos Aires (see n. 598). Furthermore, Ecuador declined any interest in a
seat on the CND when its government was consulted by U.S. officials.600
Given that neither domestic and international incentives are able to fully explain the
sharp increase of penalties for drug-related offenses, a more convincing explanation is that the
military government acted according to its own preferences. Throughout the 1970s, the head of
the military government’s Supreme Council, and interim president of Ecuador, the navy admiral
Alfredo Poveda, gained a positive reputation among U.S. officials for his strong support in drug
control efforts. In 1974, when Poveda was minister of government, U.S. officials had several
meetings with him, all of which resulted in a positive assessment. After a conversation from
August 15, 1974, Ambassador Brewster concluded: “I sense, in fact, that Poveda may be giving
the narcotics issue greater personal attention than heretofore and hopefully this will give the
program the impetus that it so clearly needs.”601 After a meeting in 1979, Ambassador Gonzalez
noted “Significant was Poveda’s observation that drug abuse is a serious problem in the country.
This is the first high-level expression that Ecuador does have a drug problem. Poveda complained
that increasing drug use is affecting traditional filial ties and undermining family life and parental
authority.”602 Although the president’s statements have to be taken with some care, they seem to
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indicate that he had strong prohibitionist inclinations and considered drug use as a potential
threat.
However, a stronger emphasis enforcement, which the U.S. was hoping for, would not
only have been costly in terms of state resources but may have led to a loss of support among
friends and allies within Ecuador’s military (due to the apparent corruption and involvement in
illicit trafficking). Increasing the penalties carried neither monetary costs nor lower risks of being
opposed by the rest of the military and state apparatus. Another factor that strengthens the
explanation that Poveda’s Supreme Council acted according to its preferences is that the military
government had no perspective of staying in power. In 1976, a group of older and conservative
army officers, led by Admiral Poveda, overthrew the government Rodríguez Lara, who had fallen
in disarray with the countries elites as well as poorer parts of society. These officers legitimized
their coup promising a prompt return to democracy.603 Despite multiple delays and banning
several candidates, in February 1978 the government’s Supreme Council had called for general
elections for July 16 of the same year.604 Hence, by the time, the government increased the
penalties for drug-related activities it was already on its way out of power. In summary, although,
given the available information, the reason for the strong increase of penalties for drug-related
crimes cannot be determined with absolute certainty, in the absence of strong domestic and
international incentives, it appears that the country’s fading leadership simply followed its own
inclinations about drug use.
8.3 Prevention and Prohibition in the 1980s
As outlined above, the democratically-elected government of Jaime Roldos Aguilera,
who died in an airplane crash in 1981, abrogated the draconian penalties the military government
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enabled through changes in the criminal code as one of his first measures in office. His successor,
the former vice-president Oswaldo Hurtado, who was in office until the end of the term in 1984,
did not make drug policy a priority of his administration. A national plan for the period from
1981 to 1985 to prevent improper drug use was the only significant measure Ecuador undertook
at the time. According to Edwards, the plan “referred to the dangers of emphasizing enforcement
over treatment and pointed to the importance of treating the issue of drug dependence as a result
of specific social ills within Ecuadorian society.”605
The prioritization of treatment over enforcement changed with the election of León
Febres Cordero, who was president from 1984 to 1988. The engineer from the Social Christian
Party with strong conservative credentials aligned Ecuador to the acceleration of “war on drugs”
led by the U.S. (see chapter V). On the one hand, Febres Cordero (1984-1988) sought to justify
his government’s authoritarian tendencies against leftist segments of the opposition and ongoing
human rights violations by publicizing “a non-existent and indemonstrable” link between
subversive groups and drug trafficking mafias, so-called narcoguerrillas.606 On the other,
according to Jácome and Álvarez Velasco his government hoped to “benefit from the financial
aid and the international cooperation that other governments were receiving.”607
During his presidency Ecuador signed bilateral drug control agreements with the United
States and Peru. Furthermore, together with the presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela,
he launched a declaration that called for greater international action and called drug trafficking an
enemy of humankind.608 On the domestic side, in 1986 his government sought to undertake a farreaching reform of Ecuador’s legislation on drugs. The lawmakers, however, rejected the project
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given that they considered the proposed penalties of perpetual prison for multiple trafficking
offenses, as well as several procedural requirements, unconstitutional and in contradiction to the
country’s criminal code.609 As highlighted by the deputy Segundo Serrano Serrano from the
Socialist Party: “It is not that I, in any way, want to assume the role of defending traffickers, but
as the lawyer I am, I think that this is a malicious attack on the regime of penalties established in
the criminal code of the Republic of Ecuador.”610 Furthermore, Deputy Moreno Ordoñez referred
to the law as “a repressive shadow of fascist character,” which was not compatible with the
constitution.611 In its stead, Ecuador’s Congress decided to unite the eight decrees which
constituted Ecuador’s drug law at the time into a unified text called Law of Control and
Supervision of the Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.612 While the
respective literature (see intro., n. 8) characterizes the 1987 codification as a new law, in the
respective parliamentary session the president of the plenary of parliamentary commissions made
clear that “the plenary could not include any modification of the law, even if it was absolutely
reasonable.”613
However, new initiatives to reform Ecuador’s drug law emerged in the year 1990. During
January and February, the country’s Congress received two projects: one elaborated by experts of
Ecuador’s Catholic University and presented by Deputy René Maugé; and another one presented
by the country’s executive. During fourteen sessions, the Commission of the Civil and the
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Criminal (“Comisión de lo Civil y Penal”) studied both laws and compared them with laws from
other countries. On June 19, it presented a slightly modified version of the executive’s proposal to
the Congress for discussion.614 It was then approved, article by article, on July 31 and August 2,
6, and 7.615 The following section provides a brief summary of the law’s most important changes
and novelties in comparison to previous laws.
8.4 Law 108
The 1990 Law of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (law 108) has gained a
reputation, and been criticized, for being one of the most prohibitionist and draconian laws in the
region and Ecuadorian history. The strongest criticisms are: That the law has increased penalties
for drug-related crimes; does not distinguish between different levels of responsibility within the
trafficking chain; and does not distinguish between drug traffickers and drug users.616 However,
while the law has strong repressive elements, a closer look shows that these claims are only
partially true, or not true at all.
One of the law’s most import novelties was the creation of the National Council for the
Control of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances (CONSEP, “Consejo Nacional de Control de
Sustancias Estupefacientes y Psicotrópicas”). Law 108 provided CONSEP with a strong mandate
to regulate and supervise the licit drug trade according to IDCR regulations; formulate and enact
national plans and strategies to prevent illicit drug use, as well as their production and
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commercialization, and the repression of the illicit drug trade; issue directives that have to be
followed by all entities involved in the regulation of the licit drug trade and the repression of
illicit drug markets; gather and analyze data about the illegal drug trade; carry out investigations
about the causes of drug addiction; and provide and coordinate training of public officials and
entities in the private sector on the prevention of drug use. 617
Another important novelty was the penalization of the possession of drugs for personal
consumption. Art. 65 penalized such possession with a penalty range of one month to two years
of prison. Whether or not the possession of drugs was for personal consumption was to be
determined by doctors from the State Attorney’s Office, considering the type of substance, the
quantity the subject possessed, the level of tolerance to the drug, and the clinical history. If the
suspect had no criminal history, judges could issue obligatory treatment as an alternative
sentence. However, if the doctors concluded that the amount possessed exceeded the amount
necessary for personal consumption, drug users faced penalties of twelve to sixteen years of
prison for the mere possession of such substances.618
Apart from penalizing the possession of drugs, the new law defined a whole new set of
drug-related crimes, many of which were punishable with twelve to sixteen years of prison, the
highest penalty Ecuador’s criminal code allowed and higher than the penalties for homicides
(eight to twelve years), terrorism (four to eight years), and kidnapping (three to six years). Crimes
penalized with the heaviest sentencing range included: The sowing or cultivation of plants that
can be used to produce or manufacture narcotic drugs; the elaboration, production, fabrication, or
preparation of narcotic drugs; the transportation and commercialization of drugs; the possession
of drugs; the provision of properties for the deposition and consumption of drugs; illicit
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enrichment through trafficking activities; and the organization and financing of illicit activities.619
Crimes with penalties of eight to twelve years included: The harvesting of plants that can be used
to produce or manufacture narcotic drugs; the offering, brokerage, or intermediation of drug
sales; the dispersion of drugs without the consent of the person taking them; the production,
maintenance, and trafficking of precursor chemicals; the unjustified loss of precursor chemicals
for entities allowed to possess them; the repression of straw men; the change or hiding of
evidence by public officials; bribery; and actions of bad faith to involve others in crimes.620 Other
punishable activities included: the supply of drugs to athletes; the possession of organic raw
materials and other ingredients used for drug consumption (both six to nine years); the conversion
or transfer of goods stemming from the drug trade; intimidation or the threat to involve others in
drug-related crimes (both four to eight years); intimidation of those knowing about or investing
drug-related crimes (four to six years); the supply of drugs to users; the unjustified prescription of
medicines with drug content; the falsification, forging, or change of prescriptions; the sale of
medicines with drug content without the proper prescription; and the production or
commercialization of products advertising or promoting drug use (all three to six years).621 Art.
90 also prescribed that if a suspect was found guilty of multiple drug-related offenses, penalties
would accumulate to a limit of 25 years of prison.622 The law’s repressive elements, however, did
not end with the penalties. Art. 116 stated that drug-related suspects were found guilty until
proven innocent, a presumption that was declared unconstitutional in 1997 and was since then
eliminated from the law.623
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Ultimately, the law included a series of articles, which converted the prescriptions and
recommendations of the 1988 Convention into domestic law, including numerous articles
regarding the confiscation of goods, assets, and properties stemming from the drug trade; mutual
judicial assistance; new restriction on the trade with precursor chemicals; and rules for the
destruction of confiscated drugs.624
The timing of the law, shortly after the conclusion of the 1988 Convention, and the
acceleration and militarization of the “war on drugs” in the Andean region, has led several
authors to conclude that the law has been driven by U.S. pressure and material incentives. Hence,
the following section starts with an analysis of the international context. It then moves on to
analyze Ecuador’s domestic context, drawing on media sources and parliamentary debates.
8.5 Analysis of Law 108
Although the law’s justification did not explicitly mention the 1988 Convention, it is
evident that the authors of the law intended to follow its instructions meticulously. However,
while the Convention had a strong impact on the law’s content, this does not explain why
Ecuador was so fast in signing (1989), ratifying (February 1990), and incorporating its
instructions into a comprehensive domestic legislation (August 1990). At the time, there was
clearly no loss of losing international standing (incentive I2).
From the available documents, it is unclear to what degree the United States pressured
Ecuador to reform its drug laws. However, two factors contradict the view that the law was the
result of direct U.S. pressure (corresponding to incentive I1). First, at the time the primary
concern of the U.S. was to eradicate drug supplies in the leading producer countries. When the
presidents of the United States, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru convened in Cartagena in February
1990 to negotiate a multilateral anti-narcotics strategy, Ecuador was not invited. Furthermore,
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while the U.S. decertification process, created in 1986 (see chapter V), provided a powerful tool
to withdraw foreign aid and access to credits, different to the early 1970s, there were no highprofile public proclamations that Ecuador was under risk of losing U.S. support. Second, as
outlined below Ecuador’s domestic context was already becoming more favorable regarding a
comprehensive reform of the country’s drug laws. Although these factors do not preclude the
possibility that lower-level U.S. officials campaigned for legal changes and more effective control
mechanisms, it is unlikely that such pressures have been the primary cause of the law.
A more convincing explanation is that Ecuador sought to obtain prestige and material
resources by taking on a leadership role in the developing IDCR and the U.S.-led “war on drugs”
(corresponding to incentive I3). After Chile, Ecuador was the second South American country to
ratify the 1988 Convention and only 5 months later approved a fully-fledged drug policy reform,
seeking to create new, and reinforce existing, control mechanism. Furthermore, Ecuador issued a
public protest after being excluded from the drug policy summit in Cartagena.625 The Ecuadorian
government accompanied these actions with an active promotion of the country as a stabilizing
force in the regional drug trade. On the one hand, it advertised the absence of a large coca and
cocaine industry as a success of its efforts. On the other hand, the country’s center-leftist
president, Rodrigo Borja Cevallos (1988-1992), argued that his government was doing everything
it could to prevent Ecuador from being penetrated by drug traffickers, while highlighting the need
for material support:
We do not refine cocaine. Drugs are not part of our exports and neither of our economy,
but naturally this does not exclude us from our responsibility to join forces with other
countries to fight together against this modern vice of drug trafficking and consumption,
along which exists an enormous economic power. (…) I talked to President Bush
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bilaterally about financing certain actions, right now while we still have the power to do
them, so that my country does not transform into a producer of drugs. Until now our fight
against drugs has been financed almost exclusively by Ecuadorian capital, but this
financing is not enough.626

Moreover, following the Cartagena summit, the United States enacted the Andean Trade
Preference Act (ATPA), which eliminated tariffs for multiple products for Andean countries.
Gaining preferred access to the U.S. market was one of the primary goals of Borja’s government.
During his trip to Washington D.C. in July 1990, President Bush applauded Borja for his
country’s efforts in the fight against illicit narcotics and rewarded Ecuador by including it into
ATPA.627
Ecuador’s active promotion of its drug policies indicates that, rather than being the result
of direct pressure, the country aimed at taking advantage of a changing international context, in
which the United States was providing greater resources and trade benefits to countries willing to
join the “war on drugs.” According to this explanation, Ecuador’s executive, which redacted the
law, pushed for the reform to signal and underline its commitments to the international
community, before it was asked to do so.
At the same time, however, Ecuador’s domestic context strongly favored the
government’s efforts. As outlined above, drug trafficking became a more important issue in
Ecuadorian politics in the second half of the 1980s under the presidency of Febres Cordero
(1984-1988). Although his initiative for a new legislation failed, due to the unconstitutional
nature of its high penalties and extradition requirements (see above), most of the legislators
discussing the law identified with the goal of modernizing the country’s drug laws. The deputy
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Enrique Delgado Coppiana, from the opposition party Democratic Left (“Izquierda
Democrática”) even called for the military to be included into the list of national institutions
responsible for drug control: “Considering the seriousness that the drug trafficking problem is
currently acquiring in the country, the State is obliged to mobilize all of the resources it can
possibly give, to combat this plague; therefore, for the commission to study, I request very
discreetly to consider the possibility of including into the national organisms for the control and
inspection of licit or illicit trafficking, the armed forces.”628
Furthermore, the amount of reporting about drug trafficking and consumption in “El
Comercio” and “El Universo,” both nationally and internationally, increased significantly in the
1990s. In the months of June and July 1990, “El Comercio” featured a total of 26 articles about
drugs (ten in June and 16 in July). In the same period, “El Universo” from Guayaquil featured 37
(24 for June and 13 for July).629 While several articles expressed concern about trafficking
activities, drug consumption, and a deteriorating security situation in Ecuador, others reported
about the rising levels of violence and the fights between security forces and the Medellín cartel
in neighboring Colombia.630 Within this context the Ecuadorian government repeated the same
discourse it advanced internationally to its domestic constituents: drug trafficking does not
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constitute a security threat in Ecuador, but in order to prevent this from happening Ecuador needs
to strengthen its controls.631
Although it is not entirely clear to what extent public opinion supported the reform
(incentive D1), there was no opposition or questioning of the law and its numerous repressive
elements in the country’s two most important newspapers. At the same time, there are several
traces of social actors demanding a tougher stance on drugs (incentive D2). On June 26, an op-ed
called “Say No to Drugs,” called for a stronger role of the state in the prevention of drug use. The
same article claimed that drug addicts are egocentric and individualistic, lazy, immature,
manipulative, undisciplined, and cannot distinguish between good and bad.632 On July 4 and 5,
both newspapers reported about a survey, carried out by the United Nations, in which Ecuador’s
children expressed the demand for better protection from drugs.633 Ultimately, on June 23 “El
Universo,” reported about a music festival called “No to Drugs,” which promoted ending drug
use among the country’s youth, organized by the “Attorney General’s Office” and the “Education
Direction of the Province of Guayas.”634
Given the alarmist and moralistic reporting of the country’s media, and the prominent
demand to do more to protect the Ecuador’s youth from drugs, it is not surprising that prior to the
executive’s initiative Ecuador’s Congress was already discussing a project for a drug policy
reform, presented by Deputy René Maugé and elaborated by legal experts of Ecuador’s Catholic
University (see above). In the reading of the law, there was unanimous support for the idea that
Ecuador needed a reform of its drug law, especially regarding the criminalization of several drug631
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related activities not captured in previous laws.635 Hence, it is entirely possible that Ecuador
would have undertaken a reform of its drug laws without the executive’s impulse and its goal to
gain preferred access to the U.S. market.
While the domestic context proved favorable for the reform, a crisis (incentive D3), like a
sudden rise in drug consumption or drug trafficking, was clearly not a cause. Although some
voices claimed that drug trafficking and consumption in Ecuador was on the rise, there are no
traces of a specific incident or a culmination of demands that compelled the government to act. In
fact, the government was able to maintain a discourse that drug trafficking was not (yet) a major
problem in Ecuador.
Thus, as outlined above, Ecuador’s 1990 drug policy reform was the result of the
government’s goal to brand itself as a responsible country and leader in regional drug control
efforts to obtain resources and preferred market access to the U.S, facilitated by a domestic
context, which was highly favorable to a reform.
While the reasons for reforming the law can be well explained, the criminalization of
drug use remains puzzling and merits further attention. It is puzzling because at the time all South
American countries, except Argentina and Brazil, had abolished the criminalization of drug use.
Furthermore, as outlined above, never in the country’s history had Ecuador decided to do so. The
parliamentary debates provide only limited insights about why the criminalization of drug users
proceeded. In the protocol of the first debate when the legislators discussed the respective articles
are missing in the documents provided by the Archive-Library of Ecuador’s Legislative Function.
The second debate reveals that Ecuador’s legislators changed the way drug consumption was
penalized. The original article stated that the possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana or
five grams of hash or three grams of cocaine or 25 grams of any other illicit drug would lead to a
635
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lowering of the penalty by a third to half of the penalty (of twelve to sixteen years). Furthermore,
if the authorities determined an addiction the penalty could be lowered even further to a range of
one month to two years of prison. The article also foresaw the possibility of issuing compulsory
treatment as an alternative form of punishment.636 This formulation of the article led to a wave of
protest by several deputies. On the one hand, they complained about the lowering of the penalty
for the possession of small quantities of drugs, which could be exploited by small-scale
traffickers. On the other hand, they did not agree that drug addicts should be punished less
severely than a casual consumer.637 Hence, the legislators decided to abolish a lowering of the
penalties according to quantities but decided to lower the penalty (to a range of one month to two
years) if the possession was considered for personal consumption by a judge. Moreover, in case
doctors determined a dependency, they could suspend the penalty and issue compulsory
treatment. The new version of the article was approved with 13 votes in favor out of the 16
deputies that were present at the time of the vote.638 In no part of the discussion, however, did a
legislator question the criminalization of drug users as such.
Given a lack of access to the documents of the executive’s commission that redacted the
law, the most likely answer is that the authors simply followed the instructions of the 1988
Convention. As outlined in chapter III, said convention criminalized for the first time the
possession of drugs for personal consumption, while allowing governments to issue alternative
penalties to imprisonment. It appears that Ecuadorian authorities adopted these instructions one
by one.
In addition to the above-outlined legal changes, in 1998, a police reform created a new
anti-narcotics division, which was composed of no less than 13 new police units responsible for
636
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enforcing “Law 108.”639 Furthermore, in 2003 an anti-narcotics agreement with the United States
was leaked to the press. According to the treaty, the Ecuadorian police would receive additional
funding, equipment, and new police stations if it met certain targets: a ten percent rise of
confiscated drugs; a 15 percent increase of impounded arms and chemical precursors; and a
twelve percent increase of persons detained, as well as court hearings held for drug offenses.640
These far-reaching legal, institutional, and operational changes had multiple effects on
the country’s criminal justice system. While Ecuador’s prison infrastructure was built for
approximately 7,000 inmates, between 1989 and 2007, its prison population rose from 6,978 to
18,000, reaching the highest percentage of prison overcrowding in Latin America (157 percent).
Of all detainees, 34 percent were charged for drug offenses. In urban areas this number rose to 45
percent. This trend is even more pronounced for the female prison population, whose percentage
of detainees for drug-related offenses oscillated between 65 and 79 percent from 1989 to 2004.641
When the self-proclaimed leftist Rafael Correa assumed power in 2007 it appeared that
his government was dedicated to a more nuanced approach, favoring public health and harm
reduction over repression and prohibition. However, as outlined below, during his second term
prohibition made a full-blown comeback. The following section outlines the first series of
changes in greater detail, followed by a concise analysis of why the Ecuadorian government
decided to move away from prohibition.
8.6 Correa’s Tolerant Wave (2007-2014)
After the government of Rafael Correa entered office in 2007, it undertook a series of
measures, which moved the country away from its prohibitionist past. First, in January 2008
639
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Correa issued a presidential decree to pardon drug traffickers, who had declared guilty, were firsttime offenders, had been found in possession of no more than two kilograms of drugs, and had
completed at least ten percent or one year of their sentence.642 Second, article 364 of the country’s
new constitution, which was approved by a referendum on September 28, 2008, decriminalized
drug consumption and established that addictions were to be treated as an issue of public
health.643 Third, in 2013 CONSEP released a non-binding table, which allowed judges to
determine how much possession of a drug could be considered to count as personal consumption.
The table stated that up to ten grams of marijuana, two grams of cocaine paste, one gram of
powder cocaine, and 0.1 gram of heroin could be judged as personal consumption.644 Fourth,
Ecuadorian lawmakers passed a new criminal code (Código Orgánico Integral Penal, COIP),
which was approved in 2014 and deepened the influence of harm reduction in the country’s legal
framework. Article 220 of the new code distinguished between (1) large-, high-, medium-, and
small-scale traffickers; (2) traffickers and growers; and (3) users and small-scale traffickers.
According to the new law, drug offenders were to be charged according to how much of a
particular drug they possessed, with maximum penalties of ten to thirteen years for large-scale
trafficking, five to seven years for high-scale trafficking, one to three years for mid-level
trafficking, and two to six months for small-scale trafficking.645 In July 2014, CONSEP presented
a new scale, which outlined how much possession of a particular drug would fall into the
different categories. Table 13 outlines the quantities that define each category for different drugs:
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Table 13: CONSEP’s 2014 Scale to Define Trafficking Categories for Different Drugs
Scale
(grams)
Small
Medium
High
Large

Heroin
Min
>0
>1
>5
>20

Cocaine paste

Powder
Cocaine
Max Min
Max Min
Max
1
>0
50
>0
50
5
>50
500
>50
2,000
20
>500 2,000 >2,000 5,000
>2,000
>5,000

Marijuana

All psychotropic
drugs
Min
Max
Min
Max
>0
300
>0
2.5
>300
2,000 >2.5
5
>2,000 10,000 >5
12.5
>10,000
>12.5

Source: No. 002 CONCEP-CD-2014, Julio 9, 2014, [288, Segundo Suplemento] R.O. [1].

The highest penalty for drug-related offenses, 16 to 19 years, could be issued to those
financing and organizing drug production and commercialization.646 Further penalties were: one
to three years of prison for illicit harvesting and cultivation, the dispersion of drugs without the
consent of the person taking them, and the unjustified prescription of medicines with drug
content; and five to seven years for the involvement of others in drug-related crimes without their
consent.647 Apart from these legal and technical changes, Ecuador enacted two further measures,
which, some considered, increased Ecuador’s independence in drug-related issues. Since 2007,
Correa had announced that the lease agreement with the U.S. for a military base in Manta, which
played a crucial role in interdicting illicit drug shipments, would not be renewed after it ended in
2009.648 Similarly, he announced to unilaterally withdraw Ecuador from the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) so that the United States could not condition the
country’s policies.649
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The paragraphs below show that the above-outlined steps towards a less prohibitionist
drug policy is best explained as the result the successful placement of demands by social
movement, which were partially designed and implemented by a CONSEP leadership that was
sympathetic to harm reduction. Furthermore, some of the measures allowed President Correa to
promote and integrate drug policy into a discourse of social justice.
From the available data, it appears that the above measures were neither driven by public
opinion, nor a crisis or demand of the government to act in unprecedented ways because of a
specific problem (incentives D1 and D3). Although it is not clear what type of drug policy
Ecuadorians preferred at the time, neither drug trafficking nor drug consumption ranked high in
opinion polls about the country’s most important problem. According to data from
Latinobarómetro (see table 14), in most years from 2007 to 2013 (there is no data for 2014), only
an estimated 0.1 or 0.2 percent saw drug consumption or drug trafficking as the country’s most
important problem (see table 14 below). Only in the years 2011 and 2013, drug trafficking rose
slightly in importance, to 0.5 and 1.5 percent respectively. Similarly, drug consumption gained
some in importance in the year 2013, when the percentage of subjects who saw it as the country’s
most important problem rose to 1.2 percent.
Table 14: Perception of Drug-Related Problems in Ecuador
In percent
Drug Trafficking most important problem
Drug Consumption most important problem

2007
0.1
0.2

2008
0.1
0.1

2009
0.2
0.2

2010
0.2

2011
0.5
0.2

2013
1.5
1.2

Source: Latinobarómetro Internat Database

However, the domestic context was favorable in other ways. During his 2006 election
campaign, Rafael Correa built a discourse based on the demands of various social movements and
civil society groups, which overwhelmingly supported his candidacy (incentive D2).650 In
650

Andrés Ortiz Lemos, “Taking Control of the Public Sphere by Manipulating Civil Society,” European
Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 98 (April 2015): 32.
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opposition to what Correa referred to as a “partyarchy” (“partidocracia”), i.e. the hegemony of the
elite-based traditional Ecuadorian parties, his own political movement “Alianza País” did not
present any candidates to the National Congress, an institution he had promised to abolish.
Instead, his government established a Constituent Assembly with the aim to write a new
constitution.651 Although the discussions and formulations of its articles were dominated by the
executive, the social movements, which had helped to secure Correa’s victory were able to
present multiple demands. According to Gabrield Buitron, a long-time activist, defender of
anarchism, and founder the NGO “Ecuador Cannábico,” many social movements and
organizations from civil society campaigning for individual and collective rights had waited for
30 or 40 years for a leftist government they could identify with. Hence, for many of them the
election of Correa signified an unprecedented possibility to advance their rights-based agenda.652
According to a member of Quito’s city council from “Alianza País,” almost every policy issue at
the time was viewed through the lens of rights.653
Even though many of the 2,300 proposals were left aside, several ones made it into the
final document. These included the creation of a plurinational state, collective rights,
communitarian economic models, and the decriminalization of drug use.654 Ortiz Lemos
characterizes the inclusion of these demands as “’cultural packages,’ delivered through slogans”
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without any real substance.655 However, as shown above, at least initially the decriminalization of
drug use had a more substantial impact.
Although the decriminalization of drug users can be interpreted as a successful placement
of a demand by civil society, at a political moment, which favored the inclusion of such demands,
the above changes also allowed Correa to feed his discourse of social justice. When Correa,
whose own father was convicted as a drug courier and served a prison sentence in the United
States, issued the pardon of convicted drug mules in 2008, he argued that trafficking
organizations were taking advantage of people in precarious economic situations and that the
heavy penalties given to people already carrying the burden of misery were in no relation to the
offense.656 He added, “It is outrageous that the Ecuadorian law is the same for the capo Rodríguez
Orejuela, from the Cali cartel, as for the poor woman, single mother, unemployed, who dared to
carry 300 grams of drugs.”657 Buitron even recognized changes in Correa’s personal thinking
about drugs over time: “He was the one talking about personal liberties and the right to carry a
dose for personal consumption, he ended the contract of the U.S. military base in Manta, he
withdrew from the preferences of the ATPDEA, and he himself was the one who gave an impulse
to perceive marijuana in a different way.”658 The fact that the secretary general of CONSEP
during Correa’s tenure, Rodrigo Vélez, was known for his preference for prevention, public
health, and alternative development in areas affected by drug trafficking, may have further
facilitated the turn to a less prohibitionist drug policy model. Prior to a CND conference in
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Vienna in 2014, Vélez was campaigning for a renegotiation of the international drug control
conventions, stating the following:
We have decided to follow the same path, the same formula, which does not work. (…)
This policy has the effect that human rights have been systematically violated through
disproportional penalties. (…) Latin America still has the dead victims while democracy
is at risk in many countries and this cannot continue.659

Veléz remarks indicate that Ecuador may have been seeking some leadership and
recognition for its efforts to move away from prohibition (incentive I3). While a deepening of the
reform initiatives may have put Ecuador in a good position to exercise a degree of leadership
within the group of countries seeking to reform drug policy, since 2015 Correa’s government
initiated a series of measures that put Ecuador back on a prohibitionist path. The following
paragraphs provide a brief summary of these changes, followed by an explanation of why they
took place.
8.7 The Return of Prohibition under Correa (2015-)
Ecuador’s shift towards harm reduction came to a sudden end in September 2015. When
addressing the country’s citizens in his regular TV and radio program “Enlace Ciudadano” on
September 4, Correa stated the following: “We want to end drug use among our youth and will
put micro traffickers into jail. The rest is pure deception.”660 In the same program, he clarified:
“You can call me authoritarian, arrogant, dictator, whatever you want, but I will not allow our
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youth to drug itself. I have demanded there to be stronger sanctions for drug traffickers.”661
Following his statements, the president ordered CONSEP to present a new table (see table 15
below) to make the quantities that define each category more restrictive. The government agency
followed suit and presented a new table on September 10. The revised scale reduced the
maximum possession for low-level trafficking to 0.1 grams for heroin, one gram for cocaine, and
20 grams for marijuana.662 Critics of the new scale argued that it became so restrictive that it is
effectively punishing drug consumption, thereby violating the normative framework of the 2008
constitution, and the 2014 COIP, both of which propose the opposite.663
Table 15: CONSEP’s Revised 2015 Scale
Scale
(grams)
Small
Medium
High
Large

Heroin

Cocaine paste

Min Max
>0
0.1
>0.1 0.2
>0.2 20
>20

Min
Max
>0
2
>2
50
>50
2,000
>2,000

Powder
Cocaine
Min Max
>0
1
>1
50
>50 5,000
>5,000

Marijuana
Min Max
>0
20
>20 300
>300 10,000
>10,000

All psychotropic
drugs
Min
Max
>0
0.09
>0.09 2.5
>2.5
12.5
>12.5

Source: No. 001-CONSEP-CD, Septiembre 10, 2015, [586] R.O.

Simultaneous to the redefinition of the categories, President Correa asked the legislators
of his party to change the criminal code by increasing the penalties for low-level trafficking from
a range of two to six months to one to three years, and medium-level trafficking from one to three
years to five to seven years. Through the elevation of penalties, the law empowered judges to
issue preventive prison for drug-related suspects.664 Even though 15 members of the governing
661

Translated from: El Mercurio, “Correa pide penas severas por drogas,” 6 de septiembre de 2015,
https://www.elmercurio.com.ec/494207-correa-pide-penas-severas-por-drogas/.
662

Redón, “CONSEP presentó nuevas escalas sobre tráfico de drogas,” (see ch. V, n. 330).

663

Daugherty, “Ecuador Toughens Drug Laws, Muddles Policy,” (see ch. V, n. 331).

664

Jorge V. Paladines, “De la represión a la prevención: Reforma y contrarreforma de la política de drogas
en Ecuador,” en Seguridad regional en América Latina y el Caribe: Anuario 2015, editado por Catalina
Niño Guarnizo (Bogotá: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung en Colombia, 2015), 164.

249

party “Alianza País” abstained the vote out of protest, on October 1, 2015 the proposed changes
were incorporated into a new law.665 Moreover, the law created a new Technical Secretary of
Drugs, which corresponded directly to the executive, while it abolished CONSEP, which used to
be controlled by the legislative.666 The first head of the new agency was a former police
commander, General Rodrigo Suarez, while Rodrigo Vélez was dismissed of his functions.667 On
top of the changes in the legal and institutional framework, the minister of the interior José
Serrano proclaimed the combat of micro-trafficking as the police’s most important goal, and
ordered 85 percent of the country’s anti-narcotics forces to target micro-trafficking, while only 15
percent of the personnel were to investigate large-scale, international trafficking organizations.668
The reasons for this shift were a series of interrelated domestic developments, which
incentivized the government to take on more hardline positions in the area of public security and
drug policy. Since 2010, Ecuador experienced a deterioration in the perception of public security.
This is evident in the Latinobarómetro survey’s question about the most important problem in
Ecuador. While in 2007, 7.4 percent of the subjects responded that crime and public security was
the biggest problem, in 2010 this number rose to 23.8 percent. In 2011, this number climbed even
higher to 32.8 percent (see table 16).
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Table 16: Perception of Crime/Public Security and Drug Consumption as Ecuador’s Most
Important Problem
In percent
Crime/public security
most important problem
Drug consumption most
important problem

2007
7.4

2008
10.2

2009
13

2010
23.8

2011
32.8

2013
31.2

2015
12.4

2016
7.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

1.2

5.5

4.8

Source: Latinobarómetro Internat Database

Given the available data it is not entirely clear what caused this sudden rise. Although
between 1980 and 2010 Ecuador’s homicide rate increased about three times, between 2007 and
2010 it rose only mildly, from 16 to 17.6 per 100,000 habitants. In 2011, this number even
dropped to 15.4.669 The occurrence of kidnapping also dropped slightly from 0.3 to 0.2 cases per
100,000 population between 2006 and 2010.670 The number of assaults dropped even more
significantly from 47.1 in 2006 to 30.2 in 2010.671 However, from 2010 to 2011 the number of
robberies per 100,000 population increased from 362.3 to 476.2 (31.44 percent), indicating that
the worsening perception of the security situation was not entirely unfounded.672
Analysts also highlight the specific role of targeted assassinations by criminal groups in
certain areas and the proliferation of these groups across the country, as well as the media, which
placed the issue of public security on the political agenda.673 Moreover, in February 2012
Ecuador’s armed forces presented a report of social responsibility, warning that if the government
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did not take immediate action, the problem of drug trafficking would get out of control.674 In the
following, Correa’s government, which faced a presidential election in February 2013, took on
public security and the combat of organized crime as one of its priorities and granted the armed
forces a greater role in fulfilling these domestic tasks.675
Simultaneously, several of the social movements and political parties that supported
Correa initially left the coalition and were replaced by more conservative forces. According to
Lemos Ortíz, the distancing between Correa and his former allies is the result of the government’s
attempt to coopt and control civil society groups.676 Buitron explains the distancing as the result
of programmatic differences about the organization of the economy. While several groups wanted
to implement more radically socialist and communal models of economic governance, Correa and
his ministers wanted to merely perfect or humanize capitalism. Hence, in the process many
organizations distanced themselves from Correa, which resulted in a loss of “progressive
thinking” in a government that he referred to as center-left or center-right.677
Within this context, Ecuador experienced the emergence of a new drug called “H,” a
highly lethal adulteration of heroin, which became popular among the poorer parts of society in
Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city, and other areas along the coast, causing panic and shockwaves
in the country’s media.678 Moreover, CONSEP released a study showing that high-school students
between 12 and 17 years of age had relatively easy access to marijuana within and around their
schools. Soon after, the police began carrying out preventive campaigns about the risks of drug
674
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use in Ecuador’s high schools as well as a series of controversial surprise rants in the country’s
educational establishments and clandestine parties for adolescents.679 At the end of the year 2014,
the police issued a report stating that even though overall crime and homicide rates have gone
down, the “threat of the drug trade has increased.”680 In May of the following year, “El
Comercio” and other media outlets reported that a criminal group in Quito was taking advantage
of the new scales in the COIP to avoid arrests by keeping the amounts of drugs they were
carrying below the limit allowed for personal consumption or low-scale trafficking. The minister
of the interior, José Serrano, reacted immediately by recommending CONSEP to reform the table
for sanctioning drug possession.681 According to a member of Quito’s City Council, aligned with
the Correa government, the opposition used the emergence of “H” and the apparent rise of drug
consumption to attack the government and their drug policy, which led to a revision of the
approach. 682 In the following weeks, a powerful discourse that Ecuador’s lax drug laws were
primarily responsible for the rise in micro-trafficking and consumption emerged, even though this
perceived trend started long before the new criminal code came into place. The most prominent
proponent of this discourse was President Correa himself, who joined the chorus of voices
demanding a tighter scale for low-level trafficking offenses (see above).
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The described developments also had an impact in the country’s public opinion. From
2014 to 2015, the percentage of subjects responding that drug consumption was the country’s
most important problem rose from 1.2 to 5.5 (see table 16 above). Although unemployment
(23.6), economic and financial problems (16.8), the situation and problems of politics (13.4), and
crime and public security (12.4) still fared much higher, as shown in table 17, Ecuador’s
perception of drug use as the country’s biggest problem was higher than in any other South
American country.
Table 17: Perception of Drug Consumption as Country’s Most Important Problem Across
South America
In percent
Tot.
Drug
1.8
Consumption

Arg. Bol.
1.4
1.0

Bras. Chile
1.4
3.5

Col.
0.8

Ec.
5.5

Par.
0.3

Peru
0.9

Uru. Ven.
3.8
-

Source: Latinobarómetro Internet Database

The above paragraphs indicate that a conjuncture of perceived crisis in the area of public
security, the emergence of a new harmful psychoactive substance (both responding to incentive
D3), influential actors within the state pressing for a tougher stance on drugs (D2), and changes in
public opinion (D1) are primarily responsible and provided strong incentives for the striking
return to prohibition. In particular, powerful gatekeepers of Ecuador’s security policy, including
the military, the police, the judiciary, and the ministry of the interior, managed to frame the
problem of drug use as an issue of public security and blamed the legal changes for the perceived
increase of micro-trafficking. The country’s president, for many years a leading proponent of
harm reduction, changed his position and reverted some of the measures his own government
instituted.
8.8 Future Outlook
The dominance of prohibition and punishment continued after the country’s 2017
presidential election and has been defining Ecuador’s drug policy until now. The newly elected

254

president, Lenín Moreno (2017-), highlighted the eradication of micro-trafficking as one of the
principal themes of his presidency, and asked the Technical Secretary of Drugs (an agency that he
later abolished to cut government spending) to, once again, revise the sentencing scale for drug
possessions.683 In line with the president, the country’s Sectorial Security Council, headed by the
minister of defense, identified micro-trafficking as the country’s biggest security threat, requiring
a large-scale effort of the state, including the use of military force.684 Simultaneously, several
cities and cantons, including Guayaquil and Manta, decided to penalize drug consumption in
public spaces.685 The kidnapping and killing of three journalists by a group of drug traffickers led
by the former FARC member alias “Guacho,” who was trying to free imprisoned group members,
further intensified the country’s shift towards hardline positions in the area of security and drug
control.
This outlook makes government-led advances in the area of harm reduction highly
unlikely in the near future. As explained by a member of Quito’s city council, who is sympathetic
to the approach: “Although it is possible to advance in punctual issues, it is currently not possible
to expose my principles or even state them in a campaign. This would clearly put my candidacy at
risk. (…) Drugs are currently a taboo issue.”686 Furthermore, he explained that there is not much
knowledge and conscience about drugs within Ecuador’s political class and that moralistic
perceptions of the problem predominate. Similarly, he recognized that there is a strong barrier to
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talk about drugs with the older population and recommended engaging primarily with younger
citizens to advance progressive policies.687 Statements by a representative of the Ministry of
Public Health, working in the area of mental health and drugs, who has been involved in the
design and implementation of the 2015 law since 2012 point in a similar direction: “The goal of
the law was to guarantee rights, but currently it does not achieve it. (…) Although the law talks
about harm reduction it does not implement it.”688 He further stated that given public opinion and
the current political climate it would even be impossible to implement a program that distributes
clean syringes to prevent the spread of diseases. Nevertheless, he believes that currently fewer
drug users get arrested than prior to 2008, which he considered an important advance.689
Contrary to the societal and political constraints, there are two important forces that may
facilitate a less prohibitionist drug policy in the medium or long-term future. First, Ecuador’s
public university Institute of Higher National Studies (“Instituto Nacional en Altos Estudios
Nacionales”) offers a master’s degree in public policy on drug prevention, which studies drugrelated challenges from a holistic perspective. In the future, alumni from the program may
generate enough critical mass in the public sphere and government institutions to advance
policies based on evidence rather than moral views. Second, Ecuador has a highly active and
professional movement campaigning for the legalization of cannabis and a drug policy based on
harm reduction, with strong links to transnational NGOs and networks. This movement not only
campaigns for the legalization of recreational cannabis, but also for medicinal cannabis and the
use of the hemp for industrial purposes. Through their presence in social media, but also through
demonstrations, the occupation of houses, and cultural events they have become an important part
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of Ecuadorian civil society. Furthermore, they are connected to diverse groups campaigning for a
variety of purposes including better conditions for bicycles or women’s rights.690
Their presence in the media, as well as their interactions with policy makers, not only
allowed them to place marijuana legalization on the political agenda but, to some extent, change
the language and discourse about drugs. For Buitron, one of their leading voices, changing the
language on drugs is a prerequisite for changing policy. According to him, most politicians are
not familiar with distinctions like problematic and unproblematic drug use, which makes it harder
to envision alternatives to prohibition. Hence, changing the language about drugs is one of the
priorities in their interaction with parliamentarians, government officials and the media.691 Carlos
Andrade from the group “Defensores Pro Cannabis,” also highlighted the possibility of presenting
laws that come from civil society to the National Assembly. According to the constitution, civil
society is allowed to present its own laws. As long as they obtain sufficient signatures, the
lawmakers have to deal with their proposal. Thus, for him, generating conscience among the
public is just as important as interacting with policy makers.692 While the legalization of cannabis
for recreational purposes is still a distant goal, Ecuador’s legislators are currently debating a new
health code, which allows for the use of cannabis-based medicines. If the proposal succeeds,
Ecuador would become the sixth South American country to allow such remedies, thereby
reinforcing the trend of normalizing a plant whose use for different purposes has been a taboo for
many decades.
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IX. COCA POLICY AND DRUG PROHIBITION IN PERU
Peru’s case is different from the previous ones in two important ways. First, as one of the three
principal producers of the coca leaf, and, to a lesser degree, illicit cocaine, the country occupies a
more important role in the geopolitics of the transnational drug trade than Uruguay and Ecuador.
Curbing illicit coca production has been one of the central goals of the IDCR and the United
States (see chapters III and V). Hence, the country has faced more international pressure to
implement prohibitionist drug policies in general, and coca eradication in particular. Yet, in many
instances Peru has resisted these pressures and its journey of becoming one of the most
prohibitionist countries in the region has been far from straight forward. As outlined below, the
most important driving force of this process has been the advocacy of different police units, the
Ministry of the Interior, and the Army, all of which benefitted from enhanced drug control
cooperation with the U.S. Over time, prohibition and coca eradication have become so deeply
engrained in the country’s institutions that it is difficult to imagine the country leaving the
prohibitionist path any time soon.
Second, Uruguay and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador have primarily carried out drug policy
reforms that can be pinned down to specific laws and dates. Peru’s drug policy, though, has
evolved in a much more incremental and piecemeal fashion. Since 1978, the country’s
governments have enacted at least 24 laws covering drug-related aspects. Furthermore, the
country’s drug policy has also been defined much more by operational elements such as the use
of the armed forces to combat drug traffickers and the degree of coca eradication. Hence, most
parts of the chapter use the theoretical framework of norm-induced incentives to explain
tendencies and trends in policy rather than specific legal changes.
Apart from these differences, there are three main reasons why this dissertation chose to
analyze Peru’s drug-policy trends. First, despite U.S. and IDCR pressure, Peru is a real latecomer
in modernizing its drug laws and adapting them to international standards. While most countries
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in the region reformed their drug laws in the early 1970s, Peru did so in 1978. Hence, much of the
chapter focuses on the country’s 1978 Decree Law 22,095, which has set Peru on a prohibitionist
path. Second, in the 1990s the country established the most severe penalization of certain drugrelated crimes in the entire region, with lifelong prison sentences for some offenses. Third, while
several countries from South America have relaxed some aspect of their drug policies in the last
15 years, especially on the operational side Peru has moved in the opposite direction, eradicating
more illicit coca and arresting more drug users, despite the fact that the possession of drugs for
personal consumption is not a crime. However, to the surprise of many, in 2017 the country
legalized the use of cannabis-based medicines. This last episode of Peru’s relation with narcotic
substances provides some insights about the factors that prevent normative changes at the
regional level from affecting state policy, but also about the dynamics that set changes in motion.
As in the previous chapters, this case study starts with a brief examination of Peru’s relationship
with the IDCR and its drug policies before 1971.
9.1 Peru’s Drug Laws Prior to 1971
From early on, Peru’s relationship with the IDCR has been marked by its role as a largescale cultivator of the coca crop and center for the processing of cocaine. For at least five
millennia, coca has been growing in various parts of the Andes and widely consumed in many
indigenous cultures because of its nutritional and symbolic properties. As emphasized by
Gootenberg: “Coca is a work-related stimulant, provides crucial vitamins, and is a digestive aid
and salve for high-altitude cold, hunger, and stress.”693 Furthermore, coca use is a ritual and
spiritual act, which affirms community trust and ethnic solidarity.694 Cocaine, which concentrates
the coca leaves’ alkaloids and usually comes in the form of a white powder, is a powerful
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stimulant to the central nervous system, creating a sense of euphoria and energy. At the same
time, it has strong numbing properties, and before it became popular as a recreational drug it
revolutionized the possibilities of carrying out surgeries in delicate areas of the body. Hence, for a
short period cocaine was widely used as a local anesthetic (see chapter III).695
For Peru’s scientific community and parts of the country’s elite, cocaine carried the
potential of a national commodity that represented progress and combined ancient traditions with
modern science.696 During the 1890s, coca paste, a crude extract of the coca leaf, became Peru’s
fastest growing quantum export, rising from 1,700 kilos in 1890 to somewhere between 4,000 and
5,000 kilos around 1900. In 1901, cocaine exports reached their peak with approximately 10,700
kilos before flattening to 6,000 kilos at the end of the decade.697 Although cocaine never exceeded
four percent of Peru’s licit export revenues, it was a crucial commodity to specific regions, such
as the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and Huánuco.698
However, the popularity of coca from Southeast Asia, which contained more alkaloids,
the emergence of drug prohibition in the U.S., the discovery of alternative analgesics, and the
slow but steady emergence of global rules and standards through the nascent IDCR, slowed down
Peru’s cocaine output and exports.699 At the same time, coca production for Peru’s internal
market rose from 4.8 million tons in the mid-1920s to eight to eleven million tons in the 1950s.700
The rising use of coca reinforced existing anti-coca sentiments and stereotypes within Peru,
whose elite tended to view its consumption as primitive and backward. Furthermore, “All kinds
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of ills, from malnutrition to low intelligence and borderline insanity, were ‘scientifically’
attributed to coca through bogus measurements.”701 This perception began to change to some
extent in the 1940s and 1950s when studies of the San Marcos University in Lima credited coca
with positive physiological and medical attributes.702 With hardly any cocaine users, the narcotic
largely escaped the negative connotations. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the 1930s even
witnessed the emergence of a prominent pro-cocaine movement, which aspired to nationalize the
entire coca and cocaine industry through a state monopoly.703 In this context, the country’s
officials ignored pressure from the United States and the League of Nations to restrict coca and
cocaine.704
As shown in tables 2 and 4 of chapter V, Peru did not participate actively in any of the
drug control conferences until 1961. In 1912, it cited economic difficulties for not sending a
delegate, although it had diplomats stationed across the European continent.705 Furthermore, Peru
was the only Latin American country, which, initially, did not notify the U.S. of its willingness to
sign and ratify the 1912 Convention.706 In 1920, Peru finally ratified the document through the
Versailles Peace Treaty (see chapter III).707 It also ratified the 1931 Convention (in 1932), but
denied to ratify the agreements from 1925 and 1936 (see table 3). While the 1912 Convention
carried only weak restrictions on coca and cocaine, Peru and other Latin American gained a
reputation for simply ignoring the rules of the 1931 Convention or taking advantage of its
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multiple loopholes.708 According to Gootenberg, the country merely delivered a list of eight
licensed factories and notes on opium dens to the League’s authorities.709 Yet, the signing of these
international treaties left its mark on Peru’s domestic legislation.
In 1921, the country’s Congress passed Law 4,428, which regulated the import and
export of opium, morphine, cocaine, and heroin, as well as their respective salts and
derivatives.710 The law created a monopoly for the import and export of the above substances at
the port of Callao. Moreover, it established a registry for their trade, production, and sales, which
were limited to pharmacies, at the Bureau of Health (“Dirección de Salubridad”).711 Until
December 1939, Peru had issued about ten licenses for the legal production of cocaine and
suspended the issuance of any further licenses to guarantee a better supervision of the existing
factories.712 All unlawful possession of the above-mentioned substances was considered illicit
commerce, and penalized with up to five years of prison for the principal authors of drug-related
crimes.713
None of the law’s 15 articles, however, contained any restrictions on the cultivation of
coca. This changed with the country’s second legislation on drugs; the Decree Law 11,005 from
1949, enacted by a conservative military government. Prior to D.L. 11,005 Peru had issued two
decrees, in 1941 and 1943, which strengthened the role of the police in anti-narcotics
investigations and tightened the controls on pharmacies.714 Art. 2 (c) criminalized, for the first
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time in Peruvian law, the cultivation of coca for the production of narcotic drugs. Art. 6
established that drug-related crimes were punishable with two to fifteen years of prison, without,
however, clarifying, which type of actions and activities justified higher penalties. Furthermore,
art. 12 considered drug users as authors or co-authors of drug-related crimes, who only escaped a
penalty if they denounced the authors of the fabrication, import, and sale of narcotic drugs. The
law also created a National Executive Council Against the Traffic of Narcotic Drugs (“Consejo
Nacional Ejecutivo Contra el Tráfico de Estupefacientes”), which had the power to preside and
judge drug-related cases.715 Next to an “alarming” increase of trafficking, which threatened the
health of the people, D.L. 11,005 cited “international discredit” as the law’s justification.716
Interestingly, by the time the military government enacted the decree, illicit trafficking of cocaine
was still in its footsteps, and took off after coca cultivation for trafficking purposes was
criminalized (see below).717
Simultaneous to the creation of a new law, the military government canceled all existing
licenses for licit cocaine manufacturers. By July 1950, the government had canceled all remaining
coca contracts and directed all funds stemming from the cocaine trade into anti-narcotics
operations and new programs of treating addiction. Hence, in the early 1950, a time when Peru
began perfecting the manufacture of cocaine hydrochloride, the drug became fully criminalized,
both legally and in practice.718 For Gootenberg, the criminalization of cocaine was part of the
right-wing military government’s goal to align with the U.S. in fighting both drugs and (potential)
communist targets to obtain training and resources. The country’s president, General Manuel
Odría (1950-1956), not only ran a hardline anti-narcotics campaign, but also oppressed his
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opponents, in particular sympathizers of the leftist party American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance (“Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,” APRA), which Odría claimed was
backed by drug money.719
The push against cocaine also marked the beginning of a dispersion of new illicit
trafficking networks. In areas that previously produced commodity cocaine, illicit, small-scale
manufacturers began to take root. Although in the 1950s illicit cocaine production was more
common in neighboring Bolivia, Peruvian producers interacted with Argentine, Brazilian,
Chilean, and Cuban mafias, which were trafficking cocaine across the hemisphere.720 The
emergence of a new criminal network intensified the cooperation between U.S. anti-narcotics
forces of the FBN and Peruvian anti-narcotics units, which started in the late 1940s. For
Gootenberg, “such policing relationships proved more decisive to prohibitions than diplomatic
maneuvers.”721
In the mid 1950s, Interpol buttressed U.S. operations against the cocaine trade by
expanding its intelligence network and carrying out several drug raids in the Andes.722 At the end
of the decade, the developing police and intelligence network against the illicit cocaine trade
began taking on the coca crop, which they conceived as a way of drying out cocaine. Soon the
eradication of coca transformed into an urgent political goal.723 The emerging fight against coca
was backed by a UN study from 1949 and 1950, which not only warned about the intimate ties
between the coca leaf and illicit cocaine, but also drew a connection between poverty and coca
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chewing and recommended a gradual repression of the coca leaf for a period of ten to fifteen
years.724 According to Gootenberg, the study paved the way for the Single Convention’s goal to
uproot coca globally under a 25-year timetable.725 Although much of the Peruvian elite shared the
discourse about the vicious cycle of poverty and coca chewing, the country’s delegates to the
CND initially objected the IDCR’s eradication plans, while highlighting Peruvian compliance in
curbing cocaine production.726 As long as cocaine production remained modest, Peruvian
authorities were able to denounce coca and cocaine without committing to any efforts of
eradicating coca. The country’s ambivalence towards coca and cocaine remained intact until the
mid 1970s when the balance of power within the government between the ones opposing any
actions against coca and the ones seeking to reduce coca crops, changed in favor of the latter. The
clearest expression of this change was Peru’s first major drug policy reform since 1949, the 1978
Decree Law 22,095, which was redacted by a small group of top officials from the
“revolutionary” military government and approved by its Council of Ministers on February 21,
1978. The following section summarizes the law’s most important elements, followed by an
analysis of the factors that helped turning the government against coca, despite the evident
obstacles.
9.2 Peru Joins the “War on Drugs:” The Decree Law 22,095
The law’s repressive orientation marked its justification, which outlined five reasons for
the reform. First, it defined the production, consumption, internal and external commercialization,
as well as the chewing of the coca leaf as grave social problems, which needed to be overcome by
an efficient and holistic plan of action. Second, it stated that the previous legal framework was
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insufficient to tackle these problems. Third, it highlighted that drug addiction constituted a grave
problem of public health, a danger for the family, and one of the primary causes of physical and
mental destruction of the human being. Fourth, it pointed out that the repression of the illicit drug
trade and their improper use is part of the moralizing role of the state, which has to norm, control,
and sanction all activities helping to develop this trafficking. Fifth, it affirmed that all actions
should be oriented in complying with international conventions, especially in regard to the
progressive eradication of coca cultivations, with the exception of industrial, medical, and
scientific uses.727
Chapter I defined the law’s general objectives, created a new inter-ministerial control
organ, and assigned new responsibilities to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education
in the prevention of drug use as well as the development of scientific studies on drug addiction. In
particular, art. 1 defined four objectives of the law: the repression of the illicit drug trade, the
prevention of their improper use, the “biosocial” rehabilitation of the drug addict, and the
reduction of the cultivation of the coca crop. Art. 3 established the Multisectoral Ministerial
Committee for the Control of Drugs (“Comité Multisectorial de Control de Drogas”), presided by
the minister of the interior, and composed of the ministers of agriculture and alimentation;
industry, commerce, tourism, and integration; education; and health; and a member of the
Supreme Court.728
Chapter II established new rules regarding the regulation of the licit drug market.
Specifically, the Ministry of Health received a mandate to establish estimates of need and submit
them to the respective IDCR organs, and issue authorizations to legitimate producers, vendors,
importers, and exporters of narcotic and psychotropic substance. Art. 13 and 14. established a
727
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government monopoly for their import and export, which were limited to the port of Callao and
the international airport of Lima-Callao.729
Chapter III included several provisions for the treatment and recovery of drug addicts,
including the creation of specialized health centers. If a judge discovered an addiction, he or she
could issue a set of requirements for overcoming the dependency. Treatments could be realized
from home, as long as addicts fulfill the requirements of the judge, who determined if the
addiction was overcome or not. Recurring drug addicts, however, would be sent to a stationary
treatment facility until they were cured. Art. 27 also reserved the right of the judge to issue
embargos on the possessions of the addict to pay for the costs of treatment.730
While chapter IV is missing from the available document, an evaluation of the U.S.
embassy on the new decree makes some references to the chapter: “The most innovation part [sic]
of chapter IV on production, commercialization and control (reftel para 4) are the timetables set
for substitution/eradication on registered holdings. The economic and social impact of these
provisions is blunted, however, by the fact that the great majority of legal holdings are under 5
hectares, and the timetable for eradication/substitution on such plots is to be set by the Ministry of
Agriculture.”731
Chapter V criminalized several drug-related activities and defined their penalties. Art. 55
sanctioned with internment (“internamiento”) of undetermined duration those who promote,
organize, finance or direct groups dedicated to the illicit trafficking of drugs between Peru and
other countries.732 According to the U.S. embassy in Lima this penalty meant that convicted
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traffickers were likely to face a minimum penalty of 25 years, which “are generally served in
isolated, devil’s island-style prision [sic] colonies, such as el SEPA in the amazon.”733
Furthermore, art. 56 decreed no less than 15 years of prison for other members of such groups; no
less than ten years for those, who administer and sell drugs to individuals less than 18 years of
age, who use violence or fraud when administering drugs, who use minors to commit drug-related
crimes, who commercialize drugs in centers of education and social rehabilitation, and who
produce and sell drugs of the lists I and II “A” of the law; between two and 15 years for those,
who cultivate marijuana and coca without permission, who explain how to use drugs to potential
users, who have access to drugs through their profession and decide to sell them illegally, who
distribute small quantities of drugs to individuals, and who possess drugs without authorization,
except for their personal consumption; and between four and 15 years to medical professionals,
who prescribe drugs without a justifiable cause. Moreover, the law penalized representatives of
businesses that were growing coca without being registered or exceeded the registered amount,
individuals who promoted the coca leaf as a form of payment or sold coca in unauthorized areas,
and the owners of localities that tolerated drug use with two to five years of prison.734 Art. 64
reinforced the law’s repressive character by prohibiting provisional liberty, conditional liberation,
commutation of sentence, conditional imprisonment, and pardon for convicted drug offenders.735
While chapter VI established a series of rules and procedures for the confiscation and
seizure of drugs as well as money and goods stemming from the drug trade, chapter VII provided
Peru’s investigative Police (PIP) with the rights to issue preventive prison of 15 days for drugrelated suspects; enter places suspected of being deposits, fabrics, or clandestine distribution
centers of illicit drugs; inspect laboratories where licit drugs were produced and stored; and
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restrict the freedom of movement and the possibility of leaving the country of drug-related
suspects.736 Chapter VIII established that violators of the rules that regulate the licit drug trade
would have to pay a fine of between two and 20 minimum salaries. Repeated offenders, however,
would be treated, and receive the same sanction, as drug traffickers.737
The last chapter, IX, created the Executive Office of Drug Control and outlined its
responsibilities. Furthermore, it established the responsibilities of the Multisectoral Ministerial
Committee for the Control of Drugs. Among its most important function were dictating
complementary (legal) norms to implement the present law; controlling the actions of the
Executive Office; and proposing measures concerning the achievement of the law’s objectives.
The most important role of the Executive Office were: planning and coordinating all national
activities that were important to reach the law’s objectives; communicating decisions of the
Multisectoral Committee to the respective government agencies; supervising the execution of the
programmed activities; administering the funds and goods received to implement the present law;
and promoting international cooperation and maintaining relations with IDCR organs.738
The above summary of the law indicates that although Peru was a real latecomer in
modernizing its drug laws, and the last country from South America that changed its drug laws
after the 1961 Convention, when it did so, it joined the emerging “war on drugs” with a strong
legal commitment. Not only did the law define higher penalties than most of its regional peers,
but, despite some loopholes, the law also obligated Peru to reduce its coca cultivations, which
according to U.S. assessments, constituted at least half of the world’s supply.739 The following
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section traces the developments that have led to these changes, highlighting, in particular, the role
of Peru’s Investigative Police (PIP) and top government officials with close links to U.S. drug
control agencies.
9.3 Coca Policy in the 1970s: From Ambivalence to Repression
At the beginning of the decade, Peru’s future drug and coca policy was far from set in
stone. Although the country had signed the 1961 Convention, and ratified the agreement in 1964,
it undertook no effort to translate its provisions into a new drug law. Furthermore, the country did
not ratify the 1971 Amendment until 1980 and the 1972 Convention until 1977 (see table 5).
Furthermore, Peru did not sanction the regional agreement ASEP until 1978 and was the last
South American country to do so. The main reason for Peru’s reluctance was the country’s role as
the world’s principal producer of the coca leaf, whose sales to illicit traffickers constituted an
important source of income for the country’s poor peasant population. Until the mid-1960s,
Peruvian illicit cocaine production was relatively limited as compared to its neighbor Bolivia.
However, tightening controls in Bolivia and Chile, an increasing demand from the U.S., and the
professionalization of Colombian traffickers fostered a boom in illicit cocaine trafficking in the
1970s.740 This renewed the attention and pressure from the U.S. and the international community
(see below). Yet, for most of the decade Peruvian leaders remained relatively ambivalent about
the rising traffic in cocaine.
At the 1972 and 1973 meetings in Buenos Aires, which led to the establishment of ASEP
(see chapter V), Peru’s ambivalence on the matter of coca was striking. On the one hand,
Peruvian delegates talked in highly dismissive terms about the leaf. The most offensive remark
came from the delegate Espinoza Barron: “There are 7 million indigenous people in Peru, who
are chewing coca (“coquean”), which degrades them and does not allow them to produce even the
740
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most necessary to feed and dress themselves.”741 Dr. Esquivel Trigoso, another Peruvian delegate,
stated that his government was seeking to reduce the use of “this stimulant” and had dictated
dispositions to control its production. He also confirmed that social workers and teachers were
trying to convince children and adolescents not to use coca.”742 On the other hand, when it came
to approving ASEP in 1973, the Peruvian delegate Fernández Puyo explained that he could not
give his approval to art. 10, which asked the parties to intensify existing measures to eradicate
plantations of cannabis and coca, given that he had received instructions to hold reservations
about anything that had to do with eradication, limitation, or destruction of plantations.743 The
vice-chairman of the meeting acknowledged that he understood Peru’s position, given the
country’s specific problems.744
Apart from the practical difficulties in controlling coca and cocaine trafficking, U.S.
Ambassador Dean also identified a lack of interest on part of the Peruvians. While he stressed the
excellent working relationship between the DEA and PIP, he stated that “Part of the problem is
that unofficially the Peruvian government still regards the illicit trafficking in drugs as an
Americanproblem [sic]. Peruvian citizens are ot [sic] using cocaine themselves to any substantial
degree. This fact coupled with a smuggling and contraband legacy going back to Buccaneer days
is impeding more substantive action programs.”745 Dean’s Semi-Annual Narcotics Report for the
Period Ending December 31, 1974, outlined the issue in greater detail:
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The attitude of the Peruvian government as a whole deserves some commentary when
discussing the extent and effectiveness of any U.S. commitment ot [sic] eradicate the
heavy cocaine traffic emanating from Peru. The GOP does not view coca growing as a
problem affecting the Peruvian people. Peruvian youth do not sniff cocaine in any
substantial quantity. The local campesino custom of chewing coca leaves extends back to
an epoch before recorded Peruvian history. While a GOP sponsored agricultural
conference has recently issued a vague cal [sic] for the eradication of this age-old custom
as being “anti-revolutionary”, there has been little evidence of a commitment on part of
GOP to actively seek a reduction in coca cultivation. Moreover, cocaine traffickers have
traditionally gotten off with only limited fines and jail terms in Peruvian courts, and a few
police officers and GOP personnel have been caught in protection of or outright
involvement in trafficking activities. While this is not to say that the GOP in any way
condones the trafficking of its citizens in cocaine, it does mean that a substantial part of
the problem has been to evoercome [sic] all of the private and public vested interests that
have the most to gain in the perpetuation of the coca growing and cocaine elaboration
within Peru.746

However, towards the end of the year 1974, the ambassador began noticing some changes
in the government’s position. In September 1974, the country’s Minister of the Interior, Pedro
Richter Prada, for the first time, mentioned a national plan “to greatly reduce planting of coca in
Peru.”747 At a ceremonial presentation of confiscated drugs, Richter expressed the idea of
replacing coca crops with peanuts. Although at a lunch with Ambassador Dean he took distance
from his plan, given that peanut production was expensive and required heavy subsidies, the
ambassador nevertheless concluded that “GOP initiatives to tackle problem may be in wind and
746
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GOP as a whole might be more willing to cooperate with USG in effort to stem flow of illicit
cocaine to U.S.”748 Dean’s positive assessment continued on October 24 when he reported that
Minister Richter had referred to the “international drug situation” as a problem that also affected
Peru: “a welcome change from attitude usually ecpressed by GOP officials [sic].”749 Dean went
on to explain:
He also noted his support for substituting food crops for coca. In this area, provided the
GOP improves its internal coordination on coca policy and makes a firm commitment to
fight drug trafficking, we may be able to assist in area of study grants to look into crop
substitution possibilities. The mission action plan called for a crop substitution study this
fiscal year. This was tabled, however, precisely due to the absence of a suitable
commitment and internal coordination on part of GOP. Some progress may eventually be
possible on both fronts, based on Minister Richter’s recent comments.750

In the following year, the ambassador noted that Minister Richter “made strong press
statements about drug abuse (Lima A-145 of July 18, 1975) and has come out forcefully for a
crop replacement program.”751 Furthermore, in August of 1975, the minister elevated the
Narcotics Investigation Division within PIP to directorate level. This enabled PIP to create
specialized drug enforcement units outside of the capital Lima.752 Though Richter left his office
shortly after, the good working relationship between U.S. officials and the office of the minister
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of the interior continued. General Campos Quesada, who followed Richter for a brief period from
September 1975 to February 1976, quickly cleared a major international drug interdiction
program by Peru, the U.S., and Venezuela, called Operation Funnel.753 His successor, General
Cisneros Vizquerra, who maintained the post until May 1978, also received positive evaluations
by Ambassador Dean: “Our initial impression of Cisneros is favorable, and we are glad that he
appears to be fully briefed on ongoing cooperative programs.”754 Minister Cisneros was also the
first Peruvian official, who informed the embassy that Peru’s military dictator, General Francisco
Morales Burmúdez (1975-1980), was planning a reduction in coca production.755
About two months later, Ambassador Dean informed that the president of the Supreme
Court, the president of the National Council of Justice, and the attorney general of Peru were
working on a revision of the country’s drug laws.756 On September 21, 1976, the attorney general,
Nelson Díaz Pomar, explained to the embassy’s narcotics coordinator that he was hoping for the
approval of the president to form a committee to review existing studies on the “coca problem.”
Once the committee finished its review, within a period of 60 to 90 days, he was hoping President
Bermúdez would establish a high-level commission to “prepare, direct and coordinate a coca
reduction plan.”757 On October 12, Díaz Pomar informed the embassy’s narcotics coordinator
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about the creation of the above-stated committee per decree, set to take on work on October 14.758
In its first meeting, the committee created five sub-committees in the following areas: “laws
relating to the repression of illegal narcotics, solution of the coca problem, control of coca and
narcotics use, prevention of drug abuse and rehabilitation of users, and international
cooperation.”759
During January 1977, Ambassador Dean mentioned for the first time in an official
communication the existence of a draft for a new Peruvian drug law. He also explained that he
made an offer to PIP chief General Rivera Santander to have the draft revised by U.S. experts.760
In April, the vice-minister of the interior informed U.S. officials, that a draft of the law was
approved by a group of four ministers, which meant that it could be forwarded to the entire
cabinet, the Council of Ministers, for ultimate approval. In the following, several Peruvian
officials confirmed that the new law was closed to being enacted.761 However, it took Peru’s
cabinet until February 1978 to approve the new law.
While it is evident from the above-cited documentation that Peru’s drug policy reform
would not have happened without a long-term U.S. investment in convincing the Peruvian
government to take decisive action against the illicit traffic of cocaine and cultivations of the coca
crop, it is also clear that the law was not a mere imposition or response to U.S. pressure (incentive
I1). On some occasions, Peruvian officials rejected U.S. proposals, which indicates that the U.S.
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had limited leverage about the self-proclaimed revolutionary, military government. A case in
point was the U.S. intent to create a regional DEA office in Lima. When consulted about the
possibility, Ambassador Dean replied: “Even more difficult will be getting GOP approval,
particularly in light of past difficulties in getting DEA agents accredited here.”762 When the
embassy consulted with Minister Richter in 1974 about the possibility of increasing DEA staff, he
replied that “this would not be possible because of the political sensitivity in this country which
has been exacerbated by the current publicity about alleged CIA involvement in internal affairs of
other Latin countries.”763 Even strong assurances that the agents would follow the previously
agreed-upon rules could not convince Richter otherwise.764
Ambassador Dean also discussed the limitations of U.S. engagement when commenting
and raising his opinion on a future international narcotics strategy of the U.S.: “we should not be
overly critical of efforts of lesser-developed countries to control drug abuse and traffic. We must
continue to stimulate, guide and support these efforts with equipment, techniques, information
and international meetings but within the very real limitations and idiosyncrasies posed by the
law enforcement, educational and political environments within these countries. To do otherwise
would be self-defeating.”765 In another point he recommended taking into consideration the host
governments’ concerns and interests: “I also strongly support embassy Quito’s emphasis on
taking into account the special concerns and approaches of our host governments in their anti-
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drug programs. By supporting and reflecting these concerns in our actions we have a better
chance of engaging these countries in programs of highest priority to ourselves.”766
Moreover, in many instances the U.S. expressed concern and skepticism that the decree
law would actually come forward, further underlining that the U.S. was facing very real
limitations. For example, when discussing the original proposals of Peru’s general attorney,
Ambassador Dean stated: “The questions were (and remain) whether the GOP really has taken a
firm decision to confront the coca problem or, failing that, whether Díaz Pomar has the necessary
backing to obtain such a decision and implement it.”767 Even in April 1977, when the proceedings
were far advanced the U.S. remained skeptical: “We know there is active and passive resistance
in a number of Peruvian circles to adoption of a comprehensive anti-coca/cocaine law, and even
to the enforcement of existing laws against excess and illegal coca production.”768
Ultimately, after the new law was passed, despite an overall positive evaluation, the U.S.
ambassador was surprised and, in some cases critical, about three elements. First, “Even for these
registered producers the law is largely repressive in nature and will encounter stiff opposition if a
serious effort is made to enforce it without some form of crop/income substitution.”769 Second,
“In what appears to be a last-minute addition to the law, time limit are set (Reftel para 8) for
illegal growers to cvomply with eradication/substitution [sic].”770 Third, “The prison sentences
established for international traffickers are stiffer than expected.”771 Interestingly, the ambassador
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was concerned that U.S. citizens caught trafficking drugs would suffer disproportionately under
the new provisions.772
The above paragraphs substantiate that even though the U.S. played a paramount role in
orienting Peru’s drug policy, the Peruvian government had a significant degree of agency in
deciding what it wanted. However, all three domestic incentives favored a change in the
legislation. First, while several embassy cables stated that Peru did not have high levels of drug
consumption, this perception began to change at the end of the year 1976 when the local press
reported about the establishment of an anti-drug youth brigade to protect high-school students at a
school in Lima from drug consumption. The same press report stated that the consumption of
coca paste had increased greatly among Peruvian middle-class youth.773
On February 22, 1978, shortly before the new law was published, “El Comercio,” one of
Peru’s most influential newspapers published an op-ed denouncing the “universalization” of drug
addiction and the impunity of the sales of narcotics to the country’s “innocent” youth, while
demanding a tougher stance of the state against drug trafficking.774 Even though it is entirely
possible that these reports have been fabricated or exaggerated by the state-controlled media to
justify its new policy, reports about rising levels of drug consumption continued throughout 1978
after the government had passed the law.775 In December 1978, the U.S. embassy stated: “The
Peruvian government and the urban populace recognize increasingly that illicit drug trafficking
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and drug abuse are real domestic problems for the country.”776 In the same cable, the embassy
reported that Peruvian neurologists and psychiatrists were conducting a first study on coca paste
users in Peru.777
While the apparently rising levels of drug consumption (corresponding to incentive D3)
help explain why the state saw itself compelled to tighten its legal framework, the advocacy of
powerful domestic actors, with strong ties to the U.S. anti-narcotics apparatus, provides an even
stronger explanation for the country’s drug policy reform (incentive D2). Apart from Peru’s
attorney general, who appears to have initiated the preparations for a new drug law, the closest
allies of the U.S. were actors from the Ministry of the Interior, including Peru’s Investigative
Police (PIP), which functioned under the ministry’s direction. As stated by Ambassador Dean:
“The Ministry has been cooperative with the embassy in the human rights field and has supported
vigorous narcotics enforcement programs by the police agencies under its direction. It has been
instrumental in the drafting of a new narcotics code now being considered by the GOP.”778
Within the Ministry of the Interior, the role of PIP deserves special attention. Throughout
the ambassador’s reports, PIP received outstanding evaluations, especially regarding their close
cooperation with the DEA. On March 7, 1975, Dean reported: “The police are anxious to do
more, but are hampered by lack of operational funds.”779 The head of PIP, Alfonso Rivera
Santander, who previously headed PIP’s narcotics section, also complained to U.S. officials that
Peru was not committed to the goal of the 1961 Convention to eradicate coca, stating that rather
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more than less land was used for coca cultivations.780 In the same conversation, he recommended
that his unit should assist the National Enterprise of Coca (“Empresa Nacional de la Coca,”
ENACO) to supervise coca plantations, given that ENACO was incapable of guaranteeing that
registered coca growers followed official guidelines.781 He also suggested to U.S. officials a new
enforcement effort in Cajamarca, located in the country’s North.782 Despite ongoing economic
crises and high inflation in the 1970s, under the leadership of Rivera Santander PIP’s Antinarcotics Division grew from 28 to 130 officers. Though it is not clear how much of this increase
was due to U.S. support, PIP was a major beneficiary of U.S. anti-narcotics aid. Apart from
regular participations in DEA training courses in Washington DC, under a 1974 narcotics
agreement, PIP received communications and audio-visual equipment, as well as direct financial
support for special investigations outside of Lima.783 When U.S. officials asked PIP’s leadership
in June 1974 what they needed to enhance their enforcement capacities, it stated interest in
improving their records management, as well as help in updating their criminal laboratory.784
When asked in 1977 on what the U.S. could do to help Peru in its anti-narcotics effort, PIP
responded by requesting “additional U.S. scholarships, instructional material for training, the
construction of a separate facility for PIP drug control operations, and a variety of electronic
equipment (including phone monitoring gear), investigative material, radios, office equipment,
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(…) transport vehicles including one light aircraft and one helicopter, 24 cars and trucks, and
motorcycles.”785
Apart form PIP, Peru’s Civil Guard (“Guardia Civil,” GC), a military style police force
was also favorable towards the new law. Although the GC was not primarily responsible for drug
control, it sometimes assisted in anti-narcotics mission, and in 1975 and 1976 sought to expand
its role in Peru’s fight against drugs. This led to some disenchantment and competition with PIP,
which nevertheless upheld the primary role in drug control efforts.786 D.L. 22,095 finally resolved
the dispute by drawing a clear distinction between PIP and the GC. While the former received a
mandate to combat drug trafficking, the latter was ordered to carry out eradication campaigns,
controlling crop substitution, and supporting ENACO in the supervision of cultivations.787 Similar
to PIP, the Civil Guard has both received and requested training, technology and operational
support, though on a lesser scale.788
To accommodate these demands, the U.S. embassy offered Peruvian officials a step-bystep approach. Such an approach would “test the depth of any GOP commitment and also move
matters toward and [sic] overall GOP plan that we could support financially and technically.”789
This explains why PIP and the Ministry of the Interior were so keen on passing a tough
legislation. Following the passing of the decree law, the U.S. entered into project agreements with
PIP, the Guardia Civil, the Peruvian government (to curb coca growing and aid in agriculture),
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and the Ministry of Education.790 The project agreement with PIP included diverse measures and
provisions: enhanced training of personnel; radio transceivers; 29 support vehicles; an expansion
of the provincial level’s narcotics unit’s personnel from 17 to 46; the establishment of a narcotics
intelligence unit of 45 personnel; DEA assistance in improving organizational, administrative,
and operational capacities; improving reporting and records systems; the establishment of
monthly statistical reports; increased travel funds; new narcotics laboratory facilities; the creation
of a special narcotics mobile response team; and an increase of overall personnel to at least
200.791 The project agreement with the Civil Guard was equally comprehensive but centered on
the capability to supervise coca cultivations.792
Overall by September 31, 1981, the U.S. had spent $3,672,000 in assisting Peru’s
narcotics control program. PIP ($1,001,000) and the Civil Guard ($741,000) were the biggest
recipients. About $300,000 went into agricultural development.793 While the support provided by
the U.S. appears small in comparison to the anti-narcotics aid provided in future decades, it
constituted more than Peru’s total anti-narcotics budget in the same period ($3,100,000).794
Hence, through U.S. assistance, several domestic actors that supported its goals increased their
staff and expanded their operational capabilities.
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Apart from these domestic incentives, which were altered significantly through U.S.
engagement, Peru also faced the risk of losing international prestige by refraining from stronger
commitments until the late 1970s (incentive I2). This particularly evident in Peru’s relationship
with its regional peers. As more and more countries ratified ASEP, Peruvian diplomats felt
increasing pressure to follow suit. As early as 1973, the Peruvian embassy in Buenos Aires sent
its Foreign Ministry (“Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Peru,” MREP) in Lima several
documents about ASEP, urging it to consider becoming a member.795 Similar notes were sent in
1974 and 1975.796 In 1978, the embassy in Buenos Aires took great lengths to explain ASEP to
the MREP, highlighting that on several occasions Argentina has expressed interest in Peru
becoming a member.797 While it is unlikely that this diplomatic pressure was the primary cause of
Peru’s drug-control commitments, it created additional incentives, thus favoring the changes
outlined above. Therefore, within a domestic-international incentive structure, which heavily
favored a prohibitionist drug-policy reform, the most important cause was the support of
important actors within the government bureaucracy, which, through the support of the U.S.,
benefitted from the changes they helped pushing forward.
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9.4 The Implementation of Peru’s Anti-Drug Policy in the 1980s: From Optimism to
Disenchantment
Although the military government set up Peru’s drug policy for the coming decade
through D.L. 22,095, the implementation of the new approach fell into the hands of the
democratically-elected government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) from the centrist
party “Acción Popular.” From early on, the emergence of violence by leftist guerilla forces of the
Shining Path (“Sendero Luminoso,” SL) and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(“Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru,” MRTA), as well as difficulties to repay foreign
credits, economic recession, and high inflation, overshadowed Balaúnde’s government. As
outlined below, these factors impacted the implementation of drug-control programs in several
ways. However, despite numerous challenges and setbacks the country’s commitment to a
prohibitionist drug policy continued throughout the decade of the 1980s.
In an attempt to break with the country’s dictatorial past and give democratic legitimacy
to Peru’s legal system, the country’s Congress revised all decrees enacted during the military
dictatorships led by Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and Morales Bermúdez Cerruti (1975-1980),
including D.L. 22,095. However, the legislative decree (D.Leg.) 122 from June 1981 merely
defined drug-related crimes with more precision to facilitate persecutions in criminal trials. The
previously-established penalties, plans to eradicate coca, and the responsibilities of the different
governmental bodies stayed the same.798 Interestingly, while D.L. 22,095 and D.Leg. 122 sought
to combat drug traffickers, most arrests carried out by the Civil Guard were against drug users. In
1980, the GC arrested 726 trafficker and 1,037 users. In 1981, this gap grew even further, to 605
traffickers and 1,098 users.799
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While Ponce described the implementation of Peru’s new drug policy as “timid,
ineffective, and unnoticeable by the public,” U.S. embassy cables and government documents
provide a more nuanced picture.800 With U.S. support, in 1980 Peru began its first campaign to
eradicate coca crops, called Operation Green Sea.801 An embassy cable from 1981 optimistically
reported: “We plan to have the illicit coca cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley largely under
control by the end of CY 1983 and their eradication effort completed by the end of CY 1985.”802
Since 1982, these campaigns started focusing on the area around Tinga Maria in the Upper
Huallaga Valley (UHV), where most of Peru’s illicit coca came from. Parallel to the eradication
efforts, in 1981, the U.S. signed an $18 million aid project for the agricultural development of
said area.803 In 1983, in collaboration with the DEA, Peru’s GC began to destroy laboratories
producing different types of cocaine, processing areas, and air strips used for clandestine
trafficking in the UHV and North-Eastern Peru.804
While the repressive policies against drug traffickers enjoyed great popularity, many
Peruvians judged the eradication efforts more critically. As stated by the U.S. embassy in 1981:
“Peruvian public opinion toward narcotics traffic and the trafficker is uniformly unfavorable from
all bands of the political spectrum. The same is not true of the coca cultivator. (…) Pro-coca
politicians and coca growers tend to ignore the fact that excess production of coca is the basis of
narcotics trafficking and defend the coca producer as an honest farmer engaged in an age-old
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practice.”805 Given the low popularity of coca eradication, the U.S. feared that the election of a
new government in 1985 could change the campaign against coca cultivations: “A García or
Barrantes victory in the April elections could have far-reaching implications for drug control.
Both candidates have indicated that they would reshape Peru’s drug control policy and
concentrate more on crop substitution and education and less on eradication.”806
Although Alan García’s clear victory did not halt the eradication campaign in the
beginning, throughout his mandate (1985-1990) opposition to Peru’s eradication policies kept
growing due to three intertwined developments. First, coca farmers and peasant workers began
expressing their discontent through demonstrations, strikes, civil unrest, and, in some cases, the
destruction of infrastructure.807 As drug-control forces established a stronger presence in the
UHV, coca farmers and cocaine traffickers increasingly worked together in deterring government
forces. An embassy cable from 1988 narrated: “During the seizure of this target [a cocaineprocessing laboratory, authors note] a mob of 250 villagers gathered near the seizure sight, held
back by GC police sentries. A large red flag with the hammer and sickle symbol was being waved
in front for encouragement. Eventually elements of the crowd grew bolder and began throwing
rocks at the GC troop.”808
The waving of a red flag symbolized the support of the SL guerrilla forces, which
exercised control in several areas of the UHV, protected drug traffickers and coca growers while
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charging protection money, landing fees for planes, and fees for the use of land.809 In their
political pamphlets, SL insurgents labeled the eradication campaign as an imperialist imposition
to repress Peru’s working class.810
Second, drug traffickers increasingly used heavy violence to halt eradication efforts. The
first of these attacks occurred in November 1984 and killed 19 civilian workers. Despite a
condolence letter from Ronald Reagan, urging Peru’s president not to give in to traffickers, this
attack caused a halt of the operation for a two-months period.811 On top of the violent responses
by trafficking groups, SL guerilla forces began launching attacks on the eradication and anti-drug
campaign.812 While in April 1986, a U.S. embassy report highlighted the good morale of
eradication workers, in the middle of the year the Civil Guard established a small base in Santa
Lucia in the UHV to support and protect civilian eradication workers.813 In April 1987, the United
States stepped up its assistance, by sending more DEA agents to support the CG in the destruction
of primary processing sites and cratering of airstrips. Furthermore, nine U.S.-contracted
helicopters, piloted by U.S. contract personnel and a Peruvian co-pilot, began flying in the
Central and Upper Huallaga Valley.814 Despite U.S. support, in September 1987 Peru’s Minister
of the Interior, José Barsallo Burga (1987-1988), reported tactical and logistic difficulties in
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implementing the country’s anti-drug campaign, expressing the need to send more police forces
to the UHV.815 However, instead of sending more police, in November 1987, Peru’s government
declared a 60-day state emergency in several parts of the valley and transferred responsibility for
said areas from the Ministry of the Interior to the Armed Forces. This meant that the CG forces
overseeing the eradication campaign withdrew from certain parts of the UHV and increasingly
restricted their missions to areas close to their base in Santa Lucía.816 In February of 1989, the
security environment became so unstable that the U.S. ambassador Watson ordered a shutdown of
the use of the U.S. air fleet in support of interdiction and eradication missions.817 As highlighted
by the ambassador: “Manual eradication is increasingly dangerous. We protect against attacks
during insertion of personnel by picking fields to be eradicated at random and keeping that
information secret until departure from the fields. But SL and trafficker-mobilized elements in the
UHV are now so ubiquitous that attacks on eradication personnel and helicopters are mounted in
the 5-6 hours between insertion and extraction.”818 Although the U.S. resumed its drug control
efforts in August after several security upgrades at the GC base in Santa Lucía, as outline below,
their temporary withdrawal made it harder to influence the Peruvian government.819
Third, while the U.S. was hoping that the deteriorating security situation would compel
the Peruvian government to use its military for drug control operations, the country’s military
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leadership prioritized the fight against the SL guerilla forces.820 For the U.S., combating SL
forces and drug traffickers, as well as the eradication of illicit coca, was part of the same struggle.
The Peruvian military, however, believed that in order to defeat the SL it depended on the support
of local peasants many of which relied on coca for a steady income. Hence, in May 1989, reports
surfaced that “the GOP, influenced by the new military commander in the UHV, is close to a
decision to de-emphasize, even abandon, involuntary coca eradication in the Upper Huallaga
Valley (UHV).”821 Although the García government never officially backed the stop of coca
eradication, the U.S. reported that anti-narcotics operations were shut down by the military in
Uchiza, where trafficker flights were now permitted. Some reports even stated that military
commanders ordered their troops to fire on police forces if they conducted anti-narcotics
operations.822 The ambassador concluded: “We are disturbed by the possibility that trafficker
flights into Uchiza are taking place and believe that this matter warrants close scrutiny.”823 While
President García continued to defend coca eradication in the public, during the last months of his
mandate government officials, including García, raised public critiques claiming that U.S.
narcotics assistance was completely insufficient and that Peru needed at least $600 million to
suppress coca production and develop the UHV.824
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The optimism and hope to eradicate illicit coca in the early 1980s had steadily given way
to disenchantment at the end of the decade. While in 1981, the U.S. embassy estimated that
50,000 hectares of coca were under cultivation in Peru, in 1987 the CIA assessed that this
numbers rose to 106,000 hectares.825 While this sharp increase might have been fueled by better
intelligence, it nevertheless underlined that the approach implemented by the Peruvian
government was not working. At the same time, Peru suffered from an increasingly unstable
security situation, which not only affected remote areas, but also the capital Lima where SL and
MRTA carried out attacks against civilians and the city’s electronic infrastructure, causing
numerous power shortages.826 While the United States wanted to continue doing more of the
same, Peru’s main priority was to defeat the insurgents. Military and civilian leaders increasingly
saw coca eradication as an obstacle and wanted to shift emphasis towards economic and
agricultural development. This dissent continued throughout the 1990s under the presidency of
Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who not only inherited a deteriorating security environment, but
also an unstable economic situation, including an inflation of 3,398.3 percent and an external debt
exceeding 70 percent of the nominal GDP.827
9.5 Drug Policy Under Fujimori (1990-2000)
The election of Alberto Fujimori, who is often characterized as a right-wing populist,
coincided a with a change of government in U.S. a year earlier. While Reagan and Bush both
emphasized the importance supply-side controls and the use of force against drug traffickers,
825

USAID, Department of State Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and Department of State Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters, “Country Narcotics Profile Paper: Peru,” 1; and CIA, “International
Narcotics Situation Report,” July 1987, DNSA, 3.
826

U.S. Embassy in Lima to RUEHC/Secretary of State, “Political Wrap-up: July 1-31, 1989,” August
1989, DNSA.
827

Knoema, “Peru – Average Consumer Prices Inflation Rate,” no date,
https://knoema.com/atlas/Peru/Inflation-rate; and CEIC, “Peru External Debt: % of GDP,” no date,
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/peru/external-debt--of-nominal-gdp.

290

Bush’s approach, at least publicly, gave more recognition to the importance of economic
development as a means of providing alternatives to farmers. Following the Cartagena Summit in
February 1990 (see chapter V), Bush’s government elaborated an ambitious Andean Counterdrug
Implementation Plan, which sought to provide “the Andean Countries with the resources to assist
in building significantly improved legal, enforcement, and military capabilities to apprehend the
leadership, dismantle the operations, and seize the assets of the cocaine traffickers.”828 While this
plan “sets the stage for expanded economic assistance,” it also stated that “All U.S. assistance is
conditioned on counterdrug performance and sound economic policy.”829 Furthermore, “the
evaluation must also take into account levels of corruption, human rights performance, and any
other activity that could undermine effective U.S. assistance.”830
Regarding Peru’s specific case, the accessible parts of the plan promised $35,945,000 of
military assistance, $18,150,000 for law enforcement, $4,000,000 for aid and an unspecified
amount of additional funds for the intelligence sector.831 As outlined in chapters V and VIII,
based on drug control performance the U.S. also provided preferred market access to Andean
products through the ATPA. Furthermore, the United States promised $100 million of food aid
for the year 1990, and $100 million of investments through a group of developed countries
supporting Peru.832 Given the country’s vulnerable economic situation, the U.S. State Department
estimated that “After the election, intensified bilateral discussions with the new government,
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linked to U.S. resource commitments, will give the U.S. an opportunity to weigh in early in the
formation of Peruvian policy on anti-narcotics activities.”833
However, throughout his presidency Fujimori disregarded some key U.S. objectives. In
an attempt to win over the peasant population of the UHV in the army’s battle against the
increasingly violent and capable insurgents, Fujimori made a pledge to limit eradication to coca
seedbeds, instead of young or fully-grown coca plants..834 While Fujimori did not reject the
possibility of forced eradication entirely, in front of 200 foreign diplomats he argued that such an
approach had to be accompanied by a firm policy of economic and agricultural development. In
the absence of such a policy, coca eradication would have devastating consequences and could
lead to a civil war. He further explained that he did not want farmers to fall in the hands of
subversive groups or drug traffickers.835 Politicians from all major parties applauded Fujimori’s
position, although some sectors argued that he should have defended the right to grow and
consume coca more openly.836
Instead of campaigning openly for forced eradication, the U.S. government decided to
publicly back Fujimori’s plan without, however, clarifying to what degree it would support
development initiatives of the UHV.837 Nevertheless, the dissent on coca eradication continued to
affect the relationship with the U.S. In Washington D.C. members of the U.S. Congress pressured
Peruvian diplomats by threatening to withdraw foreign aid, if Peru did not change its policy on
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coca and the stop human rights abuses of its armed forces. In 1991, a Peruvian diplomat raised
the possibility of coordinating with the Washington-based NGO WOLA (see chapter IV) to lobby
for Peru’s position on coca eradication and alternative development.838 In 1995, next to
Colombia, Bolivia, and Paraguay, Peru only received a qualified U.S. presidential certification,
thus facing the risk of losing access to credits and U.S. aid (see chapter V on the certification
procedure). However, pressure to eradicate mature coca not only came from the U.S. but also
IDCR officials. On January 10, 1995, Heinrich Pichler, director of the UNDCP in Lima, sent a
letter to Peru’s Foreign Ministry’s Department of Drug Control asking Peru to confirm, on behalf
of INCB director Herbert Schaepe, that Peru was not pursuing a coca liberation policy.839
In 1996, after the insurgents had been largely defeated by Peru’s military, Fujimori began
allowing for the eradication of any mature coca away from populated areas and in national parks.
The U.S. celebrated this change of direction as a major success.840
However, coca eradication was not the only concern of U.S. officials. Within a month
after taking office, Fujimori carried out a “rapid and unexpected purge inside the Peruvian
National Police.”841 While officially the purge aimed at firing corrupt police officials, the U.S.
ambassador believed that it was at least partially driven by the goal of placing anti-narcotics
programs fully under the control of the military in order to “tap into the largesse and budget
generosity of the United States.”842 Furthermore, the U.S. suspected that the move was part of an
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internal power battle between the army, whose influence had suffered during García’s APRA
government, and the National Police.843 Given the necessity to defeat the leftist insurgents,
Fujimori sided with the army whose officials took over several key posts in the Ministry of the
Interior. While the U.S. was sympathetic towards a greater involvement of the army, they
lamented that “the president has purged a number of honest and capable police officers.”844 On
top of that, Ambassador Quainton highlighted that “these changes have interrupted close working
relationships between mission elements and Peruvian police counterparts” and that it was
inevitable that “our narcotics program will be slowed down at least temporarily as new
relationships are formed.”845 Yet, the ambassador remained cautiously optimistic: “We do not
doubt Fujimori’s commitment to program objectives which appear to generally match our own.
(…) With the carrot of U.S. military assistance in the offing, we could well end up with an
integrated approach, which makes major inroads into narcoterrorism in a way which we can fully
support.”846 Subsequent developments show that the ambassador’s optimism was justified.
On March 26, 1991, Peru’s Air Force decided to intervene in the UHV to protect Peru’s
airspace from the “free and illegal use” of drug traffickers, flying coca leaves and cocaine paste to
neighboring Colombia. In doing so, Peru was fulfilling a central operational goal of the U.S.
counter-narcotics strategy.847 In May 1991, the United States and Peru concluded a so-called
umbrella agreement about their future anti-narcotics cooperation. While the agreement committed
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Peru to a security-heavy fight against the drug trade, it did not oblige the country to carry out
forced eradication of coca.848 Yet, coca growers from the UHV heavily protested the agreement,
arguing that substitution and eradication were the same while defending their ancient right to
grow coca.849
Parallel to the security-heavy operational orientation, in the early and mid-1990s Peru’s
government enacted a series of legal changes, which, in line with the 1988 Convention,
criminalized a new set of drug-related activities, and elevated the country’s penalties to new
heights. In the first year of his presidency, the country’s Congress granted the Executive
permission to reform Peru’s criminal code (CC) within a period of 90 days, a timeframe that was
extended for another 60 days in February 1991. The new CC, which was enacted by the
Legislative Decree 635 on April 3, 1991, included seven articles on drug-related crimes. These
articles penalized the promotion and favoring of illicit drug trafficking with eight to 15 years of
prison, while aggravated forms of trafficking (such as the abuse of public office, the promotion of
drugs in educational establishments and by medical professionals, the use of minors, etc.) were
penalized with no less than 15 years.850 In 1993, Law 26,223 increased the sentencing range for
aggravated forms to no less than 25 years, and introduced perpetual prison for heads of criminal
organizations or when financing terrorist activities.851
The 1991 CC also included an article on micro-commercialization and micro-production,
which was set to be penalized with two to eight years of prison, or one to four years if the
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distribution of small amounts of drugs was to the final consumer.852 Law 26,320 from 1994
clarified what constituted a small amount: 100 grams of cocaine paste, 25 grams of powder
cocaine, 200 grams of marijuana or 20 grams of its derivatives.853
The Legislative Decree 736 from 1991 added two further crimes to the CC: the
laundering of assets stemming from the drug trade or terrorism (penalized with six to twelve
years) and the investment, sale, pledge, transfer or possession of gains, things or goods stemming
from the drug trade (penalized with five to ten years).854 Decree Law 25,428 of 1992 increased
penalties for both crimes to a range of ten to 25 years for money laundering and eight to 18 years
for the latter.855 A year later, Law 26,223 elevated the penalties for drug-related money
laundering to perpetual prison. The same law added the compulsive cultivation of coca plants and
opium poppies as a new crime, also penalized with perpetual prison.856 In 1994, Law 26,332
criminalized the commercialization and cultivation of opium poppies (without compulsion) with
penalties of eight to 15 years, or two to eight years if the amount of plants did not exceed 100.857
While the criminalization of new drug-related activities corresponds with Peru’s
international commitments, following the instructions of the 1988 Convention, the comparatively
high penalties (see chapter V) stand well in line with Fujimori’s security-heavy policy against
international drug trafficking and were praised by U.S. officials as an important tool in deterring
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traffickers.858 However, Peruvian officials also used the high penalties to deflect from weaker
elements of their laws. When Fujimori’s top advisor on security issues and head of Peru’s
intelligence agency, Vladimiro Montesino’s, was criticized by U.S. officials for the obstruction of
money laundering investigations, as well as the suspension of a reporting requirement on cash
transactions, he argued “somewhat illogically” that Peru’s money laundering laws were the most
stringent in South America and did not need any change.859
At the same time, the symbolically high penalties also allowed the president to profile
himself as a hardliner against crime and terrorism, which resonated with Peru’s public. Apart
from increasing the sanctions for drug-related crimes, during his first and second terms Fujimori
also introduced the death sentence for terrorism and treason against the nation, as well as lifelong
prison for kidnapping, and increased penalties for stealing and robberies up to a range of three to
25 years of prison.860
Peru’s commitment to the “war on drugs” was not only expressed in legal and operational
changes but also in several performance criteria that were important to the U.S. In 1991, the U.S.
State Department highlighted the dismantling of 151 cocaine base laboratories as well as the
destruction of coca seedbeds, representing 15,000 hectares of mature coca.861 Furthermore, the
U.S. embassy reported a 70 percent increase in total cocaine seizures (base and HCL) for the
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period from August 1990 to July 1991, in comparison to August 1989 to July 1990.862 Yet,
relations between Peru and the U.S. remained shaky. While U.S. officials in Peru were impressed
by Fujimori’s commitment and accomplishments, the State Department lamented “an unclear
sense of Peruvian narcotics policy,” mainly due to suspected corruption within Peru’s police and
army.863 Furthermore, the accusation of human rights abuses of the armed forces raised questions
within Congress of whether or not Peru qualified for U.S. aid. This led to an intervention of U.S.
deputy secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, lobbying to approve further aid to Peru. Apart
from praising Peru’s efforts to improve the human rights situation, he highlighted the need to
support Peru’s anti-narcotics efforts: “There should be no misunderstanding: more cocaine will
enter the U.S. if aid to Peru does not go forward.”864
While the pro-aid forces within the U.S. government eventually succeeded, Fujimori’s
1992 “self-coup” in which he closed Congress, suspended the constitution, and fired parts of the
judiciary, put a temporary end to several U.S. aid programs, including military cooperation.865 At
the same time, Ambassador Quainton kept praising Fujimori’s commitment to the “war on drugs”
and other areas of U.S. interest: “President Fujimori met our traditional concerns on several
fronts. Without any support or assistance from us he moved the Air Force into the Huallaga
Valley to take control of airfields. He instituted tough penalties for human rights violators and
moved with especial vigor against the two terrorist movements plaguing the country.”866
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In the second half of the 1990s, especially after Peru permitted the eradication, U.S.
evaluations became even more euphoric. In 1998, Ambassador Jett stressed:
The GOP has registered unprecedented CN success in the last 18 months (…).
-- Through sustained successful counterdrug interdiction, most importantly as a result of
the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) and Peruvian National Police (PNP) Airbridge Denial
Program, Peru has kept the price of coca below a break-even point, effectively
eliminating coca as a competitive cash crop for the majority of Peru’s farmers;
-- As a result, alternative development, for the first time in this region, became a viable
means of convincing farmers to abandon coca and cultivate licit crops;
-- The GOP’s integrated counternarcotics strategy, which targets coca reduction through a
combination of interdiction, eradication and alternative development has produced an
amazing reduction of 40 percent over the last two year in Peru’s total coca cultivation,
(…).867

U.S. officials also lauded the creation of a new government agency responsible for
demand reduction called Commission to Fight Against Drug Consumption (“Comisión de Lucha
Contra el Consumo de Drogas”).868 In 1998, the head of the new agency, Health Minister Costa
Bauer, even committed Peru to fully eliminate coca cultivation within ten years.869 In line with
Costa Bauer’s announcement, in 1998 and 1999, Peru stepped up its eradication efforts. While in
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1996 Peru merely eradicated 1,259 hectares, in 1998 this number rose to 7,834. In 1999, the
country eradicated a total 14,733, leading to a 66 percent reduction in illicit coca cultivations.870
While it is evident that Peru depended on U.S. support to move beyond its difficult
economic situation, the above paragraphs also show that Peru’s commitment to the “war on
drugs” was strongly driven by domestic incentives. Since the late 1970s, cheap loans, a new
highway, promises of infrastructure development, and available land attracted many landless
peasants from Peru’s sierra to move to the UHV. After an initial boom in agricultural production,
prices for the UHV’s traditional crops dropped sharply. On top of that, the destruction of
infrastructure by insurgent groups made it harder for farmers to sell their products outside the
valley. As a result, many of them shifted to coca, which promised a more stable income. The
growing repression of the drug trade in Colombia reinforced this tendency, incentivizing
traffickers to purchase coca leaves or cocaine paste from the UHV and fly them back to
Colombia, thereby transforming the UHV into a center of cocaine trafficking operations.871 In the
early 1990s, even media outlets that were cognizant of the coca growers’ difficult economic
situation, like the center-left newspaper “La República, reported about catastrophic conditions in
the UHV where drug traffickers were imposing an order based on violence and terror.872 Even
without U.S. pressure, a growing concern about the expansion of the drug trade in Peru, and
specifically the increasingly unstable situation in the UHV provided a strong imperative for
action (incentives D1 and D3). At the same time, important domestic actors such as the armed
forces and the police incorporated the fight against drug trafficking into their core missions and
870
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defended the need to fight drug traffickers both publicly and internally (incentive D2). After the
defeat of the leftist insurgents, combating drug traffickers became even more important.
Furthermore, officials from all branches of the government benefitted from the repressive system,
which allowed them to collect bribes and payoffs. The most famous case is the one of Vladimiro
Montesinos (see above), who accepted bribes of up to $550,000 from drug traffickers and whose
numerous corruption scandals facilitated Fujimori’s resignation from Japan.873
An episode from the year 1994, illustrates why Peru’s domestic context was at least as
important as U.S. pressure. In May, the United States unilaterally, and without prior notice,
withdrew their radar and intelligence support for the supervision of air traffic between the UHV
and Colombia. According to media reports, legal experts from the State Department had raised
concerns that U.S. support was violating international law, given that Peru’s Air Force had a
mandate to shoot down planes using the airspace illegally in order to deter drug traffickers.874 The
U.S. withdrawal, which was reversed several weeks later, caused a wave of public outcry not only
among the Air Force, but voices from multiple side of Peru’s pollical spectrum.875 Hence, rather
than suspending an operation that was a key component of U.S. drug control strategy in the early
1990s, multiple Peruvian actors complained that they were left alone by the U.S.876 In April 2011,
the program was suspended second time, for over 18 months, after a Peruvian A-37B Dragonfly
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airplane shot down a Cessna 185, carrying U.S. missionaries.877 Despite this tragic incident,
which led to sharp accusations on both sides, the tight anti-narcotics cooperation between the two
countries continued during the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and the second
government Alan García (2006-2011).
9.6 Tied to Commerce: Drug Policy under Toledo (2001) and García (2006)
In 2001, the CIA predicted a potentially difficult relationship with either of the two front
runners of the 2001 election: Alejandro Toledo and Alan García.878 However, in the area of drug
policy the administrations of Toledo (2001-2006) and García (2006-2011) acted mostly in line
with U.S. interests. Both governments carried out moderate reforms to Peru’s legal framework on
drugs. These reforms criminalized a new set of activities related to the laundering of illegal assets
and trade with precursor chemicals. While the new laws slightly lowered the penalties for highprofile drug-related crimes, they tightened penalties for micro-trafficking. On the operational
side, both governments intensified the campaigns of eradicating illicit coca crops.
The first legal change materialized in 2002 when the country’s Congress approved a new
law on money laundering, which was a high priority to the U.S.879 While law 27,765 lowered
penalties for drug-related money laundering from perpetual prison to 25 years, it criminalized a
series of money-laundering activities, which sought to facilitate their persecution.880 Most
importantly, it enacted a reporting requirement on cash transactions, which had been suspended
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under Fujimori.881 In the same year, the government reformed the CC’s article on microcommercialization and micro-production of drugs (Art. 298). While it maintained the same
sentencing scale of (of two to eight years, and one to four years if drug sales were to the final
consumer), it added that aggravated forms were to be punished with six to twelve years of prison,
thereby allowing judges to penalize certain types of micro-trafficking more severely. It also
reduced the quantities of how much constituted a small amount: 50 grams of cocaine paste, 25
grams of powder cocaine, five grams of opiates, and 80 grams of marijuana or 20 grams of its
derivatives.882
A year later, Peru’s Congress enacted a more comprehensive drug-law reform. Law
28,002 re-codified the CC’s section on illegal drugs and lowered some of the penalties for drugrelated crimes. Art. 296 on the promotion and favoring of illicit drug trafficking (which continued
to be penalized with eight to 15 years) now included two further crimes with lower sentencing
scales: the possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking (penalized with six to twelve years)
and illicit commerce with the organic raw materials of drugs (penalized with five to ten years). A
new article (296 [a]) penalized the commercialization and cultivation of opium poppies and
marijuana with eight to 15 years. However, the new law reduced penalties to a range of six to ten
years if the commerce was with seeds, and two to six years if the criminal agent was growing less
than 100 plants. At the same time, the law foresaw a penalty range of 25 to 30 years if the
criminals obligated others to cultivate drugs by violence or threat. While the penalization of
aggravated forms of trafficking remained very high (15 to 25 years and 25 to 35 years for heads
of criminal organizations and the financing of terrorist groups) the sentencing scale was
significantly lower than the previous one (see above). Ultimately, the new article 298 on micro881
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commercialization and micro-production adjusted the sentencing scale to three to seven years,
including for drug sales to the final user, and six to ten years for aggravated forms.883 Almost
simultaneously, law 28,003 changed the name of Peru’s principal government agency to plan and
implement drug use prevention programs from Commission to Fight Against Drug Consumption
to National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (“Comisión Nacional para el
Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas,” DEVIDA).884
Two further changes in 2007 added several activities related to the illicit trafficking with
chemical precursors (penalized with five to ten years) and conspiring with others for the purpose
of trafficking (penalized with five to ten years) to the list of drug-related crimes.885 While the
above-stated changes significantly lowered the penalties for money laundering, aggravated forms
of drug trafficking, and forced cultivation, penalties for drug-related crimes remained among the
highest in the region (see table 9). This stands in line with Peru’s ongoing fight against illegal
coca cultivation, as well as drug production and trafficking, which continued during both
administrations. Most importantly, both governments continued the forced eradication of coca,
the most controversial element of Peru’s counter-narcotics approach. While the eradication of
6,436 hectares of coca in 2001 was much lower than in 1999 (14,733), in 2003 eradication levels
rose to 11,312 hectares. In 2006, the first year of Alan García’s second presidency, coca
eradication reached its highest point since 1999, with 12,688 hectares, and has not dropped lower
than 10,143 (in 2008) throughout his term.886 Despite the continuously high levels of coca
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eradication, illicit cultivation increased from 46,200 hectares in 2001 to 61,200 in 2010.887 While
this rise was driven by the aggressive eradication campaigns in Colombia, which incentivized
criminal networks to relocate coca production to Bolivia and Peru, the numbers highlight the
difficulty in containing coca growth at the regional level.
Once again, there is some evidence that Peru utilized its drug-control campaign to obtain
resourced from the U.S. In July 2003, President Toledo met with U.S. Ambassador John
Caulfield to request U.S. assistance to combat “narcoterrorism.” In particular, he asked for
technological assistance in tracking remaining SL guerillas; financial support for a joint counternarcotics intelligence center in Pucallpa, northeast of Lima and close to Peru’s border with Brazil;
and the opportunity for Peruvian officials to participate in a high-level crisis management
simulation.888
At the same time, Ponce makes a strong case that Peru’s continuity in drug policy was
driven by trade incentives.889 In 2002, U.S. Congress approved the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which was even more ambitious than its predecessor ATPA,
increasing the number of products exempt from tariffs from 5,600 to 6,300.890 The timing of the
new treaty coincided with the deepening of Peru’s export-oriented development model, which led
to the negotiation of 19 free trade agreements since 2005.891 The center piece of Peru’s export-
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centered development strategy was a free trade agreement with the United States, which was
signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2009. As highlighted by the embassy’s chargé d’affairs,
Richard Brown, in an interview with “El Comercio” in 2003, advances in trade relations between
the two countries were intimately tied to progress in Peru’s drug control efforts. In the same
interview, he pointed out that Peru was lagging behind U.S. expectations on coca eradication.892
While the prospect of U.S. aid and trade benefits are key to explain the continuity of
Peru’s drug policy, the domestic context also proved favorable. Although “El Comercio” reported
about the involvement of some remaining SL forces in trafficking activities, the threat of renewed
large-scale terrorist violence had largely diminished.893 Hence, eradicating coca did not carry the
same risks as in the 1990s, when SL forces controlled large portions of the UHV. Furthermore,
media reports continued to portray drug trafficking as a grave social problem that was not
adequately controlled by the state.894 Part of the reporting focused on new trafficking routes from
Peru to Chile, which led to the arrest of 324 Peruvian traffickers in the Chilean border town
Arica.895 On top of that, articles from “El Comercio,” informed about sharp rises of drug sales and
consumption in Lima.896 Ultimately, public opinion data indicated a strong dissatisfaction of
Peru’s population with problems related to crime control, drug trafficking, and drug consumption
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According to a 2002 opinion poll carried out by “El Comercio” to estimate how citizens of Peru’s
capital Lima perceived state responses to various policy issues, 66 percent of the subjects
responded that the control of criminal activities had gotten worse.897 In a similar poll, conducted
in 2007, 55 percent of the respondents stated that crime control had gotten worse under García’s
government.898 This coincides with data from Latinobarómetro, which underlined the worsening
perception regarding crime and drugs. In the years from 2001 to 2011, between 65.7 to 78 percent
of the subjects responded that the problem of crime had increased “a lot.”899 In the years 2001 and
2002, 71.7 percent and 57.3 percent, respectively, responded that drug addiction had increased “a
lot.”900 Ultimately, in 2001, 82.8 percent responded that the problem of drugs in Peru was “very
serious.”901 In 2001, public opinion data also revealed support for U.S. drug-control policies.
When asked how they thought the United States dealt with the problem of drug addiction, 23
percent of the subjects responded “very good” and 30 percent “rather good,” as compared to only
7.8 percent who responded “very bad” and 10.1 percent who responded rather bad.902
The above analysis underlines that even though the United States can be considered the
architect of the failed supply control policy, Peru’s domestic context was favorable to the
continuation of repressive drug interdiction and coca eradication. The presidency of Ollanta
Humala (2011-2016) provides further evidence of how deeply engrained this approach is within
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Peru’s government bodies and institutional cultures, despite the overwhelming evidence that
prohibition is not working.
9.7 Full-Blown Enforcement Under Humala (2011-2016)
For those critical of forced coca eradication and repressive drug interdiction, the election
of Ollanta Humala in 2011 offered a glimmer of hope. The former army officer, who has been
described as a leftist nationalist, appointed one of the country’s most prominent critics of the “war
on drugs” and former advisor of coca growers, Ricardo Soberón, as head of DEVIDA. During his
tenure, Soberón aspired to give the agency a more important role in designing and implementing
drug policy, next to the police and the military, and redefine the country’s cooperation with the
U.S. On the operational side, his main objectives were to strengthen police and intelligence
investigations against large-scale trafficking organizations; efforts against money laundering;
controls of the supply chains of chemical precursors used for drug production; alternative
development; and prevention and rehabilitation of drug user, rather than criminal prosecution.903
As one of his first measures, Soberón announced a stop of Peru’s coca eradication program for an
indefinite time to reexamine its utility.904 Several opposition leaders, as well as the previous head
of DEVIDA, Ricardo Vega LLona, immediately attacked the measure as irresponsible.905 Only a
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week after the suspension, the minister of the interior and former army officer, Oscar Valdés,
announced that the country had resumed its eradication efforts.906
Soberón’s limitations as head of DEVIDA became explicit in leaked communications
with the National Confederation of Farmers from Coca-Growing Basins of Peru (“Confederación
Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras del Perú,” CONPACCP). In a
meeting with the group Soberón stated: “I am not naïve to think that everything that I think about
coca and the drug trade will be incorporated into the road map of the new government, but if I do
not receive support my presence will not be useful.”907 In an e-mail to CONPACCP members he
outlined that even as head of DEVIDA he could not always detain the “violent” eradication of
coca crops. Moreover, he clarified that his range of action depended entirely on the country’s
prime minister, Salomón Lerner, and that he had no influence whatsoever on the actions of the
ministers of defense and the interior, Daniel Mora and Oscar Valdés.908
In the following, Soberón clarified publicly and before Congress that he would not
sabotage the national government’s policies and comply with its eradication strategy. While he
received public support from President Humala, members of the opposition accused him of
advancing a double discourse.909 In a cabinet reshuffle in late 2011, one of Soberón’s few
supporters, prime minister Salomón Lerner, was forced to leave the administration and replaced
by the former minister of the interior, Oscar Valdés. Due to fundamental disagreements between
906
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Soberón and Valdés about the strategic orientation of DEVIDA, as well as the issue of forced
eradication, on January 10, 2012, Soberón resigned less than six months after he took over the
post. He was replaced by Carmen Mesías, an expert on drug prevention, and supporter of forced
eradication.910 In an interview after his departure, Soberón expressed his frustration, claiming that
Peru’s drug policy was hijacked by ignorance, a lack of knowledge, and a concentration of
political, economic, and media interests. He also criticized his successor Carmen Mesías for
planning to concentrate DEVIDA’s efforts on rehabilitation and prevention, which would leave
interdiction, crop control, and eradication entirely in the hands of the police and the military.911
The brief tenure of Soberón as head of DEVIDA illustrates that the internalized and
institutionalized biases towards prohibition and repression present major obstacles for a policy
change, even at a time when the international context has become more favorable (see chapters
IV and V). Through the rest of Humala’s presidency coca eradication reached unprecedented
heights, rising from 10,290 hectares in 2011 to 35,868 in 2015, before dropping to 30,150
hectares in 2016.912 Peru’s eradication effort has led to a significant reduction of illicit coca crops
from an estimated 62,500 hectares in 2011 to 43,900 hectares in 2016. However, in the same
period coca cultivation in Colombia rose from 64,000 to 146,600 hectares, leading to a sharp net
increase of total illicit coca cultivation (from 155,600 to 213,000 hectares).913
Peru’s preference for prohibition and repression is not only reflected in the growing
numbers of eradicated coca but also recent legal changes and the number of drug-related arrests.
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In July 2013, Peru’s Congress enacted a reform of the CC to combat citizen insecurity. Law
30,076 denies the possibility to lower a penalty because of age, work or education, as well as
conditional liberty, for drug-related convicts, thus making it harder for them to go through a
process of rehabilitation.914 Furthermore, between 2008 and 2014, the prison population for drugrelated offenders rose 71 percent, from 11,304 to 19,329, thereby facilitating a sharp increase in
Peru’s total prison population from 43,466 to 70,813 (63 percent) in the same period.915
Although Peru’s law does not officially penalize the possession of drugs for personal
consumption, drug users constitute the highest number of drug-related arrests. Between 1995 and
2008, Peru’s police arrested 116,541 drug users, constituting approximately 70 percent of all
drug-related detentions (167,847).916 Between 2008 and 2013, Peru’s police arrested 43,515
consumers, 17,309 suspected micro-traffickers, and 17,568 drug trafficking suspects.917 Although
most drug users do not get punished, they often spend some days, or, in some cases, several
weeks or months in prison until their status is cleared.918 These numbers indicate that at a time
when several countries in the region have softened some aspects of their drug policies, Peru has
deepened its prohibitionist model. This raises the question, why, different to other countries, Peru
has not been able to leave behind policies, which have not detained drug trafficking,
consumption, and the illicit cultivation of coca, while fostering a prison population that is well
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beyond the country's capacities.919 The following section offers some answers and explains why,
even after the country’s surprising legalization of cannabis-based medicines in 2017, a break with
the prohibitionist policy model is unlikely to happen in the near future.
9.8 The Legalization of Cannabis-Based Medicines and Future Outlook
The above analysis has shown that domestic actors and incentives drove Peru’s path
towards prohibition at least as much as international pressures. The country’s domestic context
also helps to explain why the country appears to be reluctant to move beyond prohibition, despite
the approach’s evident failure and the rising prominence of harm reduction as an alternative
policy framework. As outlined above, the police and the armed forces in particular not only
benefit from prohibition but incorporated the fight against drugs into their core missions.
Changing this culture of prohibition will require political will and leadership. However, such
leadership would not only have to overcome institutional and cultural obstacles, but also faces the
prospect of strong public opposition. Data from a 2015 survey conducted by the think tank
“Asuntos del Sur” underlines why significant changes towards harm reduction are unlikely.
First, only 16 percent of the respondents thought that police interventions and persecution
of drug users were not an effective policy. In the region of Latin America (represented by
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay) an
estimated 40 percent believed that this policy was not effective. Second, while 37 percent of the
region believed that military interventions were not effective to reduce drug trafficking, in Peru
only 16 percent thought that military interventions not effective. Third, 23 percent of Peruvian
respondents believed that drug production should be legal or not punishable, 20 percent thought
that commerce with drugs should be legal or not punishable, and 27 percent believed that drug
consumption should be legal or not punishable. In Colombia, the region’s largest cocaine
919
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manufacturer, these numbers were much higher: 43 percent, 39 percent, and 44 percent,
respectively. In the entire region, 33 percent, 27 percent and 38 percent were in favor of
legalizing or not punishing drug production, commercialization, and consumption.920
The study also reveals conservative attitudes regarding the use and possible legality of
marijuana. On a scale from 1 to 5, representing complete disapproval (1) and complete approval
(5) of marijuana legalization, Peru’s approval was 2.33, significantly lower than the regional
average of 2.83. On another 1 to 5 scale, Peru’s approval of Uruguay’s specific project of
marijuana legalization was 2.08, while the region’s approval was 2.33. Even the approval of
therapeutic uses of marijuana was comparatively low. On a 1 to 10 scale, Peru’s approval was
3.84, while the region’s approval was 6.52.921
Hence, many observers were surprised, when in November 2017 the country established
a regulatory framework for medical and scientific investigations, as well as the import, and
possible national production, of cannabis-based medicines.922 The episode reveals important
insights about how flexibilizations of drug policies can happen even in a domestic context that
appeared to be highly unfavorable.
The path towards the legalization of medical marijuana began with a police raid of a
clandestine marijuana laboratory in Lima’s neighborhood San Miguel. However, instead of drug
traffickers seeking to make gains from selling psychoactive substances, the laboratory was run by
a group of mothers producing cannabis oil and other medicines for their children suffering from
diseases as diverse as epilepsy, autism, Parkinson, cancer, fibromyalgia, and multiple sclerosis.
These mothers, many of whom told the media how cannabis-based medicines helped to ease their
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children’s suffering had no possibility of accessing these medications legally and thus began
producing them on their own.923
The incident received wide media coverage and attention from the public, which sided
almost unanimously with the mothers, who were facing penal persecution. In the following, the
collective “Buscando Esperanza” (Searching for Hope) to which the mothers belonged began a
public campaign, not only to protest the harsh treatment they received from the police but also to
press for the legalization of cannabis-based medicines.924 The mothers received immediate
support from other civil society groups, even from some with a strong prohibitionist agenda.
Peru’s Center of Information and Education for the Prevention of Drug Abuse stated that
although cannabis has no curative powers, its medicines help to alleviate suffering from
degenerative diseases.925 On February 12, only a few days after the raid, the head of the
Commission of Health from Peru’s Congress invited the Minister of Health to speak in front of
the Commission about the potential benefits of medical marijuana.926 Soon after, Peru’s Ministry
of Health created a committee to evaluate the use of such medicines in Peru.927 Within the same
month, the country’s executive sent a legislative proposal to Peru’s Congress, authorizing the
import, commercialization, and use of cannabis-based medicines. The executive also stated that it

923

Perú 21, “San Miguel: Descubren laboratorio clandestino de marihuana,” 8 de febrero de 2017,
https://peru21.pe/lima/san-miguel-descubren-laboratorio-clandestino-marihuana-63751.
924

Perú 21, “Convocan marcha para legalizar uso medicinal de la marihuana,” 9 de febrero de 2017,
https://peru21.pe/lima/convocan-marcha-legalizar-medicinal-marihuana-63835.
925

La República, “Cedro se mostró de acuerdo con legalización de la marihuana con fines medicinales,” 9
de febrero de 2017, https://larepublica.pe/sociedad/846993-cedro-se-mostro-de-acuerdo-con-legalizacionmedicinal-de-la-marihuana.
926

La República, “Congreso citará a ministra de salud por uso medicinal del cannabis,” 12 de febrero de
2017, https://larepublica.pe/politica/847836-congreso-citara-ministra-de-salud-por-uso-medicinal-de-lamarihuana.
927

Perú 21, “Minsa crea comité para evaluar uso medicinal de marihuana en el Perú,” 16 de febrero de
2017, https://peru21.pe/lima/minsa-crea-comite-evaluar-medicinal-marihuana-peru-64263.

314

was considering a new law allowing the production of medical marihuana in Peru, two years after
the original law’s implementation.928
Between February and July 2017, the Commission of Public Health of Peru’s Congress
received two further proposals, one from the opposition party “Frente Amplio” and another one
from the governing party “Peruanos Por el Kambio.” While the first included the right to selfcultivate, the latter included a proposition to cultivate marihuana and produce cannabis-based
medicines on national territory so that patients would not have to pay expensive imported
medicines.929 Peru’s legislators eventually decided to discuss and vote on the latter project.
In the meanwhile, DEVIDA expressed publicly its support for medical marijuana, as long
as its import, production, and use would be under strict control.930 Furthermore, two well-known
personalities from Peru’s television started to speak out in favor of medical marihuana telling the
country’s Congress and public how they depended on cannabis-based medicines, thereby giving
the movement additional strength.931 On October 19, 2017, Peru’s Congress almost unanimously
voted in favor of the new law, with 66 votes in favor, three abstentions, and only four against.932
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While the passing of the law was celebrated as a major, and unexpected, flexibilization of
Peru’s legislative framework on drugs, the law also received strong criticisms from the groups
that initiated the process. First, even before the law was passed collective’s like “Buscando
Esperanza” criticized and protested against the denial of the right to self-cultivate and produce
cannabis-based medicines on their own. However, several members of Congress dismissed their
proposal, arguing that the right to self-cultivate would make the drug more accessible to the
country’s youth.933 Second, the original law only allowed the import, production, and use of
cannabis-based medicines whose content of marijuana’s psychoactive ingredient THC was less
than 0.5 percent. However, effective treatment for certain chronical diseases requires a THC
content of at least 8.5 percent.934 After several meetings and negotiations between the Ministry of
Health and representatives from civil society, in October 2018 the Ministry conceded that the
THC content should be determined by the doctor. This agreement was set to become part of the
government regulation implementing the new law.935
In February 2019, Peru’s government finally issued a regulation, which shall put Law
30,681 into practice. According to the document, both pharmacies seeking to sell cannabis-based
medicines, as well as patients seeking to use them have to subscribe to a national register,
showing some resemblances to the Uruguayan model.936

933

Esteban Acuña, “Madres de ‘Buscando Esperanza’ exigen autocultivo para conseguir cannabis
medicinal,” Perú 21, 24 de septiembre de 2019, https://peru21.pe/peru/marihuana-medicinal-madresbuscando-esperanza-piden-dejar-produccion-manos-asociaciones-cultivo-377330.
934

Jésica León, “Cannabis medicinal: controversia por reglamento que regulará su uso,” La República, 21
de mayo de 2018, https://larepublica.pe/sociedad/1246333-cannabis-medicinalcontroversia-reglamentoregulara.
935

Jésica León, “Cannabis medicinal: Minsa y colectivos logran acuerdo,” La República, 5 de octubre de
2018, https://larepublica.pe/sociedad/1331729-cannabis-medicinal-minsa-colectivos-logran-acuerdos.
936

Melina Ccoillo, “Tras larga lucha de colectivos, sale el reglamento que de ley del cannabis,” La
República, 24 de febrero de 2019, https://larepublica.pe/sociedad/1419163-larga-lucha-colectivos-salereglamento-ley-cannabis.

316

The above reconstruction of the process towards Peru’s legislation and regulation of
cannabis-based medicines shows that in the present era, the drug-policy field in South America
has become increasingly complex and flexible. Even in one of the region’s most prohibitionist
countries, under certain conditions, surprising policy modifications are possible. The use of police
force against mothers seeking to alleviate the pain of their sick children, illustrated the limitations
of marijuana prohibition in a way that resonated with most of society in a short time, compelling
the government to act in unprecedented ways (corresponding to incentive D3). While the
advocacy of multiple civil society actors as well as the overall public support for the reform were
important (incentives D1 and D2), it is highly unlikely that the law would have materialized and
received such broad support without the incident.
While some activists have expressed hope that the regulation of the medical marijuana
market will eventually lead to a wider reform, including the legalization of recreational
marijuana, the above-detailed process also underlines that there are strong levels of resistance,
which are likely to prevent this from happening in the near future.937 First, the initial reluctance to
include medicines with THC levels higher than 0.5 percent shows that, apart from alcohol, coca,
and tobacco, the consumption of psychoactive substances for recreational purposes is still a taboo
in Peru. Second, different to Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, Peru’s patients are not allowed to selfcultivate cannabis plants. This denial remains a topic of controversy and has led ongoing protests
of pro-cannabis groups.938 On top of that, Peru’s social movement for the legalization of cannabis
does not appear to have the same force as the ones in Uruguay and Ecuador. While in Quito
cannabis activists occupy houses, hold cultural events and workshops, and interact frequently
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with the policy community, Peru’s biggest organization “Legaliza Perú” is mostly active in the
digital sphere. Ultimately, the institutional obstacles of a highly prohibitionist culture across
several government bodies will be hard to overcome. Even though Peru’s National Strategy to
Fight Against Drugs for 2017-2021, elaborated by DEVIDA and approved by the country’s
Council of Ministers, included the reduction of harms and risks of drug use as one of its multiple
goals, the area of prevention and treatment, in which harm reduction is located, received the least
financial support, representing only 4.3 percent of Peru’s drug policy budget.939 Furthermore, the
document promotes a strong prohibitionist discourse, and emphasizes primarily the control of
drug supplies, which represents more than half of budget. If funds for alternative development
and the fight against terrorism are added to supply control, where they technically belong, the
area covers 91.2 percent of Peru’s budget.940 It will be fascinating to observe if Peru’s social
movements for the legalization of cannabis will be able impact the country’s public opinion as
well as policy makers in any significant ways. Furthermore, it will be interesting to follow if the
sale of cannabis-based medicines will have any impact on how Peruvians view the recreational
use of marijuana.
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X. CONCLUSION
The above case studies not only analyzed diverse policy choices, but also displayed multiple
processes that have led to these outcomes. As highlighted in each of the chapters, these processes
were shaped by specific constellations of domestic and international incentives, the preferences of
actors in positions to affect policy choices, and several other factors related to the political
cultures and systems, as well as the history of each country. Despite this multiplicity of factors,
the three cases illustrate five tendencies and resemblances, which contribute to a more complete
understanding of the drug policy field in South America. After outlining these trends in greater
detail, the present conclusion also discusses what this dissertation reveals about the effects of
international norms on policy choices. The conclusion ends with a brief outlook of the drug
policy field in South America and its interplay with international norms and developments.
First, especially the drug policy reforms from the early 1970s to the late 1990s were not
incentivized by actual policy problems, but driven by considerations about power, popularity,
material benefits, and international standing. Drug addiction was not a serious issue in any of the
three cases and international trafficking became a problem once it started to look bad on the
countries’ reputation or caught the attention of the U.S. Furthermore, joining the “war on drugs”
promised unprecedented access to training and resources, especially for the countries’ police units
and armed forces. Ultimately, although public opinion was not a driving force of drug law
reforms, criminalizing more drug-related activities and enacting higher penalties appeared to
resonate with large segments of the population, which was exposed to strong prohibitionist
discourses in important media outlets. In the present era, drug policies that respond to actual
drug-related challenges, or the perception of such problems, are more common. Yet, the framing
of the issue as well as the design and implementation of policies are still embedded in powerbased calculations, seeking to enhance the popularity of governments rather than finding adequate
long-term solutions. The biggest exception is Uruguay’s 2013 decision to legalize recreational
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marijuana, which most Uruguayans rejected. However, the country’s decision makers also viewed
the reform as an opportunity to increase the Uruguay’s international prestige.
Second, in all three countries important domestic actors and high-level government
officials supported prohibitionist drug policies. Although given the global spread of prohibition
this is hardly surprising, it nevertheless contradicts the popular notion that the “war on drugs” was
a U.S. imposition and that South American countries were victims of external policy models on
which they had no influence. The case studies, as well as chapter V, show that South American
governments did not only have significant agency in how they implemented prohibition, but also
promoted the repression and punishment of drug-related activities domestically and
internationally. The establishment of ASEP in the 1970s is particularly relevant in this regard. In
the early stages of the “war on drugs” the meetings surrounding this regional agreement could
have served as a forum to discuss and formulate alternative policies. However, South American
diplomats engaged in the same security-heavy rhetoric and suggested repressive policies, which
helped transforming the “war on drugs” from a figure of speech into a hopeless fight against a
highly lucrative, adaptable, and violent criminal industry.
The focus on South American agency, both in the implementation of prohibition as well
as the construction of the “war on drugs,” does not in any way seek to avert responsibility from
the U.S. As the case studies illustrate, U.S. support and leadership were, without a doubt,
necessary for the “war on drugs” to occur. However, to put prohibition into practice the U.S.
depended on the support of South American partners. While in some instances actors from the
region supported prohibition enthusiastically and unconditionally, at several moments,
governments denied or slowed down key U.S. proposals. Similarly, while in some instances the
U.S. was able to guarantee support through the provision of training, technology and the
financing of drug-control initiatives, in others South American actors asked the U.S. for help.
This demonstrates that the governments from the region had more control over the application
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and implementation of drug policies than is usually acknowledged. This reassessment of
responsibilities offers a recontextualization of the “war on drugs,” which helps to explain why the
region is far from overcoming prohibition in the present era, despite its evident failure and a
much more favorable international context for alternatives policies.
Third, the available data suggests that the United States was most successful in advancing
prohibition by manipulating the domestic incentive structures and offering preferential market
access. Although the threat of sanctions probably played into the considerations of South
American governments there is no evidence that fear of sanctions drove specific policy choices.
In fact, when the U.S. Congress considered Peru’s decertification in the 1990s, U.S. deputy
secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, explained to the chairman of the Senate’s Foreign
Relations Committee that cutting aid to Peru would be counterproductive and undermine U.S.
goals. Instead of sanctions, the U.S. exercised its influence by offering regular training courses
for police unites, the armed forces, and customs border patrol agents. Furthermore, in Peru the
U.S. explicitly offered financial and technological assistance in exchange for support of its
policies. As highlighted in the previous chapter, in some areas the resulting law exceeded U.S.
expectations. The linkage between market access and drug control policies was so successful that
even countries that were not initially included in the ATPA sought to impress the U.S.
government by taking on a leadership role in the fight against drugs. Similarly, when the U.S.
offered trade incentives to Peru, the country started eradicating more coca than ever before, even
during governments that the U.S. viewed critically.
Fourth, while domestic incentives were important in both time frames analyzed in this
dissertation, international incentives are clearly less important in the current era. This is because
countries that deviate from prohibition, do not face the same political costs internationally as
before. At the same time, although harm reduction has become increasingly popular in recent
years, different to prohibition there is no international regime and no important state seeking to
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promote or even enforce the approach. Hence, harm reduction advocacy is driven primarily by
civil society, whose capacities to affect policy choices are more limited. This does not mean,
however, that international developments are unimportant. The global and regional debates about
drug policy have strong repercussions about how domestic advocacy groups and, to some extent,
government officials operate and formulate policy proposals. Furthermore, local advocacy groups
receive training, intellectual and, in some cases, financial support from actors like the DPA,
IDPC, and OSF. It is highly unlikely, that Uruguay’s marijuana legalization would have occurred
without strong international support. Transnational actors not only supported local NGOs but also
offered their expertise to the country’s parliament, government agencies, and the public, hence
providing the project with an aura of legitimacy.
Fifth, the success of local advocacy is strongly tied to specific political junctures that
offer windows of opportunity for policy flexibilizations. In Peru, the legalization of medical
marijuana can be directly linked to the raid of a clandestine laboratory that produced cannabisbased medicines for children suffering from degenerative diseases, which generated protests and
unprecedented levels of support for the victims of prohibitionist drug laws. In Uruguay, the arrest
of the 66-year old writer Alicia Castilla, who did not fit into the stereotypes often associated with
drug users, for growing marijuana plants at her home created a more favorable context for a
policy flexibilization. Furthermore, a series of unrelated killings, which shocked the citizens of
the small Southern Cone nation created a political climate, in which high-level government
officials were able to make a case, and convince President Mujica, that marijuana legalization
would help to reduce violence and the problems associated with criminal groups. Ultimately, in
Ecuador the 2007 election of Rafael Correa, who was not supported by any political party but a
broad coalition of social movements, allowed civil society groups to place the decriminalization
of drug use and harm reduction on the political agenda. What these episodes have in common is
that the timing of advocacy is crucially important. While the same arguments and policy
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proposals may be dismissed under regular circumstances, they can present a viable alternative for
governments in exceptional situations. Hence, successful advocacy, be it from civil society or
within the government, needs to be able to read such opportunities and mobilize support quickly
if it wants its proposals to move forward.
After having outlined this dissertation’s findings about drug policy choices in South
America, the following paragraphs briefly discuss the most important lessons about the effects of
international norms. Most importantly, the three case studies confirm the assumption that norms,
as well as their advocacy and contestation, are influential primarily because they create and alter
incentives for governments to act according to their parameters. Almost all policy changes
analyzed in this dissertation responded to clear domestic or international incentives. The
government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017) even conducted a 180 degree turn in drug policy after
the domestic incentive structure had changed. The only exception was Ecuador’s 1978 decision to
enact draconian and unprecedented penalties for drug-related offenses. This measure appeared to
reflect the personal preferences of the military government, which was already set to leave office
at the time of the decision. However, the decree was revoked just a few months later by an elected
civilian government and thus did not have a lasting impact.
Norm-based incentives were particularly important when norm-following overlapped
with the interests of powerful international actors, such as the United Sates or representatives of
the IDCR. Such actors could pressure governments by offering or denying material benefits, or
elevating and undermining their international standing. At the same time, domestic power
holders, such as the police, the ministry of the interior, or the armed forces also exercised
important leverage over policy decisions. Moreover, international norms have critical
repercussions on public opinion. Although the advance of prohibitionist drug policies did not
emerge from concrete public demands, the repetition of strong prohibitionist discourses for
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several decades helps explain why most South American citizens view policies tolerating drug
use critically.
The above-outlined support for the assumption that drug policy reforms responded
primarily to incentives does not mean that the personal preferences of decision makers do not
matter. Especially individuals involved in the drafting of drug laws were able to insert their
preferences into the final text when the issue at stake was relatively depoliticized and not subject
to strong international or domestic pressure. For example, Uruguay’s 1974 decision to legalize
the possession of small amounts of drugs for personal consumption can be attributed directly to
the preferences of the individuals that drafted the law. The law professor, Dr. Adela Reta, was an
advocate of civil liberties and argued publicly that drug addiction was a disease and not a crime.
Although the issue was highly politicized and contested internationally, there was no opposition
to the argument that drug addicts should not be punished in Uruguay. However, even highly
politicized decisions can be affected by personal preferences. For example, Peru’s choice to
eradicate coca in the late 1970s was favored by anti-coca sentiments of the Peruvian elite and the
military government in power at the time. However, coca eradication was stopped temporarily
when the domestic context became less favorable. Personal preferences are even more important
to explain Uruguay’s 2013 decision to legalize recreational marijuana. Although the law
depended on a multiplicity of necessary conditions (see table 12), it is evident that Law 19,172
would not have materialized without the support of the highly popular president José Mujica, who
appears to have been genuinely convinced that a government-controlled regulation of the
marijuana market was a better alternative than prohibition.
Ultimately, international norms were often used as justifications for drug law reforms and
policy choices, even when the reasons for the reform were different. For example, in 1974 and
1990 Ecuador used international obligations as a justification for policy choices that were clearly
targeted to appeal to the U.S. Furthermore, after Uruguay’s government decided to regulate
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recreational marijuana to reduce the problems related to organized crime, in coordination with
civil society, it advanced a much broader discourse based on harm reduction, stressing multiple
benefits in the areas of health and security. This not only increased the law’s legitimacy but also
allowed the government to draw a connection to Uruguay’s tradition as a regulator of so-called
social vices.
Mujica’s portrayal of Uruguay as an innovator and potential model for others raises the
question if South American countries will adapt similar policy models in the near future. Since
Uruguay’s decision, the U.S. states of Alaska (2014), California (2016), Maine (2016),
Massachusetts (2016), Michigan (2018), Nevada (2016), Oregon (2014), as well as the inhabited
territories of Guam (2019) and Northern Mariana Islands (2018) legalized recreational marijuana.
Furthermore, in 2018 Canada has become the second country to fully legalize and regulate the
market for recreational marijuana. Most recently, the government of Mexico has expressed
interest in advancing a similar reform. However, so far, no other South American country has
shown signs of moving in that direction. There are several reasons why this is the case. Most
importantly, while high-profile politicians and public intellectuals have become important
advocates of harm reduction and marijuana legalization, public opinion has yet to follow.
Although the Uruguayan case has shown that advancing controversial drug policies is possible
despite public opposition, as highlighted above the project was possible because of a highly
complex set of causes, necessary conditions, and facilitating factors, which are extremely difficult
to replicated elsewhere. Although it is possible that other countries will encounter their own
political junctures that enable such reforms, the most decisive factor will be whether or not South
America’s public will become more favorable to tolerating the use of marijuana and other drugs
over time.
Marijuana legalizations in the U.S. show that long-term exposure to prohibitionist
discourses and practices is not necessarily an obstacle for changes in public opinion. Instead, it
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appears that once societies are more exposed to the use of marijuana, public opinion becomes
more favorable. As outlined in chapter VII, Uruguayans have become more supportive of
marijuana legalization after the law’s implementation, despite the fact that it has not yet
contributed to improve citizen security as the Mujica government originally envisioned.941 Yet,
rising levels of drug consumption can also lead to prohibitionist reflexes depending on the
government in place, framing by the media, and the preferences of important domestic actors. In
any case, given the increasingly favorable international context, it is likely that over time more
policy flexibilizations will materialize in one way or another. Furthermore, the rising prominence
of harm reduction provides domestic actors with new rhetorical resources and governments with
new options in dealing with their drug-related challenges that did not exist 30 years ago.
Although drug prohibition continues to be the most important norm in guiding policy choices in
South America, the framework now has a real competitor. It will be fascinating to observe how
this competition will play out in South America and elsewhere.
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